racter exhibited in it.' p. 22. 26, 27, 28. Whereas for God to give us a rule of duty, requiring things in their own nature absolutely inconsistent, on pain of eternal death, would be an infinite reproach to the Deity. And to give his Son to die to do honour to such a law, would be inconsistent with all his perfections. And yet he asserts that the Gospel, which is supposed to reveal this shocking scene, is 'glorious,' and even more glorious than the law ;' whereas, if his scheme is true, there is no glory in law, or Gospel; unless it be glo rious to require inconsistencies on pain of eternal death; and glorious to do the highest honour, before the whole intellectual system, to a law in its own nature contradictory.

5. He represents the divine law, as requiring things not only inconsistent in their own nature with each other; but also inconsistent with our moral agency. For he says, p. 5.

A principle of self-love is essential to us moral agents." And yet he asserts that this 'self-love must be totally excluded from any place' in the heart of a guilty creature, if he loves God. p. 10. For Love to God and self-love are absolutely inconsistent.' And so, according to him, the moral law requires of us that love to God, which is inconsistent with our being moral agents. p. 50. 58. And yet, according to him, if we are not moral agents, we cannot be bound by the moral law to any obedience at all. Therefore,

6. He is necessitated to maintain, that man by the fall ceased to be a moral agent, and that it was no longer his duty to love God, for the law did not bind him; its binding authority respected not his obedience.' This was the state of Adam before the revelation of a Mediator, because it was inconsistent with self-love to exercise true love to God.' p. 50. And he asserts, p. 18. that mankind at this day, antecedent to their exercising faith in Christ, are in much the same condition as Adam was after he sinned.' Particularly he says, p. 20. that they are under the same inability of loving God that Adam was,' viz. It is absolutely inconsistent with that self-love which is essential to moral agency.' And therefore the unregenerate are not moral agents, nor bound by the moral law to obedience. And where there is no law, there is no transgression. And therefore Adam's total

depravity which took place after the first sin, was not of a criminal nature: and the same is true of the unregenerate now, who are under the same inability of loving God that Adam was.' And therefore total depravity does not disqualify for sealing ordinances.

And yet, in direct contradiction to all this, he affirms, that the unregenerate, while such, are moral agents, bound by the Jaw to the same perfect obedience which was required of Adam before the fall. p. 53. This I will readily grant, man is a moral agent, bound by the moral law to love God with all his heart; and therefore God may consistently require this of him, and man is wholly to blame for not loving.' For, p. 27. nothing short of perfection may be looked upon as the whole of what is required.' For he adds, to suppose that God has receded from his original demand of perfection, made in the law, implies that this law was not good,' which is' evidently a reflection upon the divine Being, whose law it is,' and 'a reproach upon Christ, who has honoured that law. And accordingly he affirms, p. 51. That God has given his law to show us what our duty is;' and he adds, p. 52. That by the law is the knowledge of sin.' Which supposes that the binding authority of the law does respect our obedience,' as much as it did Adam's before the fall. And that therefore we are moral agents with respect to the law of perfection, as really as he was. And that therefore it is not inconsistent in any child of Adam, with that self-love which is essential to moral agency, to yield a perfect obedience to the moral law. And that therefore we are not all depraved by nature. For this supposed inconsistency, he says,

is the true reason, and the only reason,' of the depravity of our nature. For had it not been for this inconsistency, Adam would have continued to love God after the fall as he did before. p. 44. He would have continued still to exercise the same delight in the divine perfections, as he had done before.' And yet he had said, p. 10. That Adam, by becoming guilty, was totally depraved.' And if he was totally depraved, and if total depravity and moral agency are consistent, if God may consistently require us to love God with all our hearts,' and if we are wholly to blame' for not loving

then our total depravity is totally criminal. But to persist obstinately in this crime, that is, to continue impenitent and unreconciled to God, after all the means used with us by God himself, disqualifies a man to be active in sealing God's covenant, for the same reason that obstinacy in any other crime does. Or if he will say, to love God is the same thing as to love misery,' and so our depravity is a calamity, but not a erime; then he must say, that we cease to be moral agents, and the law ceases to bind us: which, to use his own words, implies that this law was not good, which is evidently a reflection upon the divine Being, whose law it is, and a reproach upon Christ, who has honoured that law.'

7. Mr. M. is very zealous for a preparatory work, and to have the unregenerate sinner strive. p. 47-54. But without any consistence with himself. For on his scheme, what can the sinner consistently strive to do? not to love that character of God which is exhibited in the law; for this, according to him, is the same thing as to love his own misery,' which is ⚫ contrary to the law,' and in its own nature impossible. Not to love that character of God which is revealed in the Gospel; for the unenlightened sinner is by him supposed not to know it; p. 48. and to love an unknown character, implies a contradiction, and so is absolutely impossible. What then would Mr. M. have the sinner do, or strive to do? Let us attend to his own words, p. 51, 52. God has given us his law, not only to show us what our duty is; but also to set light before us, whereby we may obtain a proper conviction of our guilt. By the law, is the knowledge of sin. He has repeatedly commanded them to consider their ways; and calls upon them to exercise their reason. Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord.' But if God has given us his law to show us what our duty is, and if by the law is the knowledge of sin, and if we consider this, and if we exercise our reason on the subject, then we must conclude, that it is now every day the duty of all mankind to love that character of God which is exhibited in the moral law; and that it is the duty of all to whom the Gospel comes, to love that character of God which is revealed in the Gospel; and that it is exceeding sinful to live in the neglect of these duties. But if a sinner should thus be

gin to consider and exercise his reason, Mr. M. would soon stop him, by saying, "The unenlightened do not know that character of God which is revealed in the Gospel, and so cannot love it: and to love that character of God which is revealed in the law, is the same thing as to love their own misery, which is contrary to the law, and ought not to be done." What then shall the sinner do? or what shall he strive to do? Mr. M. says, (p. 51.) that such a conviction of our guilt, and just desert of suffering the curse of the law, as shall humble us, and bring us to submit to a sovereign God, is necessary to fit and prepare our hearts to close with Christ.' But by what means shall such convictions be obtained? How will you convince the sinner, that he deserves eternal damnation for not continuing in all things written in the book of the law to do them, particularly, for neglecting to love God, while he firmly believes, that the love of God and self-love are absolutely inconsistent?' and that, therefore it is < contrary to the law,' which requires self-love, to love God. The more the sinner considers, and exercises his reason, the more clearly will he see the inconsistence of these things.— Or, will Mr. M. tell the sinner, (as in p. 53.) to strive to obtain those discoveries of God through Christ, by which he will be reconciled to God?' But why, seeing on Mr. M.'s scheme, the sinner has no prejudices against this character of God to combat and strive against, but is naturally disposed to love it, as soon as known; why, if this be the case, should not the discoveries, already made in the bible, be immediately received and embraced? Did not Jacob love Rachel the first time he saw her? or did he spend two or three months, or as many years, after the first sight of her person, striving for a discovery of her beauty?

8. Mr. M. says, p. 9. That to Adam, after his fall, it must appear in every view, inconsistent with the divine perfectious,' that he should escape the curse of the law. But in these circumstances, (p, 10.) to delight in God was the same thing as to delight in his own misery;' and therefore, he adds, that Adam, by becoming guilty, was totally depraved. Because now the love of God and self-love were absolutely inconsistent.' And he says, (p. 10.) This was

the true reason, and the only reason, why Adam could not love God after the fall. And therefore as soon as a door of hope was opened by the revelation of a Mediator, Adam instantly returned to the love of God. And there is nothing in our fallen circumstances to prevent' our doing so too. p. 44. And that without any new principle of grace. p. 48. But if these things are true, it will follow, 1. That as soon as any man believes that there is forgiveness with God for sinners through Jesus Christ, he will cease to be totally depraved: because now the true reason, and the only reason,' of his total depravity, is removed: and therefore, 2. Every man who believes the Gospel to be true, is regenerate. And therefore, 3. Every man who knows, that he believes the Gospel to be true, does with equal certainty know that he is regenerate. Because this belief and regeneration are infallibly connected, according to Mr. M. But, 4. According to him, 'none but such as profess the Christian religion ought to be admitted into the church.' And, 5. According to him, none ought to profess, that they believe the Gospel to be true, unless they are infallibly certain that they do believe it to be true. For, speaking of the profession which is made when any join with the church, he says, (p. 79.) 'Suppose a man brought into a civil court, as a witness to a particular fact; and, being sworn, should positively declare the thing to be fact and after he comes out of court, his neighbour should ask him, whether he had any certain knowledge of the fact, about which he had given his evidence: and he should say, "No, I am not certain of it; but I hope it is so, it is my prevailing opinion; although I must confess, I have many doubts and fears, whether there is any truth in it, or not." Would not all mankind agree to call such a one a perjured person, who had taken a false oath?' No one, therefore, according to his scheme, may profess that he believes the Gospel to be true, unless he is infallibly certain of the fact, that he does believe it to be true. But if regeneration and this belief are infallibly connected, then this professor must be infallibly certain of his regeneration, and so not one soul, on Mr. M.'s scheme, may, or can be admitted into the church, as graceless. And thus his scheme overthrows itself.