though diverfified in their fhape, figure, and materials. The purposes of the latter, directed to the conveniencies of human life, difcover not more plainly their origin from reafon and reflection, than do those of the former, which point all to a like end.

I need not mention the variations, which all the rules of property receive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination, and from the fubtilties and abstractions of law-topics and reafonings. There is no poffibility of reconciling this obfervation to the notion of original instincts.

What alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory, on which I infift, is the influence of education and acquired habits, by which we are fo accustomed to blame injustice, that we are not, in every inftance, confcious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious confequences of it. The views the moft familiar to us are apt, for that very reafon, to efcape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives, we are apt likewife to continue mechanically, without recalling, on every occafion, the reflections, which firft determined us. The convenience, or rather neceffity, which leads to juftice, is fo univerfal, and every where points fo much to the fame rules, that the habit takes place in all focieties; and it is not without fome fcrutiny, that we are able to afcertain its true origin. The matter, however, is not fo obfcure, but that, even in common life, we have, every moment, recourfe to the principle of public utility, and afk, What must become of the world, if fuch practices prevail? How could fociety fubfift under fuch diforders? Were the diftinction or feparation of possesfions entirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have obtained in fociety?

Thus we feem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force of that principle here infifted on, and can determine what degree of esteem or moral approbation may refult from reflections on public interest and utility. The neceffity of justice to the support of fociety is the SOLE foundation of that virtue; and fince no moral excellence is more highly efteemed, we may conclude, that this circumftance of usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and moft entire command over our sentiments. It muft, therefore, be the fource of a confiderable part of the merit afcribed to humanity, benevolence, friendship, public fpirit, and other focial virtues of that ftamp; as it is the SOLE fource of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, juftice, veracity, integrity, and those other estimable and useful qualities and principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philofophy, and even of common reafon; where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one inftance, to afcribe to it a like energy in all fimilar inftances. This indeed is NEWTON's chief rule of philofophizing *.

Principia, lib. iii.

SECTION IV.

Of POLITICAL SOCIETY.

HAD

AD every man fufficient fagacity to perceive, at all at times, the ftrong intereft, which binds him to the obfervance of justice and equity, and ftrength of mind fufficient to perfevere in a fteady adherence to a general and a diftant intereft, in oppofition to the allurements of prefent pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that cafe, been any fuch thing as government or political fociety, but each man, following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all others. What need of pofitive law, where natural juftice is, of itself, a fufficient restraint? Why create magiftrates, where there never arifes any diforder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every inftance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? It is evident, that, if government were totally ufelefs, it never could have place, and that the SOLE foundation of the duty of ALLEGIANCE is the advantage, which it procures to fociety, by preferving peace and order among mankind.

When a number of political focieties are erected, and maintain a great intercourfe together, a new fet of rules are immediately difcovered to be useful in that particular fituation; and accordingly take place under the title of

LAWS

LAWS of NATIONS. Of this kind are, the facredness of the perfon of ambaffadors, abftaining from poifoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind, which are plainly calculated for the advantage of states and kingdoms, in their intercourfe with each other.

The rules of juftice, fuch as prevail among individuals, are not entirely fufpended among political focieties. All princes pretend a regard to the rights of other princes; and fome, no doubt, without hypocrify. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent ftates, which would only be fo much wafte of parchment, if they were not found, by experience, to have fome influence and authority. But here is the difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot, by any means, fubfift, without the affociation of individuals; and that affociation never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and juftice. Disorder, confufion, the war of all against all, are the necessary confequences of fuch a licentious conduct. But nations. can fubfift without intercourfe. They may even fubfift, in fome degree, under a general war. The obfervance of justice, though useful among them, is not guarded by fo ftrong a neceffity as among individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with the usefulness. All politicians will allow, and most philofophers, that REASONS of STATE may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of juftice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance,' where the ftrict obfervance of it would be prejudicial, in a confiderable degree, to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the extremeft neceffity, it is confeffed, can justify individuals in a breach of promife, or an invafion of the properties of others.