judges are able to produce for the justifying of these their proceedings.

VI. "The multiplying of prohibitions in divers causes, but of the same nature, after consultations formerly 5 awarded." We suppose, that as well his majesty's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as also very many of his poor but dutiful subjects are greatly prejudiced by the granting of divers several prohibitions and consultations in causes of one of the same nature and condition, and upon the self10 same suggestions. For example, in case of beating a clerk, the prohibition being granted upon this suggestion, that all pleas" de vi et armis" belong to the crown, etc. notwithstanding a consultation doth thereupon ensue; yet the very next day after, if the like suggestion be 15 made upon the beating of another clerk, even in the same court another prohibition is awarded. As also where 570. prohibitions have been granted since the late queen's time into the court of arches, as before is mentioned, and but 113. consultations afterwards upon so 20 many of them obtained; yet it is evident by the said consultations, that in effect all the rest of the said prohibitions ought not to have been awarded, as being grounded upon the same suggestions, whereupon consultations have been formerly granted: and so it followeth, that the 25 causes, why consultations were awarded upon the rest of the said prohibitions, were for that either the plaintiffs in the court ecclesiastical were driven for saving of further charge to compound, to their loss, with their adversaries, or were not able to sue for them; or being able, yet 30 through strength of opposition against them, were constrained to desist; which is an argument to us, that the temporal judges do wittingly and willingly grant prohibitions, whereupon they know beforehand, that consultations are due and if we mistake any thing in the 35 premises, we desire your lordships, that the judges, for the justification of their courses, may better inform us.

VII. "New forms of consultations, not expressing the cause of the granting of them." Whereas upon the granting of consultations, the judges in times past did therein express and acknowledge the causes so remitted to be of ecclesiastical cognizance, which were precedents 5 and judgments for the better assurance of ecclesiastical judges, that they might afterward hold plea in such cases, and the like; and were also some bar as well to the temporal judges themselves, as also to many troublesome and contentious persons from either granting or seeking pro- 10 hibitions in such cases, when so it did appear unto them upon record, that consultations had been formerly granted in them; they the said temporal judges have now altered that course, and do only tell us, that they grant their consultations "certis de causis ipsos apud Westm. mo- 15 ventibus," not expressing the same particularly according to their ancient precedents. By means whereof the temporal judges leave themselves at liberty without prejudice, though they deny a consultation, at another time; upon the same matter contentious persons are animated, finding no cause expressed, why they may not at another time seek for a prohibition in the same cause, and the ecclesiastical judges are left at large to think what they list, being no way instructed, of the nature of the cause, which procured the consultation: the reason of which alteration in such con- 25 sultations, we humbly entreat your lordships, that the judges, for our better instruction, may be required to express.

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VIII. "That consultations may be obtained with less charge and difficulty." The great expenses and manifold difficulties in obtaining of consultations are become very 30 burdensome to those that seek for them; for nowadays through the malice of the plaintiffs in the temporal courts, and the covetous humours of the clerks, prohibitions are so extended and enlarged, without any necessity of the matter (some one prohibition containing more words and 35 lines, than forty prohibitions in ancient times) as by

means thereof the party in the ecclesiastical court, against whom the prohibition is granted, becomes either unwilling or unable to sue for a consultation, it being now usual and ordinary, that in the consultations must be 5 recited in eadem verba❞ the whole tenor of the prohibition, be it never so long; for the which (to omit divers other fees which are very great) he must pay for a draught of it in paper 8d. the sheet, and for the entry of it 12d. the sheet. Furthermore the prohibition is quick 10 and speedy; for it is ordinarily granted out of court by any one of the judges in his chamber; whereas the consultation is very slowly and hardly obtained, not without (oftentimes) costly motions in open court, pleadings, demurrers, and sundry judicial hearings of both parties, and 15 long attendance for the space of two or three, nay sometimes of eight or nine years before it be obtained. The inconvenience of which proceedings is so intolerable, as we trust such as are to grant consultations, will by your lordships' means not only do it expeditely, and moderate 20 the said fees, but also reform the length of the said consultations, according to the forms of consultations in the register.

IX." Prohibitions not to be granted upon frivolous suggestions." It is a prejudice and derision to both his 25 majesty's ecclesiastical and temporal jurisdictions, that many prohibitions are granted upon trifling and frivolous suggestions, altogether unworthy to proceed from the one, or to give any hinderance or interruption to the other; as upon a suit of tithes brought by a minister 30 against his parishioner, a prohibition flieth out upon suggestion, that in regard of a special receipt, called a cup of buttered beer, made by the great skill of the said parishioner, to cure a grievous disease called a cold, which sorely troubled the said minister, all his tithes were dis35 charged. And likewise a woman being convented for adultery committed with one, that suspiciously resorted

to her house in the night time, the suggestion of a prohibition in this case was, that " omnia placita de nocturnis ambulationibus" belong to the king, etc. Also where a legatary sued for his legacy given in a will, the prohibition was "quia omnia placita de donis et concessionibus 5 spectant ad forum regium, et non ad forum ecclesiasticum, dummodo non sint de testamento et matrimonio:" as if a legacy were not "donatio de" or "in testamento;" with many other of like sort. The reformation of all which frivolous proceedings so chargeable notwithstanding to 10 many poor men, and the great hinderance to justice, we humbly refer to your lordships' consideration.

X. "No prohibition to be granted at his suit, the who is plaintiff in the spiritual court." We suppose it to be no warrantable nor reasonable course, that prohibitions 15 are granted at the suit of the plaintiff in the ecclesiastical court, who having made choice thereof, and brought his adversary there into trial, doth by all intendment of law and reason, and by the usage of all other judicial places conclude himself in that behalf; and although he cannot 20 be presumed to hope for help in any other court by way of prohibition, yet it is very usual for every such person so proceeding, only of mere malice, for vexation of the party, and to the great delay and hinderance of justice, to find favour for the obtaining of prohibitions, sometimes 2 after two or three sentences, thereby taking advantage (as he must plead) of his own wrong, and receiving aid from that court, which by his own confession, he before did contemn; touching the equity whereof we will expect the answer of the judges.

XI." No prohibition to be granted but upon due consideration of the libel." It is, we are persuaded, a great abuse, and one of the chief grounds of the most of the former abuses and many other, that prohibitions are granted without sight of the libel in the ecclesiastical court; yea sometimes before the libel be there exhibited;

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whereas by the laws and statutes of this realm, as we think, the libel (being a brief declaration of the matter in debate between the plaintiff and defendant) is appointed as the only rule and direction for the due granting of a 5 prohibition; the reason whereof is evident, viz. upon diligent consideration of the libel it will easily appear, whether the cause belong to the temporal or ecclesiastical cognizance; as on the other side, without sight of the libel the prohibition must needs range and rove with 10 strange and foreign suggestions, at the will and pleasure of the devisor, nothing pertinent to the matter in demand: whereupon it cometh to pass, that when the judge ecclesiastical is handling a matter of simony, a prohibition is grounded upon a suggestion, that the court trieth 15" placita de advocationibus ecclesiarum et de jure patronatus." And when the libel containeth nothing but the demand of tithe wool and lamb, the prohibition surmiseth a custom of paying of tithe pigeons. So that if it may be made a matter of conscience to grant prohibitions only 20 where they do rightly lie, or to preserve the jurisdiction ecclesiastical, united to his majesty's crown, it cannot, we hope, but seem necessary to your lordships, that due consideration be first had of the libel in the ecclesiastical court, before any prohibition be granted.

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XII. "No prohibition to be granted under pretence, that one witness cannot be received in the ecclesiastical court to ground a judgment upon." There is a new devised suggestion in the temporal courts commonly received and allowed, whereby they may at their will and 30 pleasure draw any cause whatsoever from the ecclesiastical court. For example; many prohibitions have lately come forth upon this suggestion, that the laws ecclesiastical do require two witnesses, where the common law accepteth of one; and therefore it is "contra legem terræ" for the ecclesiastical judge to insist upon two witnesses to prove his cause: upon which suggestion,

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