but myself think that, according to the language that is here used, it is really and fairy a doubtful matter, that is to say, legally doubtful, whether that thing which might Lave been expressed with sufficient accuracy has been expressed with sufficient accuracy, or whether it is possible to make out exactly what it was that the party did mean. Now, strictly speaking, the words as they stand do only imply that it was to be at some angle, not forty-five or seventy degrees. I am quite sure the party did not mean that, and, therefore, I have a case before me in which in the words of the specification the party uses language of which all that can be said is that with reasonable certainty it does not express the party's meaning. Well, then, in the latter part, where he speaks of what he had before spoken of:Having regard to my 7th head of improvement of roads and ways, I say that the first and second mode is the paving with blocks of wood, having the grain inclined to the horizon from about forty-five degrees to about seventy degrees, and I claim the dowelling of the blocks together in paving when slanting or leaning in opposite directions;" and then he speaks about the rails, and so on. Now, I cannot but myself think here, that the party has meant to have it understood that the dowelling itself is a part of the invention, and therefore, prima facie, I should have thought it rather contrary to one's common experience to have it, in the year 1839, claimed as an invention, that certain blocks of wood were to be fastened together by means of dowelling, and I doubt whether that is any invention at all. Now I cannot but myself think, that on such a patent as this, before the Court does anything so as to interfere against the defendants, that the Court ought to take some method to have it established that the plaintiff has got that legal right which the plaintiff pretends to have. But, then, with respect to the second part of the case, supposing that the plaintiff's patent is good, is it so clear that what the defendants have done is a violation of the patent? I do not mind the mode in which that affidavit is made, on which Mr. Knight Bruce has laid so much stress; namely, the speaking by Mr. Hodgson and the Count De Lisle in the way they do about the invention; what they say is, "They verily believe that the invention for which the above-named plaintiff took out the letters patent in the bill mentioned did not and does not, in any respect, correspond to or resemble the invention of this deponent, Richard Hodgson, communicated to him by the other deponent, Augustus De Lisle; and they say "that the plaintiff hath improperly laid claim to the said last-named invention, and hath endea voured to include the same or such part thereof as relates to wood-pavement in the specification of his said patent." Now I cannot but think that the fair inference of that affidavit is, that they mean to say, that the patent in fact and truth is for an invention different from the defendants' invention, but that the plaintiff wishes to have it thought that his specification is for the same invention; that is what I understand the plaintiff to say, and therefore by no means to admit, as Mr. Knight Bruce presses on me that they do admit by the affidavit, that these two inventions are the same. Now, with respect to the defendants' invention, as I understand it from their specification, it is a precise and definite thing, and is an invention by means of cutting a cube in a certain manner, which is detailed in the specification itself, and it appears to me that where the defendant does point out a particular mode of cutting the solid body, the cube, in such a manner as that, invariably and of necessity, there must be figures precisely of the same shape produced, always having certain given angles upon the planes of the sides, and, therefore, always producing, when laid transversely one across the other, that certain isosceles triangle of which he speaks, which enables him exactly to determine and place the same in all places, however numerous, in which they can be introduced; the hole and the pin which will have the effect of uniting several blocks with each other, in the manner that is easily shown by those instruments. I cannot but think that he, primá fucie, at least, has invented a definite thing which does materially differ from that very vague and indefinite thing which the plaintiff has described in his specification. Now I think myself, therefore, that, before I interfere by injunction, what I ought to do is to direct the plaintiff to bring such action as he may be advised; in that action he will have, in the first place, to make out that his patent is a good and legal patent, that is the first fact he will have to make out; and then he will have to make out that by the act which the defendant actually has done, that the patent, if good, has been infringed; and both those points can be determined, simply by directing that the plaintiff shall bring an action. It is not necessary to give any special directions as to admissions, but it does appear to me that the case stands in such a shape that it will be too much to infer from these very singular affidavits, which contain a series of conduct of a most extraordinary kind with respect to the agreement and the treaty on it; it does appear to me to be too much to infer from those affidavits that there has been a clear admission on the part of the defendants, that what the defendants are doing is the same thing as what the plaintiff has taken out a patent for, or to infer that the defendants have admitted their patent to be only for that thing for which the plaintiff has taken out his patent, or to infer that the defendants have at all conceded any point; which if I do correctly understand their affidavits, they were determined from the beginning to defend as manfully as by law they might, and perhaps by other means if necessary. And it does appear to me, therefore, that in this case the proper order to be made is to direct the plaintiff to bring such action as he may be advised, and to direct the motion to stand over, with liberty for both parties to apply. END OF VOL. II. INDEX. ABANDONMENT- Parties making experiments with reference to any manufactures, and ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, See "STATUTES." ADMIRALTY- The Court of Queen's Bench will not issue a mandamus, commanding ALTERATION— A patentee, who claims more than is useful, may alter and disclaim the BILL IN CHANCERY- A demurrer to a bill to restrain an infringement of a patent, by reason The Court will not dismiss a bill on the coming in of the answer if the CAVEAT- A caveat against the sealing of a patent at the Great Seal will be dis- CERTIFICATE— A Judge, at the trial of a patent cause, will certify that the validity of CLAIM- Claims, when inserted in a specification, are not in aid of the descrip- COMBINATION- The combination of two things which are separately old in a process of CONFIRMATION, See "Statute 5 and 6 Will. IV., c. 83”— The Court will not confirm letters patent where it is shown that the CONSIDERATION— If a patent is for two or more things, and one is old or not useful, the Costs, See" Statute 5 and 6 Will. IV., c. 83 "- The Privy Council will give costs to the party opposing an application At the Great Seal, costs will be given against the party opposing a DEFENDANT- A Court will not grant a defendant the right of having from the DEMURRER- Where a general demurrer has been filed to a bill for an account In case of a general demurrer to a bill, all the statements in the bill must A demurrer to a plea that a party had infringed before the date of a If a party proceed on a contract to recover moneys for the purchase of A demurrer to a bill, because it does not set forth the specification of a DISCLAIMER- A patentee may disclaim a part of his invention after verdict adverse to |