whole British force, and so much exposed, that it has been a cause of astonishment, they preserved their ground so long, ⚫ and ultimately succeeded in retreating. Whose blame this was, I know not: it was not mine; nor did it meet with my approba• tion.'

Pinkney's estimate of this new order of battle, was not better than Stansbury's. In his narrative, he says: The fifth regiment, which had been removed from its position, where it 'might have contrived to repulse the enemy in his attempts to leave the vicinity of the bridge, had now, to the great discouragement of my companies and of the artillery, been made to retire to a 'hill, several hundred yards in our rear, but visible nevertheless 'to the enemy; where it could do little more than display its gallantry. The two companies of General Stansbury's brigade, acting as riflemen, had changed their station, so that Ino longer perceived them. The residue of General Stansbury's brigade had been moved from the left, and made to take ground (invi•sible to us by reason of the intervening orchard) on the right of 'the fifth regiment, with its own right resting upon the main road, and disclosed to the enemy."

The

Winder is careful to show, that whatever may be the demerits of this order of battle, he is not responsible for them. Upon inquiry,' he says, I learnt that General Stansbury was on a rising ground, on the left of his line. I rode immediately thither, and found him and colonel Monroe together. latter gentleman informed me, that he had been aiding General Stansbury to post his command, and wished me to proceed and 'examine it, to see how far I approved of it. The column of the "enemy at this moment appeared in view, about a mile distant, 'moving up the Eastern Branch, parallel to our position. From 'the left, where I was, I perceived that if the position of the advanced artillery were forced, that two or three pieces upon 'the left of Stansbury, would be necessary to scour an orchard 'which lay between his line and his artillery, and for another 'rifle company to increase the support of this artillery. These were promptly sent forward by General Smith, and posted as bastily as possible, and it was barely accomplished, before I 'was obliged to give orders to the advanced artillery to open upon the enemy, who was descending the street towards the bridge-all further examination or movement was now impos'sible.'

Hence it is evident, that excepting only the additional support given to the artillery on the left, and which is not among the things complained of, General Winder had nothing to do with the order of battle. But besides letting us into this secret, we have also a pretty distinct intimation who was the great tactician of the day; and who it was that arranged and disarranged

6

front, and flank, and rear, in the face of an enemy, and in the presence of the commanding General, and without his consent, or approbation, or knowledge. The full disclosure of this important character is, however, reserved for Col. Sterret's statement: 'The 5th regiment,' says this officer, 'was formed under the direction ' of colonel Monroe, on the left, and in line with General Stansbu'ry's brigade: And again, I ought to notice, that the first line 'formed on the battle ground was changed under the directions of colonel Monroe.' Here then is the most positive proof, that whatever injury was done by the alteration of the first order of battle, (as stated by Stansbury and Pinkney and Sterret,) was exclusively the work of Mr. Secretary Monroe. Still, the picture would be incomplete, were it not for the attempt, after doing the mischief, to escape the odium. Caught in the very act of changing the disposition, and substituting for it one that placed the different corps beyond sustaining distance, this could no longer be either denied or concealed;-but the case was not desperate, and a loop hole for retreat was found, in ascribing the plan to some other and unknown person:-"Remember," said he," that though you see me busy, the plan is not mine."

Nor did this propensity to error, or power to commit it, terminate here. Every man, who in this day of disgrace retained his senses, saw that the enemy's attack was a coup de main ; that without cavalry and cannon, he contemplated only sudden irruption and rapid retreat; that though irresistible in the field, by an ill-organized and badly commanded militia, yet that the first strong position that should be taken, by even this rabble, would necessarily stop his career and convert his attack into flight; that the Capitol offered a position of this kind, impregnable to small arms and rockets-and flanked by other strong brick buildings, equally redoubtable-and that a sufficient force remained unbroken and unengaged, to occupy and defend this post. Gen. Armstrong, the Secretary of War, saw these advantages, and wished to seize them, but, twice interdicted by the President from interfering with the command of the army,*

When it was decided that Col. Monroe should accompany the army and superintend its movements, it was feared that the Secretary of War, unless gagged and pinioned, might take measures that would thwart this arrangement, and perhaps defeat it. To prevent any interference of this kind, it was therefore determined that no order of his, oral or written, should be given to any General or other officer, unless previously submitted to the inspection of the President; and he was accordingly served with a rule to this purpose, on the 13th day of August, seven days before the campaign began. It is true, that when the danger approached, and when it was seen that the enemy had reached the gates, without disturbance or opposition of any kind, this order was relaxed, and the aid of the Secretary, to give direction to the army, was even requested,-but it is also true, that the sight of Mr. Monroe and his assurance that all was done that could be done,' quieted the alarm,

he could but offer the opinion, that if Peter's corps, with the ' remains of Barney's and the two battalions of the 36th and '38th regular regiments, (who had not yet fired a gun,) were made to occupy the wings of the Capitol, and the covered space between these, (with such exterior support as would 'furnish a supply of bread and water, and ammunition,) the enemy might be checked, and the post defended.* This advice was not relished by either the General de jure, or the General de facto; the former plead the dispersion of the troops, their dispirited condition and unfitness for a desperate defence, and the utter impossibility of giving to such garrison any exterior support whatever: the latter believed that much would be hazarded by an attempt near the Capitol. I knew,' says he in his letter to the investigating committee, (page 70 of the Documents) that a column of the enemy had advanced from the high 'ground which had been held by our troops, and meeting, as they would, with no opposition, might take possession of the 'heights above the City, and thus force our troops, in case of a new disaster, into the plain between the Capitol, the Eastern 'branch, and the Potomac. Whereas, by occupying the heights ' above Georgetown, the enemy must either attack us to disad'vantage, or entering the city, expose his right flank and rear to 'an attack from us.'t

6

In presenting these instances of Col. Monroe's military interference, from the 20th to the 24th of August, not selected to serve a particular purpose, but taken indiscriminately, and in succession, the dispassionate inquirer cannot overlook the fact, that every interposition involved an error-and that every error directly contributed to the disgrace of our arms and the destruction of the Capitol.

Fifth. We have at length happily reached the last cause assigned for the capture of Washington, viz. the rejection of our historian's services, tendered on the 18th of August; and as the public will no doubt sufficiently appreciate this cause, we shall content ourselves with giving the text, without thinking it at all necessary to add a commentary.

'Being interdicted,' says the historian, the use of my sword,

and produced a renewal of the injunction, that "Military functionaries should "be left to the discharge of their own duties, upon their own responsibility." * We find this proposition referred to, and argued, in Gen. Winder's narrative, (page 168 of the Documents) but he omitted to state the quarter from which it came. That the question was started by himself, or by Mr. Monroe, will not be asserted.

The column of the enemy, which Mr. Monroe knew had advanced from the high grounds which had been occupied by our troops,' and which he so much feared would drive the American army into a cul de sac, was, in medical language, a mere hallucination—a conceit, of a disordered brain No column of the enemy approached the City till sunset.

I had left the City of Washington, for the summer; but a domestic misfortune carried me back in the beginning of August, and I found every thing quiet in respect to the defence of the place. On the 18th of the month, observing the parade of several volunteer companies of the City and Georgetown, I inquired the cause, and was informed advice had reached the City of the approach of the enemy by the Patuxent. On the evening of the same day, I received a note from Col. Monroe, advising me that the menacing movements of the enemy up the bay had determined him to reconnoitre them, for which purpose he intended leaving the City the next morning. I had before been apprised of the arrival of Admiral Cochrane in the Chesapeake, and the increase of the enemy's shipping, and made no doubt the attack I had long expected was now to be carried into execution. I could not discover that any precautions had been taken to obstruct the march of the enemy, and I knew that no efficient preparations had been made to resist them. I was, at this time, quartered with a revolutionary officer, who had spilt his blood in the cause of his coun⚫ try, and he will recollect my solicitude for the safety of the City; my ideas of the route by which the enemy would approach it, and the best mode of resisting them. I felt most sensibly for my country, and, with agony of mind, in my answer to colonel Monroe's note, proposed that, could my arrest be suspended, and my sword be restored for a short period, I would take the command of the militia, and save the City, or forfeit my life. This was a proffer of dire responsibility at so late an hour: but I preferred death, to inaction, at such

a crisis.

'Having received no reply to my note to colonel Monroe, I left the metropolis on the 20th, being persuaded President Madison would have hazarded the burning up of the whole district, sooner than discompose the harmony of the Cabinet, by giving offence to Secretary Armstrong. [*] I am indeed shocked when I take a retrospect of the evidences which fell under my own observation, at that time, of the terror in which that minister kept more than one great man at Washington; for I would sooner cease to exist, than live in fear of an equal. Sick and disgusted, I retired to the mountains, for the restoration of my health:'

[*] The General could not believe that his friend Monroe had any views of his own that could interfere with this patriotic proposal, and therefore lays the blame on the President, and Secretary of War, who never heard of it until the General himself told the story. We do not, however, mean by this remark, to insinuate that if they had known, they would have accepted, the proposition. They knew well, already, that in the General's vocabulary, as in his practice, promising and performing were things not at all connected

with each other.

ART. IX.-Remarks on the present state of Currency, Trade, Commerce, and National Industry, in reply to an Address of the Tammany Society of New-York. By OLIVER WOLCOTT, Governor of the State of Connecticut, pp. 45. New-York,

1820.

2. Review of the Trade and Commerce of New-York, from 1815 to the present time; with an inquiry into the causes of the present distress, and the means of obviating it. By An Observer, pp. 43. New-York, 1820.

3. Thoughts on Political Economy, in two parts. By DANIEL RAYMOND, Counsellor at Law, pp. 470. Baltimore, 1820.

OUR country can no longer boast of the trade she once enjoyed. In our eastern cities commerce has declined apace, real estate has suffered depreciation, commodities have fallen in value, while industry, no longer finding its former employment, languishes without reward. In our Western country, the value of land has experienced a great decline, its produce remains unpurchased, and a depreciating currency is spreading its destructive influence, and laying the foundation for permanent distress.

In the Review of the Trade and Commerce of New York, the writer recurs to the period commencing with the French Revolution, during which we realized such large profits from the trade of the world which then fell into our hands. He conceives that the causes which created the nominal high prices existing after that period, and which, although reduced, have not yet fallen to their lowest ebb, are to be traced to the circumstances-that the whole wealth and credit of the world were called into forced activity, and kept in circulation-and that the paper system lent its efficient aid to create a nominal capital, and vastly to increase the circulating medium: and by a table giving the prices of the articles of necessity, it appears, that from 1770 to 1790 they had increased one fourth; whereas, from 1790 to 1815, they had more than doubled. The author very properly ascribes the failures and consequent distress that took place after the peace, in a great measure, to that system of over-trading which our Banks contributed to promote; and gives a correct view of the manner in which these facilities were obtained, and of the evil consequences that resulted to our trade from the system of management they adopted. He correctly ascribes the losses that were sustained in 1817, to a fall in the price of foreign commodities, occasioned by a supply disproportioned to our means; and the losses of 1819 to a fall in the price of our own produce in consequence of a general reduction of the nominal value of commodities throughout the commercial world. We have noticed this pamphlet, not because there is any thing profound in its reasonings, or labour