In re Samuel Wilson and Thomas Greig, Bankrupts. District Judge approved of the composition, and of its terms. The District Judge, in his decision, (18 Nat. Bkey. Reg., 101,) considered all the questions in detail, except those relating to the debt to Brigg, Entz & Co., and to the mental unfitness of Mr. Greig, and arrived at the conclusion that the composition was for the best interests of all concerned. In regard to the review of such a decision, it was said, in In re Wronkow, (before cited:) "It is next insisted that the compromise is not for the best interest of all concerned. The requisite majority of the creditors, at the first meeting, thought it was. The same thing occurred at the second meeting, called specially to consider that very question. The register coincided in the opinion of the creditors, and so reported. The District Court, upon full argument, has decided in the same way. This Court ought not to interfere under such circumstances, unless specific errors in the action of the creditors or the Court below can be pointed out, which, if sustained, would change the judgment. Mere general questions of expediency must ordinarily be considered as settled, when the requisite majority of the creditors, the register, and the District Court all agree. Nothing short of fraud or gross error in judgment should call into exercise the jurisdiction of this Court in such a case. That does not appear here. This Court is simply called upon to decide, upon the whole case, that the creditors and the District Court have come to a wrong conclusion as to what is for the best interest of all concerned." These views are the law of this Court and cover the present case. The question as to the contracting of the debt to Brigg, Entz & Co., and the question as to the mental fitness of Mr. Greig, were questions arising out of the evidence taken before the register. They were points which either were, or were not, urged before the District Judge, under the general objection filed with the register. If they were urged, they, were questions of expediency, and were passed upon. they were not urged, they might have been, and must, on this review, be regarded as having been waived in the Dis If In re Samuel Wilson and Thomas Greig, Bankrupts. trict Court, so that, because not passed upon by the District Court, they cannot be passed upon by this Court, in review. As matter of fact, however, I am, on consideration of the evidence, of opinion that the debt to Brigg, Entz & Co. was not fraudulently contracted. As to Mr. Greig's mental condition, the physician testified, on the 24th of April, that Mr. Greig was not then in a fit mental condition to be examined; that the probabilities of a change of his condition were good, if he had a proper amount of rest; that he was not then fit to carry on business; but that freedom from business anxieties, rest and proper treatment, would be very improving, with a fair prospect, in time, of a restoration of his capacity to attend to business. Seventeen days after that Mr. Greig was examined. No creditor, after that, took any objection as to the mental condition of Mr. Greig, although adjourned meetings were held on seven different days after the 11th of May, and the proceedings were not closed before the register until August 6th. The entire 8th paragraph of the resolution is in these words: "And, for the purpose of better securing the payment of the several instalments of composition, according to the tenor of the preceding resolutions, we do hereby further resolve, that James W. Jones, of the city of New York, be appointed custodian and special receiver of all the property and estate of the debtors, shown in the statement of debts and assets filed by them at the meeting of creditors at which these resolutions are passed, together with the increase and the profits and the avails thereof; and we do hereby request his appointment by this Court as such receiver; provided, however, and such appointment shall be made subject to this limitation and restriction, that said Jones shall not take any of said property into his custody or possession until the said alleged bankrupts shall have defaulted in the payment of their composition notes, or any of them, as hereinbefore provided to be given; and it is further provided, that the said James W. Jones, before entering upon the duties of his trust as such receiver as aforesaid, shall execute and file in this Court a good and In re Samuel Wilson and Thomas Greig, Bankrupts. sufficient bond, in the penalty of ten thousand dollars, with one or more sureties, to be approved by the Court, conditioned for the faithful performance by said Jones of his duties as such receiver as aforesaid." The 7th paragraph of the resolution provides as follows: "The injunction heretofore granted in these proceedings, restraining the debtors from disposing of their property, shall be vacated and annulled. In all other respects, the proceedings in bankruptcy shall remain as they are now, and shall be deemed to be pending until the composition is completed, for the purpose of any application which the creditors, or any of them, may see fit to make, upon the default of the debtors in the payment of any of the composition notes so to be given as aforesaid." I do not think the 8th paragraph of the resolution violates any provision of the statute, or works any of the results set forth in the 5th objection contained in the petition of review. The provisions of the 8th paragraph are stated therein to be for the purpose of further securing the payment of the several instalments of the composition. Taking the 7th and 8th paragraphs in connection, the creditors are not, in case of default in the payment of any instalment, deprived of any right which they would have had if the 8th paragraph had not been contained in the resolution, nor is the Court prevented from appointing some other person than Jones as receiver, nor from requiring from Jones, or from any other receiver, a bond in such sum as it may deem proper. The 8th paragraph purports to relate only to what shall be done with the property, after default in the payment of some one of the notes. In that regard it looks toward security. Before default, the property is to remain with the debtors, in consonance with the plan of the composition. It would remain with the debtors even without the 8th paragraph. Whether the property be in the hands of the debtors, or in the hands of Jones, or whatever becomes of it, the creditors are not, by the 8th paragraph, deprived of any of the rights which the petition of review alleges they are deprived of. The case of In re Janeway, (8 Benedict, 267,) is cited. In that case, the composition provided, that, as soon as In re Samuel Wilson and Thomas Greig, Bankrupts. the resolution should be recorded, all the property should revert to the debtors, the same as if no proceedings in bankruptcy had taken place, and that an order of discontinuance might be entered, at the option of the debtors, without further notice to the creditors. The notes were to be deliverable within ten days after the order of confirmation, and, before any note should be given, the property might revert to the debtor, and the proceedings be out of Court. The Court refused to sanction such a composition, on the ground that it was no composition. The present case is not like that. The construction given to the terms of the composition by the petition of review is, that it provides "for the return of all the property to the debtors, upon the delivery of the notes." Such is the proper construction. The provisions of the 8th paragraph are not of the substance of the composition. They request certain action to be taken by the Court in case of default. The Court is not compelled to comply with the request. It is still free to enforce the composition, or proceed with the bankruptcy, in like manner as if the 8th paragraph were not part of the resolution. These were the views of the District Court, and they are approved. The prayer of the petition of review, for the reversal of the order of August 20th, 1878, is denied, with costs. Alexander Blumenstiel, for Brigg, Entz & Co. Gershom A. Seixas, opposed. Robbins v. The Firemen's Fund Insurance Company of San Francisco. HENRY A. ROBBINS AND DANIEL F. APPLETON vs. THE FIREMEN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY OF SAN FRAN CISCO. R. took out a policy of insurance on merchandise, his own, or held by him in trust or on commission: Held, that the insurance was on the merchandise and not on the interest of R. in it, and that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the intent of the parties to the policy was to insure only the goods of R., or his interest in the goods. The owner of the property so held on commission by R., and so insured, insured it himself, also: Held, that the insurance on such property was double, and that the policy of R. on such property was contributory with the policy of the owner on the same property. (Before SHIPMAN, J., Southern District of New York, March 27th, 1879.) SHIPMAN, J. This is a motion for a new trial. Without giving a history in detail of all the facts in the case, the facts which are material upon the decision of this motion are as follows: The American Watch Company, of Waltham, Massachusetts, has been, for many years, a large manufacturer of silver watch cases and of watch movements. Robbins & Appleton, the plaintiffs, were, at the time of the issuing of the policies hereinafter mentioned, and for a long time have been, the sole selling agents of said company, and to this firm the entire production of the company was sent for sale, upon commission. The plaintiffs were factors or agents for no other person or corporation. They also manufactured and sold gold watch cases, upon their own account. Within a year prior to the fire hereinafter mentioned, they procured four policies in different fire insurance companies, in their own names, payable to themselves, whereby they were insured against loss by fire, to the extent of thirty thousand dollars, on "watches, jewelry and, other merchandise, their |