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is the reafon of this difference? The transition of the imagination to ourselves, from objects related to us, is always eafy; both on account of the relation, which facilitates the transition, and because we there pass from remoter objects, to those which are contiguous. But in paffing from ourselves to objects, related to us; though the former principle forwards the transition of thought, yet the latter opposes it; and confequently there is not the fame easy transfufion of paffions from pride to love as from love to pride.

4. The virtues, fervices, and fortune of one man infpire us readily with efteem and affection for another related to him. The fon of our friend is naturally entitled to our friendship: The kindred of a very great man value themselves, and are valued by others, on account of that relation. The force of the double relation is here fully difplayed.

5. The following are inftances of another kind, where the operation of these principles may ftill be discovered. Envy arifes from a fuperiority in others; but it is obfervable, that it is not the great difproportion between us, which excites that paffion, but on the contrary, our proximity. A great difproportion cuts off the relation of the ideas, and either keeps us from comparing ourselves with what is remote from us, or diminishes the effects of the comparison.

A poet is not apt to envy a philofopher, or a poet of a different kind, of a different nation, or of a different age. All these differences, if they do not prevent, at least weaken the comparison, and confequently the paffion.

This too is the reason, why all objects appear great or little, merely by a comparifon with thofe of the fame fpecies. A mountain neither magnifies nor diminishes a horfe in our eyes: But when a FLEMISH and a WELSH

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horfe are seen together, the one appears greater and the other lefs, than when viewed apart.

From the fame principle we may account for that remark of hiftorians, that any party, in a civil war, or even factious divifion, always choose to call in a foreign enemy at any hazard, rather than submit to their fellowcitizens. GUICCIARDIN applies this remark to the wars in ITALY; where the relations between the different ftates are, properly speaking, nothing but of name, language, and contiguity. Yet even these relations, when joined with fuperiority, by making the comparison more natural, make it likewife more grievous, and cause men to fearch for fome other fuperiority, which may be attended with no relation, and by that means, may have a lefs fenfible influence on the imagination. When we cannot break the affociation, we feel a stronger defire to remove the fuperiority. This feems to be the reason, why travellers, though commonly lavish of their praise to the CHINESE and PERSIANS, take care to depreciate thofe neighbouring nations, which may stand upon a footing of rivalship with their native country.

6. The fine arts afford us parallel inftances. Should an author compofe a treatife, of which one part was ferious and profound, another light and humorous; every one would condemn fo ftrange a mixture, and would blame him for the neglect of all rules of art and criticifm. Yet we accufe not PRIOR for joining his Alma and Solomon in the fame volume; though that amiable poet has perfectly fucceeded in the gaiety of the one, as well as in the melancholy of the other. Even suppose the reader should peruse these two compofitions without any interval, he would feel little or no difficulty in the change of the paffions. Why? but because he confiders these performances as entirely different; and by that

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break in the ideas, breaks the progrefs of the affections, and hinders the one from influencing or contradicting the

other.

An heroic and burlesque defign, united in one picture, would be monftrous; though we place two pictures of fo oppofite a character in the fame chamber, and even close together, without any scruple.

7. It needs be no matter of wonder, that the easy tranfition of the imagination fhould have fuch an influence on all the paffions. It is this very circumstance, which forms all the relations and connexions amongst objects. We know no real connexion between one thing and another. We know only, that the idea of onething is affociated with that of another, and that the imagination makes an easy tranfition between them. And as the eafy tranfition of ideas, and that of fentiments mutually affift each other; we might before-hand expect, that this principle muft have a mighty influence on all our internal movements and affections. And experience fufficiently confirms the theory.

For, not to repeat all the foregoing inftances: Suppose, that I were travelling with a companion through a country, to which we are both utter ftrangers; it is evident, that, if the profpects be beautiful, the roads agreeable, and the fields finely cultivated; this may ferve to put me in good-humour, both with myfelf and fellowtraveller. But as the country has no connexion with myself or friend, it can never be the immediate caufe either of self-value or of regard to him: And therefore, if I found not the paffion on fome other object, which bears to one of us a clofer relation, my emotions are rather to be confidered as the overflowings of an elevated or humane difpofition, than as an established paffion But fuppofing the agreeable profpect before us to be fur

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veyed either from his country-feat or from mine; this new connexion of ideas gives a new direction to the fentiment of pleasure, derived from the profpect, and raises the emotion of regard or vanity, according to the nature of the connexion. There is not here, methinks, much room for doubt or difficulty.

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1. It seems evident, that reafon, in a strict fense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falfehood, can never, of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no inAlience but fo far as it touches fome paffion or affection. Abflract relations of ideas are the object of curiofity, not of volition. And matters of fact, where they are neither good nor evil, where they neither excite defire nor averfion, are totally indifferent; and whether known or unknown, whether mistaken or rightly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any motive to action.

2. What is commonly, in a popular fenfe, called reafon, and is fo much recommended in moral difcourfes, is nothing but a general and a calm paffion, which takes a comprehenfive and a diftant view of its object, and actuates the will, without exciting any fenfible emotion. A man, we fay, is diligent in his profeflion from reason; that is, from a calm defire of riches and a fortune. A man adheres to justice from reason; that is, from a calm regard to public good, or to a character with himself and

others.

3. The fame objects, which recommend themselves to reafon in this fenfe of the word, are alfo the objects of what we call paffion, when they are brought near to us, and acquire fome other advantages, either of external fituation, or congruity to our internal temper; and by that means, excite a turbulent and fenfible emotion.

Evil, at a great distance, is avoided, we fay, from reafon: Evil, near at hand, produces averfion, horror, fear, and is the object of paffion.

4. The common error of metaphyficians has lain in afcribing the direction of the will entirely to one of thefe principles, and fuppofing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly against their intereft: It is not therefore the view of the greateft poffible good which always influences them. Men often counteract a violent paffion, in profecution of their diftant interefts and defigns: It is not therefore the prefent uneafinefs alone, which determines them. In general, we may obferve, that both thefe principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or prefent difpofition of the person. What we call frength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm paffions above the violent; though we may eafily obferve, that there is no perfon fo conftantly poffeffed of this virtue, as never, on any occafion, to yield to the folicitation of violent affection and defire. From these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding with regard to the future actions and refolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and paffions.

SECT. VI.

1. We fhall here enumerate fome of those circumftances, which render a paffion calm or violent, which heighten or diminish any emotion.

It is a property in human nature, that any emotion, which attends a paffion, is easily converted into it; though in their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to each other. It is true, in order to cause a perfect union amongst paffions, and make one produce

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