to fuccefs; yet, if he be rejected, he has no remedy. He can neither feize the office by force, nor obtain redrefs at law; his right therefore is imperfect. A poor neighbour has a right to relief; yet if it be refufed him, he muft not extort it. A benefactor has a right to returns of gratitude from the perfon he has obliged; yet if he meet with none, he muft acquiefce. Children have a right to affection and education from their parents; and parents on their part, to duty and reverence from their children; yet if these rights be on either fide withholden, there is no compulfion to enforce them.

It may be at first view difficult to apprehend, how a perfon fhould have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means neceffary to obtain it. This difficulty, like moft others in morality, is refolvable into the neceffity of general rules. The reader recollects, that a perfon is faid to have a

or

right" to a thing, when it is "confiftent with "the will of God" that he should poffefs it. So that the question is reduced to this; how it comes to pafs, that it fhould be confiftent with the will of God, that a perfon fhould poffefs a thing, and yet not be confiftent with the fame will that he should ufe force to obtain it? The anfwer is, that by reafon of the indeterminatenefs, either of the object, of the circumftances of the right, the permiffion of force in this cafe, would, in its confequence, lead to the permiffion of force in other cafes, where there exifted no right at all. The candidate above defcribed has, no doubt, a right to fuccefs; but his right depends upon his qualifications, for instance, upon his comparative virtue, learning, &c.; there must be somebody therefore to compare them. The existence, degree, and refpective importance of these qualifications are all indeterminate; there must be fomebody therefore to determine them. To allow the candidate to demand fuccefs by force, is to make him the judge of his own qualifications. You

cannot

cannot do this, but you must make all other candidates the fame; which would open a door to demands without number, reason, or right. In like manner, a poor man has a right to relief from the rich; but the mode, feafon, and quantum of that relief, who fhall contribute to it, or how much, are not ascertained. Yet thefe points must be afcertained, before a claim to relief can be profecuted by force. For to allow the poor to afcertain them for themselves, would be to expofe property to fo many of thefe claims, that it would lofe its value, or cease indeed to be property. The fame obfervation holds of all other cafes of imperfect rights; not to mention, that in the inftances of gratitude, affection, reverence, and the like, force is excluded by the very idea of the duty, which must be voluntary, or not at all.

Wherever the right is imperfect, the correfponding obligation is fo too. I am obliged to prefer the beft candidate, to relieve the poor, be grateful to benefactors, take care of my children, and reverence my parents; but in all thefe cafes, my obligation, like their right, is imperfect.

my

on.

I call these obligations "imperfe&t," in confor mity to the established language of writers upon the fubject. The term however feems ill chofen on this account, that it leads many to imagine, that there is lefs guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation, than of a perfect one. Which is a groundless notiFor an obligation being perfect or imperfect, determines only whether violence may or may not be employed to enforce it; and determines nothing elfe. The degree of guilt incurred by violating the obligation is a different thing, and is determined by circumftances altogether independent of this diftinction. A man, who by a partial, prejudiced, or corrupt vote, difappoints a worthy candidate of a ftation in life, upon which his hopes, poffibly, or liveli hood depends, and who thereby grievously difcourages merit and emulation in others, commits, I am perfuaded

perfuaded, a much greater crime, than if he filched a book out of a library, or picked a pocket of a handkerchief; though in the one cafe, he violates only an imperfect right, in the other a perfect

one.

As pofitive precepts are often indeterminate in their extent, and as the indeterminatenefs of an obligation is that which makes it imperfect; it comes to pass, that pofitive precepts commonly produce an imperfect obligation.

Negative precepts or prohibitions, being generally precife, conftitute accordingly a perfect obligation.

The fifth commandment is pofitive, and the duty which refults from it is imperfect.

The fixth commandment is negative, and impofes a perfect obligation.

Religion and virtue find their principal exercife arnongft the imperfect obligations; the laws of civil fociety taking pretty good care of the reft.

СНАР.

CHA P. XI.

THE GENERAL RIGHTS OF MANKIND.

Y the general Rights of Mankind, I mean the rights which belong to the fpecies collectively; the original ftock, as I may fay, which they have fince diftributed among themselves.

These are,

I. A right to the fruits or vegetable produce of the earth.

The infenfible part of the creation are incapable of injury; and it is nugatory to inquire into the right where the ufe can be attended with no injury. But it may be worth obferving, for the fake of an inference which will appear below, that, as God has created us with a want and defire of food, and provided things fuited by their nature to fuftain and fatisfy us, we may fairly prefume, that he intended we should apply thefe things to that pur-) pofe.

II. A right to the flesh of animals.

This is a very different claim from the former. Some excufe feems neceffary for the pain and lofs which we occafion to brutes, by reftraining them of their liberty, mutilating their bodies, and, at laft putting an end to their lives, which we fuppofe to be the whole of their exiftence, for our pleafure or conveniency.

The reafons alledged in vindication of this practice, are the following: that the feveral fpecies of brutes being created to prey upon one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove, that the human fpecies were intended to feed upon them; that, if let alone, they would over-run the earth, and ex

clude

clude mankind from the occupation of it; that they are requited for what they fuffer at our hands, by our care and protection.

Upon which reafons I would obferve, that the analogy contended for is extremely lame; fince brutes have no power to fupport life by any other means, and fince we have for the whole 'human fpecies might fubfift entirely upon fruit, pulse, herbs and roots, as many tribes of Hindoos actu ally do. The two other reafons may be valid reafons, as far as they go; for, no doubt, if man had been fupported entirely by vegetable food, a great part of those animals which die to furnish his table, would never have lived: but they by no means juftify our right over the lives of brutes, to the extent in which we ufe it. What danger is there, for inftance, of fifh interfering with us, in the occupation of their element? Or do we contribute to their fupport or preservation?

It feems to me that it would be difficult to defend this right, by any arguments which the light and order of nature afford; and that we are beholden for it, to the permiffion recorded in fcripture, Gen. ix. 1, 2, 3: "And God bleffed Noah and his fons, and faid unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth; and the fear of and the dread of you, fhall be upon every you, "beaft of the earth, and upon every fowl of the "air, and upon all that moveth upon the earth, "and upon all the fishes of the fea; into your hand are they delivered: every moving thing fhall be meat for you; even as the even as the green herb, have I given you all things." To Adam and his pofterity had been granted at the creation, "every green herb for meat," and nothing more.

•

In

the laft claufe of the paffage now produced, the old grant is recited, and extended to the flesh of animals," even as the green herb, have I given you all things." But this was not till after the

kr

flood;