2. They thought the Reafon of this Inevitableness of Events to be an unchangeable Connexion of natural Causes.

Our Oppofites flifly maintain the former of these Tenets. Now let the Reader obferve, that the most prodigious Abfurdities accompanying this Stoical Error, follow the first part of their Opinion, tho' feque ftred from the fecond. For if all things come to pafs unavoidably, what need I care what I do? yea, if I fhall care, I fhall care whether I will or no; and a thousand the like horrid Conceits follow the Opinion of the Neceffity of Events, whatsoever we make to be the Caufe of this Neceffity.

It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day, that all things are done unavoidably, and they with our Oppofites make God's Will to be the Caufe of his Unavoidableness; and therefore they judge of God's pleasure or difpleafure by the Events. Yet there is no Chriftian but abhorreth this Turcism, and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Maranatha.

Its too apparent therefore, that albeit our Adverfaries are true Chriftians, yet in this Point their Opinion is guilty by reafon of its Confequence, both of Stoicifm, and Turcifm.

Again, if we confider the second part of the Stoics Opinion, we shall perceive, that the Opinion which we confute cannot be minced, but that it will be complete Stoicifm. The Stoics thought the Connexion of Caufes to be the Caufe of the Neceffity of Events, its true; but what did they think to be the Connexion of Caufes? doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature, which they supposed to be a Deity. It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws, but whatsoever they meant by the Fates, its evident they made their Decrees to be the Caufe of the Connexion of Caufes. How often read we both in Philofophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta, Parcarum Le

ges,

ges, &c. Yea, the word Fatum it felf is as much as a Decree; as Edictum from Edicere, fo Fatum from Fari. Quid aliud eft Fatum quàm id quod Deus de unoquoque fatur? faith Minutius. Well then, to apply; Do not our Adverfaries in this point fup. pofe an Inviolable Linking of all things together, one neceffarily following in the neck of another? Do they not make the Cause of this Linking to be God's irrefiftible Decree? Do not they defend complete Stoicism? What part of Stoicifm do they disclaim? Do they not maintain Inevitable Neceffity; Do they not teach an indiffoluble Connexion of all things? Do they not believe the divine Decrees to be the Cause of this Connexion? Certainly they muft needs confefs themselves Stoics in this point, unlefs we will give them leave to grant the Premises, and deny the Conclufion. I know the Stoics had mif-conceits concerning the Deities, as accounting those to be Deities which are not, whofe Decrees they made the Canfes of all things; but they were the common Errors of Paganism, and are befides the point in hand: And truly these fet afide, I fee not wherein our Adverfaries differ from the Stoics. I have prosecuted this Argument more copioufly, because it includeth many others, I mean, all thofe which Scripture or Reason furnish us with, against the Error of the Stoics, and they are many; for I think verily, there are few Opinions which have a greater retinue of ridiculous and erroneous Confequences, than this of the unavoidable Neceffity of Events: Some of them may make one laugh, and fome of them may make one tremble. I omit the former, because they are obvious to every Man's conceit, and I would not willingly make fport of fo ferious a matter. Of the laft fort I will fpecify one in a fecond Argument.

That Opinion, which being admitted maketh God the Author of Sin, is grofs and erroneous, that I

may

may fay no worfe; but fo, I fpeak it with horror, doth the Opinion of our Oppofites. I know they are renowned Chriftians, and as they abhor Stoical Errors, fo they hold this damnable Doctrin (which is worse than ever any Heretic held, which tranfformeth God into a Devil) to be most accurfed: yet fo the cafe ftandeth, that as the Error of fatal Neceffity, fo this of the Canfe of Sin, fatally followeth their Opinion; which I prove thus.

They teach, that nothing is done in the World, nor can be done, but what God hath Decreed to be done. Now it's too certain, that three quarters of the things which are done in the World are Sins; therefore according to this Opinion, God is the principal Caufe of Sins, Devils and Men are but his Inftruments.

The ufual anfwer is, that God is the Cause of all the Actions that are Sinful, but not of the Sinfulness of the Actions; of all our Works, but not of our Obliquities and Imperfections: as one that rides upon a halting Jade is the Cause of his Motion, and yet not of his Halting.

It's a hard cafe when they have but one frivolous Distinction to keep God from Sinning: Might I here without wandring, difcourfe of the Nature of Sin, I could prove Sin it felf to be an Action, and confute this groundlefs Diftinction that way; but I will keep my self as much to the purpose as I can, and fo answer it thus, or rather confute it.

That which is a principal Cause of any Action, is a Caufe of thofe Events which accompany that Action neceffarily; This rule is most certainly true. Therefore if God by his Decrees do force us to those Actions which cannot be done without Sin, God himself, I am afraid to rehearse it, must needs be guilty of Sin. If God Decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden Fruit, feeing the eating of the Fruit which he had forbidden muft needs be

with

with a grofs Obliquity, I do not fee how this Diftination will justify God; for Adam finned becaufe he ate the Fruit that was forbidden; but they fay, God decreed that he should eat the Fruit which was forbidden, Neceffarily and Unavoidably. The Conclufion is too blafphemous to be often repeated.

The Reader may fee how well that common Distinction holdeth water, yea, if this Nicety were found, Man himfelf might prove, that he committed no Murder tho' he Stabbed the dead Party to the Heart; for at his Arraignment he might tell the Judge, that he did indeed thruft his Dagger into his Heart, but it was not that which took away his Life, but the Extinction of his natural Heat and vital Spirits. Who feeth not the wild Frenzy of him who fhould make this Apology; yet this is all our Adverfaries fay for God? They fay, his Decree was the 'Cause that Adam took the fruit, and put it into his mouth, and ate that which he had commanded he should not eat; Yet they say, he was not the Cause of the Tranfgreffion of the com. mandment.

The example of the balting Jade is a mere Impertinency; for fuppofe it were, as it is not, applicable to us, who halt naturally; yet Adam, before this Action, was found; and therefore God neceffitating him to fuch an inconveniency, dealt with him as if one fhould drive a lufty Nag into rough Paffages, where he must needs break his legs. Neither is it, as I faid, applicable unto us the lame Pofterity of Adam, for he who rideth an Horfe that was lame before, altho' he be not a caufe of the Impotency which he findeth in the Horfe already, yet in urging him to motion, he is now a Cause of the actual Imperfection in the Motion, and fo perhaps a Caufe of increafing the Impotency for the future; tho' he were not the Caufe of his Lameness, yet he is of his Limping at that time. Let the Horfe ftand

ftill, and fee whether he will halt or no. Marry if the Horfe go of himself, then the Rider is no caufe of his halting, and fo we may fay that all our haltings are from our felves, without any Inftigation from God.

I know our Oppofites have another shift, teaching, that God ufeth to punish one fin by making us to commit another; fo that altho' we Sin, he doth but Punish.

Albeit I do not believe this to be true, as 'tis commonly expounded, yet I abftain at this time from a farther examination of it, because it weakens not my Argument about Adam; for his Sin was the first that ever he committed, and the original of all that ever followed; and therefore if God's Decree was the Cause that he ate the forbidden fruit, as our Adverfaries teach, its apparent whom they make the Author of all Sin, These two Arguments well scanned, are fufficient to make any, not foreftalled with pre-conceits, to be afraid of that Opinion which believeth all things to come to pafs Ne ceffarily, by reafon of God's irresistible Decree; and therefore they fhall fuffice for the confutation

of it.

Moreover feeing it is clogged with fuch monftrous Confequences, methinks our Opinion fhould be far more amiable, which giveth no countenance to fuch hideous mis-fhapen Errors, as it will appear by the process of this Difputation.

Now I procede to the confirmation of our Opinion, concerning the Contingency of fome Events in refpect of God, by two Arguments more.

The firft is this, that God hath Decreed that all his Creatures ordinarily, and for the most part, should work according to their feveral kinds and endowments, by which he in the Creation diftinguished them: For illuftration they may be ranked into three feveral Forms.