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SECTION I.

Of the DIFFERENT SPECIES of PHI

LOSOPHY.

M

ORAL philofophy, or the fcience of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, inftruction, and refor mation of mankind. The one confiders man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his actions by tafte and fentiment; purfuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects feem to poffefs, and according to the light in which they prefent themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this fpecies of philofophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an eafy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They felect the moft ftriking obfervations and inftances from common life; place oppofite characters in a proper contraft; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in thefe paths by the foundeft precepts and most illuftrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they B 2

think,

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think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

The other fpecies of philofophers confider man in the light of a reafonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of fpeculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find thofe principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our fentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond contro. verfy, the foundation of morals, reafoning, and criticifm; and fhould for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the fource of thefe diftinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular inftances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiofity must be bounded. Though their fpeculations feem abftract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wife; and think themselves fufficiently compenfated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can difcover fome hidden truths, which may contribute to the inftruction of pofterity,

It is certain, that the eafy and obvious philofophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abftrufe; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more ufeful than the other. It enters more into

common

common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principies which actuate men, reform their conduct, and brings them nearer that model of perfection which it defcribes. On the contrary, the abftrufe philofophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into bufinefs and action, vanishes when the philofopher leaves the fhade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles eafily retain any influ ence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our paffions, the vehemence of our affections, diffipate all its conclufions, and reduce the profound philofopher to a mere plebeian.

This alfo must be confeffed, that the moft durable, as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philofophy, and that abftract reasoners feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to fupport their renown with more equitable pofterity. It is eafy for a profound philofopher to com→ mit a mistake in his fubtile reasonings; and one miftake is the neceffary parent of another, while he pushes on his confequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclufion, by its unufual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philofopher, who proposes only to represent the common fenfe of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he commit a mistake, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illufions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at prefent; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. LA BRUYERE paffes the feas, and ftill maintains his reputation: But the glory of MAle

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