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SECTION V.

WHY UTILITY PLEASES.

PART 1.

T seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility

that one would expect to meet with this principle every where in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reasoning and enquiry. In common life, we may obferve, that the circumftance of utility is always appealed to; nor is it supposed, that a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display his usefulness to the public, and enumerate the fervices, which he has performed to mankind and fociety. What praife, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts deftroy not its fitness for any useful purpofe! And how fatisfactory any apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity, if we can fhow the neceffity of that particular conftruction for the use intended! A fhip appears more beautiful to an artist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, where its prow is wide and swelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precife geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A building, whose doors and windows were exact squares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of a human creature, for whose

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fervice the fabric was intended. What wonder then, that a man, whofe habits and conduct are hurtful to fociety, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourfe with him, fhould, on that account, be an object of disapprobation, and communicate to every spectator the strongest fentiment of difguft and hatred * ?

But perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of usefulness,, or its contrary, has kept philosophers from admitting them into their systems of ethics, and has induced them rather to employ any other principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it is no juft reason for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience, that we cannot give a fatisfactory account of its origin, nor are able to refolve it into other more general principles. And if we would employ a little thought on the prefent fubject, we need be at no loss to account for the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles, the moft known and avowed in human nature.

From the apparent usefulness of the focial virtues, it has readily been inferred by fceptics, both ancient and modern, that all moral diftinctions arife from education, and were, at firft, invented, and afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and fubdue their natural ferocity and selfishness, which incapacitated them for fociety. This principle, indeed, of precept and education, muft fo far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it may frequently encreafe or diminish, beyond their natural ftandard, the fentiments of approbation or diflike; and may even, in particular instances, create, without any natural principle, a new fentiment of this kind; as is evident in all super

* See NOTE [A A].

Aitious

ftitious practices and obfervances: But that all moral affection or diflike arifes from this origin, will never furely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no fuch diftinction, founded on the original conftitution of the mind, the words, honourable and fhameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable, had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be more fuperficial than this paradox of the sceptics; and it were well, if, in the abftrufer ftudies of logic and metaphyfics, we could as eafily obviate the cavils of that fect, as in the practical and more intelligible sciences of politics and morals.

The focial virtues muft, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the esteem of uninftructed mankind, and engages their affections. And as the public utility of thefe virtues is the chief circumftance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be fome way agreeable to us, and take hold of fome natural affection. It must please, either from confiderations of felf-intereft, or from more generous motives and regards.

It has often been afferted, that, as every man has a ftrong connexion with fociety, and perceives the imposfibility of his folitary fubfiftence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all thofe habits or principles, which promote order in fociety, and infure to him the quiet poffeffion of fo ineftimable a bleffing. As much we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice of juftice and humanity, by which alone the focial confederacy can be maintained,

as

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and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and affiftance.

This deduction of morals from felf-love, or a regard to private intereft, is an obvious thought, and has not arifen wholly from the wanton fallies and fportive affaults of the fceptics. To mention no others, POLYBIUS, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as moft moṛal writers of antiquity, has affigned this selfish origin to all our fentiments of virtue *. But though the folid, practical sense of that author, and his averfion to all vain fubtilties, render his authority on the present subject very confiderable; yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience feems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.

We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very diftant ages and remote countries; where the utmost fubtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of self-intereft, or find any connexion of our present happiness and fecurity with events fo widely feparated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular interest.

Where private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue, we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these diftinct fentiments, which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We praife, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous, humane action contributes to our particular intereft: But the topics of praife, which we infift on, are very wide of this circumftance. And we may attempt to bring over others to our *See NOTE [BB].

fentiments

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