SECTION I. Of the GENERAL PRINCIPLES of MORALS. DISP ISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irkfome; except, perhaps, thofe with perfons, entirely dif ingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controverfy, from affectation, from a spirit of oppofition, or from a defire of showing wit and ingenuity, fuperior to the rest of mankind. The fame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the fame contempt of their antagonifts; and the fame paffionate vehemence, in inforcing fophiftry and falfehood. And as reafoning is not the fource, whence either difputant derives his tenets; it is vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace founder principles. Those who have denied the reality of moral diftinctions, may be ranked among the difingenuous difputants; nor is it conceivable, that any hu nan creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is fo wide, and this difference is ftill fo much farther widened, by education, example, and habit, that, where the oppofite extremes come at once 3 under under our apprehenfion, there is no fcepticifm fo fcrupulous, and scarce any affurance fo determined, as absolutely to deny all diftinction between them. Let a man's infenfibility be ever fo great, he must often be touched with the images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever so obftinate, he must observe, that others are fufceptible of like impreffions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding that no body keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will, at laft, of himself, from mere wearinefs, come over to the fide of common fenfe and reason. There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all found judgment of truth rational and falfehood, they should be the fame to every intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and conftitution of the human fpecies. The ancient philofophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, feem to confider morals as deriving their exiftence from tafte and fentiment. On the other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured to account for thefe diftinctions by metaphyfical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the human understanding. Such confufion reigned in these fubjects, that an opposition of the greatest confequence could prevail between one fyftem fyftem and another, and even in the parts of almoft each individual fyftem; and yet no body, till very lately, was ever fenfible of it. The elegant Lord SHAFTESBURY, who first gave occafion to remark this diftinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the ancients, is not, himfelf, entirely free from the fame confufion. It must be acknowledged, that both fides of the queftion are susceptible of fpecious arguments. Moral diftinctions, it may be faid, are difcernible by pure reafon : Elfe, whence the many difputes that reign in common life, as well as in philofophy, with regard to this fubject: The long chain of proofs often produced on both fides; the examples cited, the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies detected, the inferences drawn, and the feveral conclufions adjusted to their proper principles. Truth is difputable; not taste : What exifts in the nature of things is the ftandard of our judgment; what each man feels within himfelf is the. ftandard of fentiment. Propofitions in geometry may be proved, fyftems in phyfics may be controverted; but the harmony of verfe, the tenderness of paffion, the brilliancy of wit, muft give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but frequently concerning the justice or injuftice of his actions. In every criminal trial the first object of the prifoner is to difprove the facts alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: The fecond to prove, that, even if thefe actions were real, they might be juftified, as innocent and lawful. It is confeffedly by deductions of the understanding, that the first point is ascertained: How can we fuppofe that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other? VOL. II. ė On |