1829. DOE the amount of the costs, which must come out of that fund Exch. of Pleas, in the event of the verdict being found against the corporation. In either view of the case, therefore, he was an incompetent witness, and the consequence will be that the verdict must be set aside, and the rule made absolute. HULLOCK, B.-I am of the same opinion. The question is simply whether a member of a corporation is a competent witness in an action by the corporation, in respect of corporation property. Independently of the release, no question could be entertained; for he is interested not only in the property to be recovered, but also in the fund out of which the costs may, in one event, ultimately come. In order to strip him of his interest, and to render him competent, a release is put in, by which he releases his right in respect of this property. But, assuming that the corporation are unsuccessful in this action, out of what fund are the costs to come? Undoubtedly out of the funds of the corporation; with respect to which, notwithstanding the release, the witness retains his interest. I happen to know a corporation, the members of which are in the receipt of large sums of money, the whole of which are distributed amongst themselves. Surely, in such a case, it would be impossible to say that the individual members. would not be interested when the divisible fund must necessarily be increased or diminished by their success or failure in the action. Under these circumstances, I confess, notwithstanding the old cases which have been cited, that in my opinion this witness was incompetent. To decide otherwise, would, I think, unsettle a principle well established and universally adopted at almost every assizes that occur. VAUGHAN, B.-I concur in the opinion expressed by my learned brothers. In the case of Weller v. The Governors V. Тооти. 1829. DOE Exch. of Pleas, of the Foundling Hospital, the witnesses were admitted because they were mere trustees, and had not the least personal interest. That is not the case here, and wherever it is once admitted that a witness has an actual and direct interest in a fund which may be affected by the verdict, he is thereby rendered incompetent. v. TOOTH. Rule absolute. Where no mo- client, the Court will not allow costs to an indi vidual conduct- roll of the Courts omitting to take as such, is inca- BigH6. 61. YOUNG v. DOWLMAN. THE plaintiff in this case discontinued his action. On the taxation of costs, it was objected, on the part of the plaintiff, that the person acting as attorney for the defendant was not an attorney of the Court, having been struck off the roll of attornies in the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, and, having for some years omitted to take out his certificate as a solicitor of the Court of Chancery, although he had subsequently taken out a certificate without obtaining leave from the Court for that purpose. No advances of money having been made by the defendant, the Master, under the circumstances, refused to allow the costs; upon which Humfrey obtained a rule to shew cause why the Master should not be directed to review his taxation; against which Patteson shewed case. The question is, whether this person, not being an attorney of the Court of King's Bench, or of the Common Pleas, or a solicitor in Chancery, having ceased to take out his certificate as such, is entitled to recover his costs in this case. It is not a question between the plaintiff and defendant, but merely as respects the party assuming the character of an attorney, for he has no 1829. YOUNG บ. DOWLMAN. remedy against his client, who cannot therefore be damni- Exch. of Pleas, fied by withholding these costs. This circumstance distinguishes this case from that of Reader v. Bloom (a), which may be relied upon in support of the application; for the judgment of the Chief Justice in that case proceeds upon the assumption that advances had been made. If any money had been paid by the defendant to this person, it would be impossible to contend that the client ought not to be indemnified, but this is an application for costs which cannot be recovered against the client. Humfrey, contra.-According to the practice both of the King's Bench and Common Pleas, this rule ought to be made absolute. That of the latter Court was settled in the case of Reader v. Bloom, in which the same arguments were resorted to as upon the present occasion, but the Court, notwithstanding, refused the rule which sought to deprive the party of his costs: and Mr. Justice Park said (b): "The meaning of the statute is, that, if a non-attorney sues for extra costs, he shall not recover them against his client." In Tidd's Practice, p. 77, it is laid down, that "it is no ground of objection to bail, 2 Chit. Rep. 98, nor for cancelling a bail-bond, 1 D. & R. 215, or setting aside proceedings, that the attorney by whom the bail was put in, or who sued out the writ, had neglected to take out his certificate: and the circumstance of the plaintiff's cause having been conducted by an attorney who has not obtained his certificate, does not deprive the plaintiff of his right to full costs against the defendant." GARROW, B.-I should be sorry, if, upon the present occasion, we were called upon to adopt a rule different from that which has been acted upon by the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas; but, in discharging this (a) 10 B. Moore, 261; S. C. 3 Bingh. 9. (b) 3 Bingh, 11. 1829. YOUNG v. DOWLMAN. Exch. of Pleas, rule, we shall not infringe upon the decisions to which allusion has been made, because the case is, in its circumstances, altogether distinguishable from those which have been cited. I think, that, in this case, the Master has exercised a sound discretion. The party making this application has been struck off the roll of attornies of two of the common-law Courts of Westminster Hall; and although he still remains upon the roll of the Court of Chancery as a solicitor, yet, having omitted to take out his certificate, he is not entitled to practise as such, although he has subsequently, improperly, and surreptitiously obtained a certificate without procuring leave from the Court for that purpose. There can be no doubt, that, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the latter is entitled to receive from the plaintiff all the costs which he may have incurred, and, if it had happened that this person, before he undertook the business, had required an advance of money, the Court would not have interfered to prevent the taxation of costs to that extent, because they would have been unwilling to disturb the rights of his client. But the question in this case is not between the client and his opponent, but whether, where acts of Parliament require certain things to be done, in order to capacitate persons to practise as attornies, and to recover their fees, and those requisites are not complied with, the Court will, notwithstanding, lend their assistance to enable the offending party to recover his costs. To do this, would, in If costs were allowed my opinion, work an injury to suitors. HULLOCK, B.-I am entirely of the same opinion, and think that, if this rule were not to be discharged, this 1829. YOUNG บ. DOWLMAN. Court would be holding out a premium to individuals Exch. of Pleas, who have been struck off the rolls of other Courts to practise in this. This is not a case in which the plaintiff is to lose or be deprived of his costs: if he had made any advances of money, he had an opportunity of saying so; but, the question is, whether a person, who is admitted to be incapable of practising in the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, and, in point of law, is incompetent to practise in the Court of Chancery, is entitled to call upon this Court, to lend their assistance to enable him to recover his costs. After the interval of twelve months, an attorney is not entitled to take out his certificate as of course, but must first apply to the Court upon an affidavit of the circumstances which have occasioned the omission. Can any one doubt, that, if this person had applied to the Court of Chancery, stating the circumstances of his case, that Court would have refused his application? I own, that, if the case cited had been precisely analogous to this, my opinion would be unchanged, for I cannot think that any Court should countenance an application like this. Such a doctrine, would, in my opinion, be fraught with the greatest injustice, and be highly derogatory to the dignity of the Court. VAUGHAN, B.-I confess that my mind has in some measure fluctuated during the discussion of this case, in consequence of the decision in the Court of Common Pleas, to which allusion has been made. Upon examination, however, it will be found that the Chief Justice, in his judgment, proceeds upon an assumption that the plaintiff had at the outset made advances to the party who conducted his cause, which circumstance distinguishes that case from the present, for here no advances have been made; and the question resolves itself into this simple point, whether this Court will lend itself to put money into the pocket of an individual, who, not being an attorney of the Courts of |