SECTION II. TH Of BENEVOLENCE. PART I. HERE is a principle, supposed to prevail, among many, which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved difpofition, fo in its turn it tends ftill further to encourage that depravity. This principle is, that all benevolence is mere hypocrify, friendship a cheat, public fpirit a farce, fidelity a fnare to procure truft and confidence; and that, while all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private intereft, we wear these fair difguifes, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one must be poffeffed of who profeffes fuch principles, and who feels no internal fentiment that belies fo pernicious a theory, it is eafy to imagine: And alfo, what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a fpecies, whom he reprefents under fuch odious colours, and fuppofes fo little fufceptible of gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we fhould not afcribe these principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we must, at leaft, account for them from the moft carelefs and precipitate examination. Superficial reafoners, indeed, obferving many falfe pretences among mankind, and feel ing, perhaps, no very strong restraint in their own difpofition, might draw a general and a hafty conclufion, that all is equally corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed from all other species of existence, admit of no degrees of good or bad, but are, in every inftance, the fame creatures under different disguises and appearances. There is another principle, fomewhat resembling the former; which has been much infifted on by philofophers, and has been the foundation of many a fyftem; that, whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no paffion is, or can be difinterested; that the moft generous friendship, however fincere, is a modification of felf-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty and happiness of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthufiafm of paffion, we feem to take part in the interefts of others, and imagine ourselves divefted of all felfish confiderations: But, at bottom, the moft generous patriot and most niggardly mifer, the braveft hero and most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare. Whoever concludes from the feeming tendency of this opinion, that thofe, who make profeffion of it, cannot poffibly feel the true fentiments of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himself, in practice, very much mistaken. Probity and honour were no ftrangers to EPICURUS and his fect. ATTICUS and HORACE feem to have enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous and friendly difpofitions as any difciple of the aufterer fchools. And among the moderns, HOBBES and LOCKE, who maintained the felfish felfish fyftem of morals, lived moft irreproachable lives; though the former lay not under any reftraint of religion, which might fupply the defects of his philosophy. An EPICUREAN or a HOBBIST readily allows, that there is such a thing as friendship in the world, without hypocrify or difguife; though he may attempt, by a philofophical chymistry, to refolve the elements of this pasfion, if I may so speak, into those of another, and explain every affection to be felf-love, twifted and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the fame turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the fame direction to the original paffion; this is fufficient, even according to the selfish system, to make the wideft difference in human characters, and denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interefted. I efteem the man, whofe felf love, by whatever means, is fo directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him ferviceable to fociety: As I hate or defpife him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you fuggeft, that these characters, though feemingly oppofite, are, at bottom, the fame, and that a very inconfiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between them. Each character, notwithstanding thefe inconfiderable differences, appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untranfmutable. And I find not in this, more than in other fubjects, that the natural fentiments, arifing from the general appearances of things, are eafily deftroyed by fubtile reflections concerning the minute origin of these appearances. Does not the lively, chearful colour of a countenance inspire me with complacency and pleasure; even though I learn from philofophy, that all difference of complexion arifes from the most minute differences of thicknefs, in the most minute parts of the fkin; by means of which a fuperficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colours of light, and abforb the others? But though the question, concerning the univerfal or partial felfifhnefs of man be not fo material, as is ufually imagined, to morality and practice, it is certainly of confequence in the fpeculative fcience of human nature, and is a proper object of curiofity and enquiry. It may not, therefore, be unfuitable, in this place, to beftow a few reflections upon it *. The most obvious objection to the felfifh hypothefis, is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our moft unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest ftretch of philofophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox. To the moft carelefs obferver, there appear to be fuch difpofitions as benevolence and generofity; such affections as love, friendship, compaffion, gratitude. Thefe fentiments have their caufes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and obfervation, and plainly diftinguifhed from thofe of the selfish paffions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted; till fome hypothefis be difcovered, which, by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and feem to have proceeded entirely, from that love of fimplicity, which has been the fource of much false reasoning in philofophy. I fhall not here enter into any detail on the prefent fubject. Many able philofophers have shown the infufficiency of thefe fyftems. And I fhall take for granted what, I believe, the smallest reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer. See NOTE [S]. But But the nature of the fubject furnishes the ftrongest prefumption, that no better fyftem will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect fimplicity. The cafe is not the fame in this fpecies of philosophy as in phyfics. Many an hypothefis in nature, contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more accurate scrutiny, folid and fatisfactory. Inftances. of this kind are fo frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty philofopher*, has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way, in which any phænomenon may be produced, that there is a general prefumption for its arifing from the caufes, which are the leaft obvious and familiar. But the presumption always lies on the other fide, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our paffions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The fimpleft and most obvious caufe, which can there be affigned for any phænomenon, is probably the true one. When a philofopher, in the explication of his fyftem, is obliged to have recourfe to fome very intricate and refined reflections, and to fuppofe them effential to the production of any paffion or emotion, we have reafon to be extremely on our guard against so fallacious an hypothesis. The affections are not fufceptible of any impreffion from the refinements of reafon or imagination; and it is always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, neceffarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourfelves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives, which the mind, from vanity or felf-conceit, is defirous of fuppofing more preva Monf. FONTENELLE, lent: |