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changed by any peculiarities of the health or temper of the perfons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in their poffeffions. Cuftom readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our paffions, as well as in our reafonings.

It may not be amifs to obferve on this occafion, that the influence of general rules and maxims on the paffions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles or internal mechanifm, which we here explain. For it feems evident, that if a perfon full grown, and of the fame nature with ourselves, were on a fudden tranfported into our world, he would be much embarraffed with every object, and would not readily determine what degree of love or hatred, of pride or humility, or of any other paffon fhould be excited by it. The paflions are often varied by very inconfiderable principles; and thefe do not always play with perfect regularity, efpecially on the first trial. But as custom or practice has brought to light all thefe principles, and has fettled the juft value of every thing; this muft certainly contribute to the eafy production of the paffions, and guide us, by means of general eftablished rules, in the proportions, which we ought to obferve in preferring one object to another. This remark may, perhaps, ferve to obviate difficulties, that may arife concerning fome caufes, which we here afcribe to particular paffions, and which may be efteemed too refined to operate fo univerfally and certainly, as they are found to do.

SECT. III.

1. In running over all the caufes, which produce the paffion of pride or that of humility; it would readily occur, that the fame circumftance, if transferred from ourfelves to another perfon, would render him the object of love or hatred, efteem or contempt. The virtue, genius,

beauty,

beauty, family, riches, and authority of others beget favourable fentiments in their behalf; and their vice, folly, deformity, poverty and meannefs excite the contrary fentiments. The double relation of impreffions and ideas ftill operates on thefe paffions of love and hatred; as on the former of pride and humility. Whatever gives a separate pleasure or pain, and is related to another person or connected with him, makes him the object of our affection or difguft.

Hence too injury or contempt towards us is one of the greatest fources of our hatred; services or esteem, of our friendship.

2. Sometimes a relation to ourselves excites affection towards any perfon. But there is always here implied a relation of sentiments, without which the other relation would have no influence *.

A perfon, who is related to us, or connected with us, by blood, by fimilitude of fortune, of adventures, profeffion, or country, foon becomes an agreeable companion to us; because we enter eafily and familiarly into his fentiments and conceptions: Nothing is ftrange or new to us: Our imagination, paffing from felf, which is ever intimately present to us, runs smoothly along the relation or connexion, and conceives with a full fympathy the perfon, who is nearly related to felf. He renders himself immediately acceptable, and is at once on an eafy footing with us: No diftance, no referve has place, where the person introduced is supposed so closely connected with us.

Relation has here the fame influence as cuftom or acquaintance, in exciting affection; and from like causes.

The affection of parents to children feems founded on an original infint. The affection towards other relations depends on the principles here explained.

The

The ease and fatisfaction, which, in both cafes, attend our intercourse or commerce, is the fource of the friendship.

3. The paffions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger. It is this conjunction, which chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the foul, unattended with any defire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not compleat within themselves, nor reft in that emotion, which they produce; but carry the mind to fomething farther. Love is always followed by a defire of happiness to the perfon beloved, and an averfion to his mifery: As hatred produces a defire of the mifery, and an averfion to the happiness of the person hated. Thefe oppofite defires feem to be originally and primarily conjoined with the paffions of love and hatred. It is a conftitution of nature, of which we can give no farther explication.

4. Compaffion frequently arifes, where there is no preceding efteem or friendship; and compaffion is an uneasiness in the sufferings of another. It feems to fpring from the intimate and ftrong conception of his fufferings; and our imagination proceeds by degrees, from the lively idea to the real feeling of another's mifery.

Malice and envy alfo arife in the mind without any preceding hatred or injury; though their tendency is exactly the fame with that of anger and ill-will. The comparison of ourfelves with others feems to be the fource of envy and malice. The more unhappy another is, the more happy do we ourfeves appear in our own conception.

5. The fimilar tendency of compaffion to that of benevolence, and of envy to anger, forms a very close

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relation between these two sets of paffions; though of a different kind from that which was infifted on above. It is not a resemblance of feeling or fentiment, but a resemblance of tendency or direction. Its effect, however, is the fame, in producing an affociation of paffions. Compaffion is feldom or never felt without fome mixture of tenderness or friendship; and envy is naturally accompanied with anger or ill-will. To defire the happiness of another, from whatever motive, is a good preparative to affection; and to delight in another's mifery almoft unavoidably begets averfion towards him.

Even where intereft is the fource of our concern, it is commonly attended with the fame confequences. A partner is a natural object of friendship; a rival of enmity.

6. Poverty, mean nefs, difappointment, produce contempt and dislike: But when thefe misfortunes are very great, or are reprefented to us in very strong colours, they excite compaffion, and tenderness, and friendship. How is this contradiction to be accounted for? The poverty and meannefs of another, in their common appearance, gives us uneafinefs, by a fpecies of imperfect fympathy; and this uneafiness produces averfion or diflike, from the resemblance of fentiment. But when we enter more intimately into another's concerns, and wifh for his happiness, as well as feel his mifery, friendship or goodwill arifes, from the fimilar tendency of the inclinations.

7. In refpect, there is a mixture of humility, with the efteem or affection: In contempt, a mixture of pride.

The amorous paffion is ufually compounded of complacency in beauty, a bodily appetite, and friendship or affection. The close relation of these fentiments is very obvious, as well as their origin from each other, by means of that relation. Were there no other phænoVOL. II.

P

menon

menon to reconcile us to the prefent theory, this alone, methinks, were fufficient.

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1. The prefent theory of the paffions depends entirely on the double relations of fentiments and ideas, and the mutual affiftance, which thefe relations lend to each other. It may not, therefore, be improper to illuftrate thefe principles by fome farther inftances.

2. The virtues, talents, accomplishments, and poffeffions of others, make us love and efteem them: Because thefe objects excite a pleafing fenfation, which is related to love; and as they have alfo a relation or connexion with the perfon, this union of ideas forwards the union of fentiments, according to the foregoing reafoning.

But fuppofe, that the perfon, whom we love, is also related to us, by blood, country, or friendship; it is evident, that a fpecies of pride muft alfo be excited by his accomplishments and poffeffions; there being the fame double relation, which we have all along infifted on. The perfon is related to us, or there is an easy transition of thought from him to us; and the fentiments, excited by his advantages and virtues, are agreeable, and confequently related to pride. Accordingly we find, that people are naturally vain of the good qualities or high fortune of their friends and countrymen.

3. But it is obfervable, that, if we reverfe the order of the paffions, the fame effect does not follow. We pafs eafily from love and affection to pride and vanity; but not from the latter paffions to the former, though all the relations be the fame. We love not those who are related to us, on account of our own merit; though they are naturally vain on account of our merit. What

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