or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confefs, that it is not reafoning which engages us to fuppofe the paft refembling the future, and to expect fimilar effects from caufes, which are, to appearance, fimilar. This is the propofition which I intended to enforce in the prefent fection. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I muft acknowledge myfelf to be indeed a very backward scholar; fince I cannot now discover an argument, which, it feems, was perfectly familiar to to me, long before I was out of my cradle.

E 1

SECTION V..

SCEPTICAL SOLUTION of thefe DOUBTS.

PART

THE paffion for philofophy, like that for religion,

feems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclination, and pufh the mind, with more determined refolution, towards that fide, which already draws too much, by the biafs and propenfity of the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we afpire to the magnanimous firmness of the philofophic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at laft, render our philofòphy like that of EPICTETUS, and other Stoics, only a more refined fyftem of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue, as well as focial enjoyment. While we ftudy with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and tranfitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all the while, flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the bustle of the world, and drudgery of bufinefs, feeks a pretence of reafon, to give itfelf a full and uncontroled indulgence. There is, however, one fpecies of philofophy, which feems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it ftrikes in with no

diforderly paffion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propenfity, and that is the ACADEMIC or SCEPTICAL philofophy. The academics talk always of doubt and fufpenfe of judgment, of danger in hafty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than fuch a philofophy to the fu pine indolence of the mind, its rafh arrogance, its lofty pretenfions, and its fuperftitious credulity. Every paffion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; and that paffion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. It is furprifing, therefore, that this philofophy, which, in almoft every inftance, must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of fo much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumstance, which renders it fo innocent, is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and refentment. By flattering no irregular paffion, it gains few partizans: By opposing so many vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who ftigmatize it as libestine, profane, and irreligious.

Nor need we fear, that this philofophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, fhould ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts fo far as to destroy all action, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for inftance, as in the foregoing fection, that, in all reafonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is not supported by any argument or procefs of the understanding; there is no danger, that these reafonings, on which almost

all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by fuch a difcovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by fome other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the fame. What that principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry.

Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reafon and reflection, to be brought on a fudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual fucceffion of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, at firft, by any reafoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; fince the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the fenfes; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely becaufe one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the caufe, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and cafual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of the one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, fuch a perfon, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter or fact, or be affured of any thing beyond what was immediately prefent to his memory and fenfes.

Suppose again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived fo long in the world as to have observed fimilar objects or events to be conftantly conjoined together; what is the confequence of this experience? He immediately infers the exiftence of the one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the fecret power, by which the one object produces the other;