tion of caufe and effect in either of thefe two lights; but beyond thefe, we have no idea of it *.

To recapitulate, therefore, the reafonings of this fection: Every idea is copied from fome preceding impreffion or fentiment; and where we cannot find any impreffion, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all fingle inftances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impreffion, nor confequently can fuggeft any idea, of power or neceffary connexion. But when many uniform inftances appear, and the fame object is always followed by the fame event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new fentiment or impreffion, to wit, a cuftomary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its ufual attendant;" and this fentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arifes from a number of fimilar inftances, and not from any fingle inftance; it must arife from that circumftance, in which the number of inftances differ from every individual inftance. But this customary connexion or tranfition of the imagination is the only circumftance, in which they differ. In every other particular they are alike. The first inftance which we faw of motion, communicated by the fhock of two billiard-balls (to return to this obvious illuftration) is exactly fimilar to any inftance that may, at prefent, occur to us; except only, that we could not, at first, infer one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at prefent, after so long a course of uniform experience. I know not, whether the reader will readily apprehend this reafoning. I am afraid, that, fhould I multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of

* See NOTE [E].

lights,

lights, it would only become more obscure and intricate, In all abstract reasonings, there is one point of view, which, if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards illuftrating the subject, than by all the eloquence and copious expreffion in the world. This point of view we fhould endeavour to reach, and referve the flowers of thetoric for fubjects which are more adapted to them.

SECTION VIII.

Of LIBERTY and NECESSITY.

PART I.

T might reasonably be expected, in queftions, which have been canvaffed and difputed with great eagernefs, fince the first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at leaft, fhould have been agreed upon among the difputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real fubject of the controverfy. For how eafy may it feem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make thefe definitions, not the mere found of words, the object of future fcrutiny and examination? But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we fhall be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided, we may prefume, that there is some ambiguity in the expreffion, and that the difputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controverfy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwife nothing could be more fruitless than to reafon or difpute together; it were impoffible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms, that they could fo long

form

form different opinions of the fame fubject; efpecially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true; if men attempt the difcuffion of queftions, which. lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitlefs contefts, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the question regard any fubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preferve the dispute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions, which keep the antagonifts ftill at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

This has been the cafe in the long difputed queftion concerning liberty and neceffity; and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we fhall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the fame opinion with regard to this fubject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvaffed on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophistry, that it is no wonder, if a fenfible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the propofal of fuch a queftion, from which he can expect neither inftruction nor entertainment. But the ftate of the argument here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promifes at least fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not much disturb his eafe by any intricate or obfcure reafoning.

I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of neceffity and of

liberty,

liberty, according to any reasonable fenfe, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doctrine of neccility.

It is univerfally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every natural effect is fo precifely determined by the energy of its caufe, that no other effect, in such particular circumThe ftances, could poffibly have refulted from it. degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with fuch exactness, that a living creature may as soon arise from the fhock of two bodies, as motion, in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a juft and precife idea of neceffity, we must confider whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

It seems evident, that, if all the fcenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before, we should never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of neceffity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say, upon fuch a fuppofition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could poffibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes entirely from the uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature; where fimilar ob

jects