of a triangular shape, and adapted only to a pump of a square form. This pump seemed to be principally useful, when it was desirable to throw up large quantities of water in a short space of time, and a number of hands could be put to the working of it.

The valves of Baker's pump were fitted to a round shaft, and occupied, like the other, the whole of its area: but instead of resting upon the sides of the shaft, were supported by a brass rim, which prevented the friction against the sides of the shaft consequent upon the other construction, and to obviate which Perkins since obtaining his patent had adopted a check bolt. It appeared that Baker's invention required fewer hands to work it, and could be applied to the common house pump.

STORY J. in summoning up the cause to the jury stated as follows :-To entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, he must establish that his machine is a new and useful invention; and of these facts his patent is to be considered merely prima facie evidence of a very slight nature. He must, in the first place establish it to be a useful invention; for the law will not allow the plaintiff to recover, if the invention be of a mischievious or injurious tenden

cy. The defendant, however, has asserted a much more broad and sweeping doctrine; and one which I feel myself called upon to negative in the most explicit manner. He contends that it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, that his invention is of general utility; so that in fact, for the ordinary purposes of life, it must supersede the pumps in common use; in short, that it must be for the public, a better pump than the common pump; and that unless the plaintiff can establish this position, the law will not give him the benefit of a patent, even though in some peculiar cases his invention might be applied with advantage. I do not so understand the law. The patent act uses the phrase "useul invention" merely incidentally; it occurs only in the first section, and there it seems merely descriptive of the subject matter of the application, or of the conviction of the applicant. The language is "when any person or persons shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine," &c. he or they may, on pursuing the directions of the act, obtain a patent. Neither the oath, required by the second section, not the special matter of defence allowed to be given in evidence by the sixth section of the act, contains any such qualification or reference to general utility, to establish the validity of the patent. Nor is it

alluded to in the tenth section as a cause for which the patent may be vacated. To be sure, all the matters of defence or of objection to the patent are not enumerated in these sections; but if such an one as that now contended for had been intended, it is scarcely possible to account for its omission. In my judgment the argument is utterly without foundation. All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well being, good policy or sound morals of society. The word "useful,” therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assasination, is not a patentable invention. But if the invention steers wide of these objections, whether it be more or less useful, is a circumstance very material to the interest of the patentee; but of no importance to the public. If it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard. There is no pretence that Mr. Perkins' pump, is a mischievous invention; and if it has been used injuriously to the patentee, by the defendant, it certainly does not lie in his mouth to contest its general utility. Indeed,

* Whittemore vs. Cutler, 1 Gallis, 429, 435.

the defendant asserts that Baker's pump is useful in a very eminent degree; and if it be substantially the same as Perkins', there is an end of the objection: if it be not substantially the same, then the plaintiff must fail in his action. So that in either view, the abstract question, seems hardly of any importance in this cause.

And, in the case of Bedford vs. Hunt, 1. Mason, 303, Mr. Justice Story observes, that no person is entitled to a patent under the act of Congress, unless he has invented some new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used before.

By useful invention, in the statute, is meant such a one as may be applied to some beneficial use in society; in contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of society. It is not necessary to establish, that the invention is of such general utility, as to supersede all other inventions now in practice to accomplish the same purpose. It is sufficient, that it has no noxious or mischievous tendency; that it may be applied to practical uses; and that so far as it is applied, it is salutary. If its practical utility be very limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to the

inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect. The law, however, does not look to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use; and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit.

I shall now proceed more immediately to the subject, or essence of the thing or matter for which monopolies can be legally granted, by letters patent. The statute of 21 Jac. before cited, allows the grant of letters patent for "the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures, to the true and first inventor." The statutes of the United States, allow a similar monopoly to the person or persons, who shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,' &c. These clauses may be said to be the pivots, on which turns the whole law of patents for new inventions, in Great Britain, and the United States. They are descriptive of the kind of property, which may be obtained by patents for new inventions; while the other regulations in the law of both countries, point out the methods by which the title to

9