Constitutional DemocracyJanos Kis outlines a new theory of constitutional democracy. Addresses the widely held belief that liberal democracy embodies an uneasy compromise of incompatible values: those of liberal rights on the one hand, and democratic equality on the other. Liberalism is said to compromise democracy, while democracy is said to endanger the values of liberalism. |
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Inhalt
| 3 | |
| 9 | |
| 11 | |
| 13 | |
public debate and voting | 21 |
On the relation of the two models | 25 |
Liberalism and the descriptive claims of the ethical model | 29 |
Virtue in politics | 35 |
Equality of votes and equality of voters | 71 |
the selection of voting rules | 75 |
A weakness of contractarian theory | 81 |
The typology of preferences | 85 |
Filtering the preferences of the contracting parties | 91 |
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW | 116 |
Striking down legislation | 183 |
개 8 8 9 | 187 |
The politics of virtue and personal autonomy | 39 |
Concluding remarks | 43 |
Notes | 45 |
25 | 47 |
29 | 48 |
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST THE COMPROMISE THESIS | 51 |
Introduction | 53 |
The conflict | 57 |
Constitutional constraints constitutional review | 61 |
Political equality and rule by the majority | 65 |
65 | 189 |
71 | 195 |
75 | 197 |
81 | 199 |
85 | 203 |
The interpretive practice of | 249 |
Summary and a glance | 303 |
| 321 | |
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accept according activism adopted allowed already amendment answer apply approved arguments assume authority body claim collective competence conception concerning consequences constitution makers Constitutional Court constraints contested contrast controversy correct critical decide decisions demands democracy democratic determine dignity direct discussion elected equal established expression fact follows freedom fundamental rights further give given grounds hand human important individual instance institutions intention interests interpretation issue judges judicial justices legislation legislature less liberal majority matter means minority moral moral reading nature objections ordinary original Parliament party person political popular sovereignty position possible practice preferences Press principle procedure protection provisions question reasons regard relation representatives Republic requirements resolution respect rules social status strict reading substantive sufficient Suppose theory thesis tion true values violate vote voters