In the Lowest ftand the mere natural Agents, in animate and fenfelefs Creatures; to thefe God hath given certain Instincts and Inclinations, by which they are determinatly fwayed to thefe or thefe certain Effects and Operations, unless they are outwardly hindered: for heavy Bodies cannot chufe but defcend, Fire cannot chufe but burn, &c.

In the Second ftand the Senfitive Creatures, fourfooted Beafts, Fowls, and Fishes; to thefe God hath given Senfe and Knowlege to difcern what is Good for their Nature, and what is Bad; and amongst divers Goods to prefer that which is Beft. He hath given them alfo a free Appetite, or a kind of sensitive Will, by which they may either Freely profecute, or avoid fuch Objects as they like or mislike; not determinatly tyed to this or that certain Operatias the other were. A ftone cannot choose but defcend, but a beaft may as well go up hill as down, &c.

on,

In the upper form are Men, reasonable Creatures, whom God hath made more voluntary than the other, by giving them greater freedom of Choice, and prefenting unto their more elevated Knowlege a great variety of Objects. Now then, without doubt God diftinguished thus his Creatures in Abilities and Faculties, that they might operate in their feveral Kinds; that the natural Agents might work naturally, the Voluntary voluntarily, as that eloquent French-man Du Vain hath well explained this point. The truth of all this no Man will deny explicitly: Well then, let them hearken to the Confequences of this Truth, fo common both in Logic and Metaphyfics, among those who handle of natural and voluntary Causes. If God hath Decreed that many things fhould be done voluntarily by his Creatures, then alfo hath he Decreed that many things fhould be done contingently, in refpect of him; but the firft is granted truth, therefore the fecond fhould be. The Connexion I

prove thus. All things are done contingently in refpect of God, which for ought he hath Decreed might with as much poffibility not be as be: But all things which are done by the Creatures voluntarily, may as well not be done as done; therefore if he hath Decreed that many things fhould be done voluntarily, he hath alfo Decreed that they should be done contingently. The Minor is evident; because if the Creatures may not as well omit them as do them, they do them not voluntarily but neceffarily.

This Argument both confirms and explains our Opinion, fhewing how and why many things come to pals contingently in refpect of God; yea, it maketh it queftionlefs, that God hath Decreed that many things fhould be done contingently, or after fuch a refiftible manner, that they might without fruftrating his Decree have been left undone: yea, we fee now that contingency it felf is neceffary in respect of God's Will, who will have many things done voluntarily. Otherwife to what purpose did God give his Creatures Wills, if he will not fuffer them to use them?

See again the Inconveniencies of the former Opinion, which confoundeth all forts of Creatures, and makes a Man to operate with no more Freedom than a Stock or Stone. For according to our Oppofites, I eat, I drink, or walk with as much neneity, as Lead finketh down. God hath Decreed that that fhould fink, and therefore it must; and fo God hath Decreed that I muft walk a mile, and therefore I muft.

Here they have a starting hole, but it is so poor a one, that it doth not relieve but difgrace them. They fay, that God's Decree doth not compel any Man's Will to any thing, that he fhould do fuch a thing whether he will or no; but he fo difpofeth and worketh it, that it fhall defire that which God would have done. And therefore, they fay, Man hath use of his Will, because whatfoever he doth, Aaa 2

tha'

tho' neceffitated to it by God, yet he doth it willingly.

This Flim-flam would move any Man's patience, but I will be ferious. The prerogative of a voluntary Ageat confifteth not in doing that which it defireth to do, or rather in defiring to do that which it doth (for according to them, Man defireth the thing because it is to be done, yet it is not to be done because he defireth) in Freedom from Coaction and Violence; but in Liberty of Choice to do or not to do this or that, and fo in Freedom from the neceffity of Immutability. So that ftill for all this shift, they make Man no more Voluntary than a Stone. A Stone hath a natural Propenfion or kind of Appetite to fall downward, yet becaufe this Appetite is reftrained neceffarily to this Term, fo that the Stone muft needs fall down, it cannot be faid to defcend Voluntarily, in any propriety of fpeech. Is not this just a Man's cafe, according to them? A Man drinks, they grant he doth it voluntarily; yet they fay, his Will is fo reftrained by God's Decree to this Action, that it was not poffible for him to omit it. What difference is there now betwixt the Will of a Man, and the Will of a Stone, only that God employeth a Man in more actions, which altereth not the cafe? Surely if this be true, it was no wonder Deucalion and Pyrrha got Stones turned into Men fo faft.

This Argument doth fo entangle our Opposites, that altho' in the Question about particular Providence they are peremptory for the neceffity of all Events in refpect of God; yet when they come to the Question about Free-will, and more particularly in Free-will about natural Matters, as Walking, Sleeping, Riding, &c. they fpeak fo off and on, that one may plainly perceive how they have a Wolf by the Ears: Sometimes they do yield Free-will in fuch things, not confidering how they contradict what

they

they faid before about particular Providence; fomtimes they yield it, they fay, not so much because they yield it to be true, as because they will not contend about fuch petty matters; a very fleeveless put off! Somtimes they ftifly deny it, but they are unwilling or unable to produce any Arguments worth a rush.

That Opinion which makes God's Knowlege abfolutely Infinite, and most Glorifieth his Omnifciency, muft needs be better Divinity, than that which fupposeth by its confequence God's Knowlege to be but Finite. Now our Opinion doth the first, our Oppofites the second; therefore, the Minor Propofition I juftify thus. An abfolute Infinity in knowlege must be either in refpect of the number of Objects, or in refpect of the manner of comprehending them. Now according to their Opinion, in these respects God's Knowlege is but Finite; Ergo.

For the first Respect, to speak exactly, it cannot make knowlege completely Infinite; for feeing there cannot be an exact Infinite number of Objects, feeing that all things that ever were, or ever fhall be, cannot be truly Infinite in number; it is impoffible that any Knowlege whatfoever fhould be properly termed Infinite in this refpect. Yea, feeing the vastest number, and most incomprehenfible to our mortal Arithmetic, may in it felf be doubled and trebled, it is an infallible Truth, that any Knowlege in this regard may be trebled alfo, and yet remain Finite, if we fpeak not vulgarly or largely, but as in Metaphyfical Exquifitions. Well, come to the fecond Refpect, here also our Oppofites do much debate God's Knowlege, making it but Finite, and that not of the largest fort; for while they Teach that God hath Decreed how all things fhall Infallibly come to pafs, they require indeed of God an Infinite Power, whereby to execute his Decrees, but feeing all things.

fhall

fhall be effected as he hath Decreed they fhould, a finite Knowlege may well ferve the turn. What wonder is it if God Fore-knows what will be done, if he can but remember his own Decrees? It requireth indeed a large Memory, but not an infi nite Knowlege.

Suppofe a Man had but that Power to bring to pafs what he determined, it would be no ftrange matter if he could fore-tell future Events: He would make a hard fhift with his Hypomnemata, Regifters, and Records, and the Art of Memory, but he would remember what he had contrived fhould come to pass, in fuch and fuch a Country.

Wherefore in the fecond Refpect, viz. in the Manner of comprehending of things, they make the Divine Prefcience to be but Finite, whilft they Teach, that God knoweth how all things fhall come to pafs; because the fame Knowlege is the Caufe, by virtue of Decrees, of whatsoever fhall be effected in the World.

Now that our Opinion attributeth unto God a Knowlege exactly Infinite, and makes his Prescience more wonderful, will plainly appear. God, fay we, ab æterno, hath ordered that fuch Agents as he created Voluntarily, fhould have a double Liberty in their Operations, viz. a Liberty of Contradiction, to do, or not do; as a Painter may choose whether he will work or no and a Liberty of Contrariety, to do a thing after this or that manner; as a Painter may ufe what colors, in what quantity, after what fashi on, he pleaseth.

Now then, God leaving to his Creatures free Liberty. to work or not to work, after this or that manner, so that for any neceffity impofed upon their Actions by him, whatsoever they omit, was as pof. fible to be done, as what they did: And yet from all Eternity Fore-knowing whatfoever his Creatures would do, or not do, his Fore-knowlege must needs

be