be understood to mean, that it is not evidence to go to a jury; for, on the contrary, I think it is evidence, and evidence of the most persuasive nature, but especially when coupled with the inquisition and warrant of attorney: for though I cannot subscribe to the doctrine which the question seems to insinuate, that a legal conclusion admits of degrees of comparative strength, or that it is more or less conclusive at different times; and though I can no more admit that three pieces of evidence, none of which is conclusive in itself, do altogether amount to a conclusion, any more than I can, that three cyphers make a unit; yet I feel very sensibly that persuasive evidence may be more or less strong according to its nature, and that three pieces of evidence, tending to establish one and the same fact, are stronger evidence than one of them would be singly. And therefore, upon the whole, my answer to the second question is, that the inquisition, the fine, and the warrant of attorney, are not in any case which has been put singly, or altogether, conclusive evidence, so as to warrant the judgment of the Court of King's Bench. 23. An averment may also be made that the vouchee died before the judgment was given, where such vouchee appeared by attorney. 24. Thus, in the case of Wynne v. Wynne, one of ante, c.3. the questions was, whether the plaintiff in error was Wils. R. § 38. not estopped to assign the death of the vouchee to 42. The Court was clearly of opinion, that the death of the vouchee before judgment was not contrary Must be brought within Twenty Years. Tit. 35. c. 14. § 22. but a matter collateral to the record, and properly assignable for error, and triable by a jury: for all the record said was, that the vouchee appeared by her attorney; it did not say any thing of her actual existence at the time, but put a matter in issue, which was properly triable by the country. 25. The statute 10 & 11 Wm. III. c. 4. has been stated in the former Title, by which it is enacted, that a writ of error to reverse a common recovery must be brought within twenty years after such recovery has been suffered, and not within twenty years after the accruer of the title to the lands. Lloyd v. 26. A writ of error was brought 19 Geo. II. to Vaughan, 2 Stra. 1257. reverse a common recovery which was suffered in 5 Ann. The defendant pleaded this statute in bar, the writ of error not having been brought within twenty years after the recovery was suffered: to which it was answered, that the plaintiff's title did not accrue until the death of one of the vouchees without issue in the year 1739. After several arguments, the Court determined that the writ of error did not lie; because the statute 10 & 11 Wm. III. was made to quiet possessions, and to fix a certain period beyond which fines and recoveries should not be impeached; for the words of the statute are express, "twenty years after such fine levied or recovery suffered." And it has not the words which are in the statute of fines, viz. after the title accrued. The terminus a quo is the time when the recovery is suffered; and if that was once exceeded, there would be no knowing where to stop. A reversioner, after an estate tail which had subsisted above à century, might upon this principle be allowed to reverse a common recovery; whereas persons in reversion were never the objects of the Legislature's care. It was sufficient that they had a chance of the reversion's vesting within the twenty years, in which case they might bring a writ of error, but not afterwards. be barred. Tit. 35. c. 14. 27. A person may bar himself from bringing a How it may writ of error to reverse a common recovery, by the same means by which he may bar himself from bring- § 24. ing a writ of error to reverse a fine. Thus Pigot "If he who suffers a common recovery levy a pa. 169. says, fine, or make a feoffment, he cannot have a writ of error to reverse it." 28. A release of errors from the common vouchee cannot be pleaded in bar of a writ of error to reverse a common recovery. 29. In a writ of error to reverse a common recovery, the defendant pleaded a release of all errors by the last and common vouchee. It was resolved by all the Judges that such a release could not be pleaded; for the common youchee was put in only for form, and in truth he rendered nothing; therefore it was against reason that his release should bar others that suffered the loss, and were entitled to have a remedy by the reversal of the judgment. Norrice v. sified. 30. As a common recovery can only be reversed A Recovery by a writ of error, or some proceeding of a similar may be falnature, to which none are entitled but those who have an immediate interest in the lands, the law allows all strangers, whose interests are affected by a common recovery, to falsify it. And it is laid down by Booth, in his Law of Real Actions, chap. 24, that a common recovery may be falsified, 1°, by entry Pigot, 156. and plea; 2°, by action; 3°, by action and plea; and 4o, by plea only. 31. A common recovery may be falsified and invalidated on a trial in ejectment; for if a common reco 1 Vesey, 403. 3 Atk. 313. ante, § 22. By a Tenant for Years. 1 Inst. 46 a. very is given in evidence, and set up by way of defence, the plaintiff may show any defect in the recovery; and if the Court is of opinion that the recovery is void, and the plaintiff entitled to recover, such recovery is completely falsified, as to that action. 32. Thus, it may be shown that the person against whom the writ was brought had no estate of freehold in the land at the time; and the cases of Dormer v. Parkhurst, Goodtitle v. Chandos, and Taylor v. Horde, which have been already stated, are instances of recoveries falsified in ejectment, for want of a good tenant to the præcipe. 33. In the case of Sir Butler Wentworth, which was tried at the bar of the Court of Common Pleas in Mich. 1744, evidence of weakness of understanding was admitted to invalidate the deed, by which a tenant to the præcipe was made, for the purpose of suffering a common recovery; and the effect of the recovery was by that means defeated. 34. In the case of Hume v. Burton, Lord Chancellor Lifford cited the case of Jones ex dem. Hale v. Cave, tried at Hereford at the Lent assises in 1765, by Sir Eardley Wilmot, in which evidence was admitted to prove the weakness of understanding of a vouchee in a common recovery, who appeared by attorney, and the recovery was by that means invalidated. A motion was made the next term for a new trial, on account of misdirection of the Judge, and it was contended that such evidence ought not to have been admitted; but the motion was refused. 35. At common law, if the tenant of the freehold had suffered a common recovery, it operated as a good bar to all terms for years derived out of the freehold; for the person who recovered the lands was supposed to come in by a title paramount, so that he was not bound by the leases of the person against whom he recovered besides, a termor for years could not in Plowd. 83. any case falsify a common recovery. 36. By the statute of Gloucester, 1 Edw. I. c. 11. a remedy was given to the lessee for years, by way of receit and trial, whether the recovery was upon good title, or by way of collusion; and in case it appeared that the recovery was by collusion, then the lessee for years was permitted to enjoy his term, and the execution was staid until the determination of the term. Fitz. N. B. 198. 220. 37. The operation of this statute not having been Bro. Ab. tit. found sufficiently extensive, another act was made, Lease, 26. 21 Hen. VIII. c. 15, whereby it is provided, that a tenant for years may falsify a feigned recovery had against the person in reversion. Vaugh. 127. $ 69. 38. Although a common recovery can only be re- Courts of versed by the Court of C. P. in the first instance, Equity. and by the Court of K. B. upon a writ of error from the Court of C. P., yet the Court of Chancery can, Tit.35.c. 14. in fact, invalidate a common recovery, where it appears to have been obtained by fraud or imposition, by compelling the recoveror to convey the estate to the person who is entitled in equity to have it, or by declaring the recoveror to be a trustee for such person. 2 Ab. Eq. 39. Where a person who was deaf and dumb suf- Ferres v. fered a common recovery of entailed lands, assisted Ferres, by his uncle, and then settled the same to certain 695. uses; upon the circumstances of the case it appeared he had done nothing but what in conscience he ought to have done, yet being under these circumstances, |