and the injunctions of the constitution, were no longer to be urged in opposition to this final decision.

The rechartering of the United States bank,-a question depending upon the condition of the country, and requiring for a correct decision both financial talents and experience, was (as he declared in his manifesto read to the cabinet) decided by the people, at the presidential election.

All the doubtful measures of his administration were thus thrown upon the responsibility of the people; and instead of defending them upon general principles of expediency, policy or justice, they were to be tried by the simple test, whether they had been made subjects of discussion during the canvass and if so, they had been decided by the popular vote.

Thus summarily disposing of the objections. of his opponents, and presuming upon a continuance of the popular favour, the president now determined to take a new and decisive step in consolidating the strength of the party, which had elevated him to the executive chair.

The excitement of the political contest was at an end; nullification was virtually relinquished by South Carolina; and the modification of the tariff had tranquillized the public mind, and put an end to all apprehensions of a collision between that state and the general government.

The angry feelings engendered by the election had subsided, and in a tour, which the presi

dent made through the eastern states in the early part of 1833, both parties united to do honour to the chief magistrate of the republic;--his opponents heartily approving of his course towards South Carolina, and of the principles avowed by him in his proclamation and message, and his supporters giving vent to those feelings, which had originally enlisted them as a party in his favour.

A political calm had succeeded the tempest, and it seemed as if the second term of Gen. Jackson's administration was about to prove as quiet and tranquil, as the first had been stormy and turbulent. This expectation was not destined to be realized. The cabal that surrounded the president saw too plainly, that their power could only be maintained by political agitation. Without an animated opposition, the passions and prejudices of parties would subside, and they doubted the result of a dispassionate examination of their measures.

It was necessary to take some steps to rouse the decaying embers of party discord, and to consolidate their strength.

The party had no bond of union, and already showed signs of disbanding. A new bond was to be created. The official patronage wielded by the government, although great, and exercising extensive influence, could be conveniently used only at particular periods.

When a vacancy is filled up, the effect is often produced of converting an active and efficient partisan into an official,

unwilling to hazard his station by taking too zealous a part in politics. "Ibit eo, quo vis, qui zonam perdidit," is not the prudent exclamation only of the soldier suddenly made rich by an exertion of desperate valour. The political partisan is often stimulated to extraordinary exertions by the hope of reward; and his zeal in the contest is not unfrequently equalled by the prudence, which dictates to the official incumbent, the propriety of not appearing to take too active a part in the contest, and thereby exposing the public to the hazard of losing, in case of an unfavourable result, the services of so valuable an offi

cer.

Disappointed applicants, too, could not always be appeased by promises, and too often were the exertions of a successful candidate more than counterbalanced by those, whom he had prevented from being the recipients of executive favour.

It was, therefore, necessary to acquire another species of influence, possessing a more perma→ nent activity.

The patronage of the government could only be relied upon in emergencies, and was not in itself sufficient to control the opinions of a community with such various interests, and occupying so extensive a country as the United States.

An opportunity was now presented to place in the hands of the executive, the influence so much desired.

By the law creating the United States bank, the public mo

neys were required to be deposited in its vaults, and as an equivalent for that deposit, the bank assumed the responsibility of acting as the fiscal agent of the government.

In the act, however, it was provided, that the public deposits might be removed by the secretary of the treasury; but requiring him to lay his reasons for removing them immediately before congress.

If these public deposits could be removed from this institution, and be subjected to the discretion of the secretary of the treasury, to be placed in the local banks, and liable to be removed at pleasure, a new influence would be conferred upon the executive, operating upon all the monied institutions of the country, and through them upon the commercial community.

How far these motives influenced the step taken by the executive, shortly after the adjournment of congress, in relation to the public deposits, it is not our province to determine.

Other reasons were urged, as for example, the insecurity of the public moneys in the United States bank; the conduct of the bank in relation to the redemption of the three per cents.; its exaction of damages for the dishonour of the draft for the first instalment under the treaty with France; and its alleged interference with politics.

The first and only proper reason, however, was entirely without foundation, and the other reasons seemed rather the suggestions of prejudice and vindic

tive feeling, than grounds of action for statesmen acting in behalf of the country.

No injustice will, therefore, be done in assigning to the desire of obtaining political influence, a prominent place among the motives, which determined the president, shortly after the adjourn ment of congress, to remove the public deposits from the United States bank, and to place them in local banks, subject to be removed by the secretary of the treasury.

An attempt had been made to procure the sanction of the congress to this step, at its second

session.

The president in his opening message, and the secretary in his annual report, intimated that there were good grounds to doubt, whether the public moneys were safe in the custody of the bank; but the house of representatives, after a deliberate examination, declared by a vote of 109, to 46, that the public deposits might be safely continued in that institution.

Congress having thus positively refused to authorize the removal, new means were adopted to effect the contemplated end.

The secretary of the treasury, (Louis M'Lane,) who had expressed his determination not to sanction their removal, was transferred to the state department, and Wm. J. Duane, of Pennsylvania, was appointed his successor. It was soon, however, found that Mr. Duane was not willing to act in that matter

without sufficient reasons to sustain him before the world.

The president had urged him, during his northern tour in the summer of 1833, to remove the public moneys from the obnoxious institution, without convincing him of the propriety of the step. He finally obtained from him his consent to appoint Amos Kendall as an agent to inquire into the terms, upon which the local banks would take the public deposits upon the basis of mutual guaranty. This basis, however, was found to be inadmissible. The banks refused to guaranty for each other, and the secretary was soon made to understand, that it was the president's determination to remove the deposits at all hazards.

To this he explicitly refused to lend himself. He even refused to fix a day after the adjournment of congress, for their removal, in case that body did not act upon the subject.

The most he would agree to, was, to remove them in case congress ordered him so to do. In this dilemma, the president convoked the cabinet on the 10th of September, 1833, and laid before its members an exposition of his views upon this important question.

The doctrines advanced in this document were, that the power of the secretary to remove the deposits was unqualified, and not limited to particular contingencies; that the speedy termination of the charter of the bank rendered it incumbent on the secretary to introduce a plan for

keeping and disbursing the public revenue before its dissolution, to avoid any derangement consequent upon such a change at that moment; that the conduct of the bank in relation to the three per cents. and the bill on the French government, and its interference with politics, deserved punishment; and under those circumstances, the president assumed the responsibility himself, of removing the public deposits from the United States bank, and fixed upon the 1st of October, 1833, as the day for their removal. The secretary of the treasury deliberated upon the question thus authoratively pressed upon him, and on the 21st of September, he announced to the president his determination not to carry his directions into effect. He also resolved not to resign, and as he was the only officer who could give a legal order for the removal of the public moneys, the president was compelled, in order to carry his designs into effect, to remove the secretary. This was done on the 23d of September, and Roger B. Taney appointed in his place.

The new secretary was known to entertain similar opinions to those of the president, both as to the right and expediency of removing the deposits, and he immediately issued the necessary orders for their removal.

Almost simultaneously with this step, an attempt was made to destroy the credit of the bank,

21

by suddenly presenting for payment, at one of the distant. branches, a large amount of notes which had been secretly accumulated.

This demand was promptly met, but connected with the withdrawal of the public deposits, it evinced a settled hostility against the bank, and compelled the directors to adopt a general system of retrenchment, with a view to its own safety.

Great commercial distress immediately ensued. At the moment of taking this step, the business of the country was unusually active. The capitalist, and the merchants and mechanics, had unlimited confidence in each other, and all the monied institutions of the country had extended their loans to the utmost bounds of their ability.

At such a juncture, great and rigid retrenchment, attended with want of confidence, was necessarily productive of ruinous consequences. Private creat was deeply affected, and the business of the country was interrupted to a degree, that could be attributable only to the panic which followed this violent attack upon the pecuniary concerns of the community.

The period embraced in this volume terminated in the height of this distress, and we must defer, to a future opportunity, an account of the mercantile panic of 1833, and of the measures adopted in congress for its relief.

པདཔ༦

IN the Register for the years 1830-31, an account was given of the negotiation between the American and French governments, in relation to the claims upon the latter for spoliations, and of the conclusion of a treaty adjusting the amount to be paid by France, as a full indemnity for those claims. Although the sum stipulated to be paid (25,000 000 francs did not mount to one half of the original spoliations, and no allowance was made for the interest accruing before the treaty, still it was deemed expedient to accede to the compromise; and both the government and the people of the United States congratulated themselves upon the final settlement of the only difficulty between them and their earliest ally.

This pleasing anticipation was not destined to be speedily reali

zed.

By the second article of the treaty, the government of France agreed to pay the 25,000,000 of

francs, with 4 per cent. interest, in six annual instalments; the first to be paid at the expiration of one year from the exchange of the ratified treaties. These instalments were to be paid at Paris, to such person as should be authorized by the government of the United States to receive them.

The treaty was duly ratified by both governments, and on the 2d of February, 1832, the ratified treaties were exchanged at Washington.

Immediately after the treaties were ratified, congress passed the laws necessary for complying with the stipulations on the part of the United States; and the secretary of the treasury, on the 7th of July, 1833, drew a bill of exchange upon the minister of state and finance of the French government, directing the first instalment to be paid to the order of the cashier of the U. S. bank; and a full power of attorney was given by the president of the United States, authorizing