plaufe. The present theory is the fimple refult of all thefe inferences, each of which feems founded on uniform experience and obfervation.

Were it doubtful, whether there were any fuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we fee, in numberlefs inftances, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interefts of fociety, is fo highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; fince it is impoffible for any thing to please as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful, whether there were, implanted in our nature, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we fee, in numberless inftances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that it is impoffible, but that every thing, which promotes the intereft of fociety, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneafinefs. But when thefe different reflections and obfervations concur in establishing the fame conclufion, muft they not beftow an undisputed evidence upon it ?

It is however hoped, that the progrefs of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the prefent theory, by fhowing the rife of other fentiments of esteem and regard from the fame or like principles.

SECTION VI.

Of QUALITIES USEFUL to OURSELVES.

PARTI.

IT feems evident, that, where a quality or habit is fubjected to our examination, if it appear, in any respect, prejudicial to the person possessed of it, or such as incapacitates him for business and action, it is inftantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections. Indolence, negligence, want of order and method, obftinacy, fickleness, rashness, credulity; these qualities were never efteemed by any one indifferent to a character; much lefs, extolled as accomplishments or virtues. The prejudice, resulting from them, immediately ftrikes our eye, and gives us the fentiment of pain and difapprobation.

No quality, it is allowed, is abfolutely either blameable or praise-worthy. It is all according to its degree. A due medium, fay the PERIPATETICS, is the characteristic of virtue. But this medium is chiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for inftance, and dispatch in business, is commendable. When defective, no progrefs is ever made in the execution of any purpose: When exceffive, it engages us in precipitate and illconcerted measures and enterprises: By fuch reasonings, we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all

moral

moral and prudential difquifitions; and never lofe view of the advantages, which refult from any character or habit.

Now as these advantages are enjoyed by the person poffeffed of the character, it can never be felf-love which renders the prospect of them agreeable to us, the fpectators, and prompts our efteem and approbation. No force of imagination can convert us into another perfon, and make us fancy, that we, being that perfon, reap benefit from those valuable qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no celerity of imagination could immediately transport us back, into ourfelves, and make us love and efteem the perfon, as different from us. Views and fentiments, fo oppofite to known truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the fame time, in the fame perfon. All fufpicion, therefore, of selfish regards, is here totally excluded. It is a quite different principle, which actuates our bofom, and interefts us in the felicity of the perfon whom we contemplate. Where his natu ral talents and acquired abilities give us the prospect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, profperous fuccefs, a fteady command over fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous undertakings; we are ftruck with fuch agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately arife towards him. The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, profperity, are connected with every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleating fentiment of fympathy and humanity

Let us fuppofe a perfon originally framed fo as to have no manner of concern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the happiness and mifery of all fenfible beings with greater indifference than even two contiguous fhades

* See NOTE [GG].

of

of the fame colour. Let us fuppofe, if the profperity of nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and he were defired to choofe; that he would ftand, like the fchoolman's afs, irrefolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the same afs between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination or propensity to either fide. The confequence, I believe, must be allowed juft, that fuch a perfon, being abfolutely unconcerned, either for the public good of a community or the private utility of others, would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial, to fociety, or to its poffeffor, with the fame indifference as on the most common and uninteresting object.

But if, inftead of this fancied monfter, we fuppofe a man to form a judgment or determination in the case, there is to him a plain foundation of preference, where every thing else is equal; and however cool his choice. may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the perfons interefted be remote from him; there muft ftill be a choice or diftinction between what is useful, and what is pernicious. Now this diftinction is the fame in all its parts, with the moral diftinction, whofe foundation has been fo often, and fo much in vain, enquired after. The fame endowments of the mind, in every circumftance, are agreeable to the fentiment of morals and to that of humanity; the fame temper is fufceptible of high degrees of the one fentiment and of the other; and the fame alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or by connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of philofophy, therefore, we muft conclude, that these fentiments are originally the fame; fince, in each particular, even the most minute, they are governed by the fame laws, and are moved by the fame objects.

Why

Why do philofophers infer, with the greatest certainty, that the moon is kept in its orbit by the fame force of gravity, that makes bodies fall near the furface of the earth, but because these effects are, upon computation, found fimilar and equal? And muft not this argument bring as strong conviction, in moral as in natural difquifitions?

To prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, ufeful to the poffeffor, are approved of, and the contrary cenfured, would be fuperfluous. The leaft reflection on what is every day experienced in life, will be fufficient. We fhall only mention a few inftances, in order to remove, if poffible, all doubt and hesitation.

The quality, the moft neceffary for the execution of any useful enterprife, is DISCRETION; by which we carry on a fafe intercourfe with others, give due attention to our own and to their character, weigh each circumftance of the bufinefs which we undertake, and employ the fureft and fafeft means for the attainment of any end or purpose. To a CROMWEL, perhaps, or a DE RETZ, difcretion may appear an alderman-like virtue, as Dr. SWIFT calls it; and being incompatible with thofe vaft defigns, to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be a fault or imperfection. But in the conduct of ordinary life, no virtue is more requifite, not only to obtain fuccefs, but to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and difappointments. The greateft parts without it, as obferved by an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner; as POLYPHEMUS, deprived of his eye, was only the more expofed, on account of his enormous ftrength and stature.

The best character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human nature, is that which is not swayed by temper of any kind; but alternately employs enterprise

and