vinced him he had been deceived in the report of their disaffected and mutinous disposition. The troops detached from the army to oppose his progress, fought with obstinate bravery; and the inhabitants seizing their arms with alacrity, emulated the spirit and persevering courage of the regular soldier. The enemy finding he must encounter serious opposition, halted at Connecticut farms, consigned most of the buildings of that village to the flames, and then retreated to Elizabeth Point, opposite to Staten Island.

While General Knyphausen lay at Elizabeth point, Sir Henry Clinton, with four thousand men, returned from the conquest of Charlestown, South Carolina, and joined him at that place. On the 23d of June, Sir Henry moved, by different routes, five thousand infantry, and a large body of cavalry, with twenty pieces of artillery, towards Springfield. General Washington supposed that his determined object was the destruction of the American camp and stores at Morristown. The effective force at this time under his immediate command amount to little more than three thousand men. Not being able to contend with the enemy, but with the advantage of ground, he made the best disposition of his small force to defend his post, and detached General Green with a thousand men to guard the defiles on the road, and particularly to dispute the enemy's passage of the bridge near Springfield. This service was performed with great military judg ment, and with the spirit and efficacy of disciplined courage. When overpowered by num

bers, General Green drew up his brave band on the heights behind Springfield. Sir Henry Clinton was not disposed to attack him in his strong position, nor to encounter the danger of proceeding to Morristown, and leaving Green in his rear; he therefore relinquished the object of his expedition, and burning the town of Springfield, returned to New York.

General Washington keenly felt this insult offered to his country, and was deeply mortified at his inability to repel it. In a letter to a friend he observed, "You but too well know, and will regret with me, the cause which justifies this insulting manoeuvre on the part of the enemy. It deeply affects the honour of the States, a vindication of which could not be attempted in our present circumstances, without most imminently hazarding their security; at least so far as it may depend on the security of the army. Their character, their interest, their all that is dear, call' upon them, in the most pressing manner, to place the army immediately on a respectable footing."

Late in the spring, the Marquis La Fayette returned from France, with the pleasing intelligence that his government had resolved to assist the United States, by employing this year a respectable land and naval force in America.

This grateful information reanimated the public mind, and gave a new stimulus to the agency of Congress, and of the governments of the several states; that preparation might be made to cooperate with the French armament on its arrival. This event excited anew in the breast of the

Commander in Chief, the mingled emotions of ambition and patriotism. His country having solicited foreign aid, he felt the disgrace she must suffer, should the allies find her in a situation not to second their friendly assistance. He anticipated the deep wound that would be inflicted on his own feelings, should the French commanders find him the nominal head of a naked, destitute, and inefficient army. To prevent the evils that were apprehended, he addressed a circular letter to the goverments of the states, urging them to exertions proportionate to the present prospect of their country; and painting to their view the picture of dishonour and ruin that must arise from the neglect to improve this prosperous tide in their affairs.

Vigorous measures were in consequence adopted by Congress and by the states to recruit the army, to lay up magazines, and to enable their General to comply with the reasonable expectations of their allies. But the agency of different bodies was necessary to carry these public measures into effect, and their operation was dilatory. On the 20th of June, General Washington ipformed Congress that the army was yet destitute of many essential articles of clothing. "For the troops," he observed, "to be without clothing at any time, is highly injurious to the service, and distressing to our feelings; but the want will be more peculiarly mortifying, when they come to act with our allies. If it be possible, I have no doubt immediate measures will be taken to relieve their distresses.

"It is also most sincerely to be wished, that there could be some supplies of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose condition is still miserable. This is, in some inwhole lines of states.

stances, the case with the It would be well, for their own sakes, and for the public good, if they could be furnished. They will not be able, when our friends come to cooperate with us, to go on a common routine of duty; and if they should, they must, from their appearance, be held in low estimation."

In the near prospect of the arrival of the French armaments, the embarrassments of General Washington increased. His army was not yet in a situation to co-operate with the allies, and he be-. came extremely anxious to know the force on which he might absolutely depend. He wished to attack New York, if the means were in his power. But to concert an attack upon this post with the French commanders, and in the event be unable to execute his part of the engagement, he knew would dishonour the American arms, and expose the French marine force employed in the service to destruction. Should prudence forbid an attempt upon New York, his force might be competent to assail some other British post, and it was highly expedient that the plan should be ripened, and all measures prepared for immediate action, the moment the French detachments should reach the continent. The anxiety of the Commander in Chief on this subject was disclosed in the following letter to Congress.

The season is come when we have every rea

son to expect the arrival of the fleet, and yet for want of this point of primary consequence, it is impossible for me to form a system of co-operation. I have no basis to act upon; and of course, were this generous succour of our ally now to arrive, I should find myself in the most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general and the admiral, from the relation in which I stand, as soon as they approach our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to be pursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; but circumstanced as I am, I cannot even give them conjectures. From these considerations, I have suggested to the committee, by a letter I had the honour of addressing them yesterday, the indispensable necessity of their writing again to the states, urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken, and of the result. The interest of the states, the honour and reputation of our councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies, all require that I should, without delay, be enabled to ascertain and inform them what we can or cannot undertake. There is a point which ought now to be determined, on the success of which all our future operations may depend, on which, for want of knowing our prospects, I can make no decision, for fear of involving the fleet and army of our allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not seconded by us, to material inconvenience and hazard. I shall be compelled to suspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our hopes."

Congress had assured the French minister, that