with each other by means of the relation, often become mutually deftructive, and leave the mind in perfect tranquillity.

But fuppofe, that the object is not a compound of good and evil, but is confidered as probable or improbable in any degree; in that cafe the contrary paffions will both of them be prefent at once in the foul, and inftead of balancing and tempering each other, will fsubfift together, and by their union, produce a third impreffion or affection, fuch as hope or fear.

The influence of the relations of ideas (which we shall explain more fully afterwards) is plainly feen in this affair. In contrary paffions, if the objects be totally different, the paffions are like two oppofite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the paffions are like an alcali and an acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and confifts in the contradictory views of the fame object, the pasfions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate.

The effect of a mixture of paffions, when one of them is predominant, and fwallows up the other, fhall be explained afterwards.

SECT. II.

1. BESIDES thofe paffions above-mentioned, which arife from a direct pursuit of good and averfion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or confideration. Thus Pride is a certain fatisfaction in ourselves, on account of fome accomplishment or poffeffion, which we enjoy : Humility, on the other hand, is a diffatisfaction with ourfelves, on account of fome defect or infirmity.

Love or Friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or fervices: Hatred, the contrary.

2. In these two fets of paffion, there is an obvious diftinction to be made between the object of the paffion and its caufe. The object of pride and humility is felf: The caufe of the paffion is fome excellence in the former cafe; fome fault, in the latter. The object of love and hatred is fome other perfon: The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults.

With regard to all these paffions, the causes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for inftance, raises pride; and it is effential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and fatisfaction.

Now as the causes of these paffions are very numerous and various, though their object be uniform and fimple; it may be a fubject of curiofity to confider, what that circumftance is, in which all thefe various caufes agree; or, in other words, what is the real efficient caufe of the paffion. We fhall begin with pride and humility.

3. In order to explain the caufes of thefe paffions, we must reflect on certain principles, which, though they have a mighty influence on every operation, both of the understanding and paffions, are not commonly much infifted on by philofophers. The first of these is the affociation of ideas, or that principle, by which we make an eafy tranfition from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They ufually pafs with regularity, from one object, to what refembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it *. When one idea is prefent to the imagination, any

See Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. III.

other,

other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility, by means of that introduction.

The fecond property, which I fhall obferve in the human mind, is a like affociation of impreffions or emotions. All refembling impreffions are connected together; and no fooner one arifes, than the reft naturally follow. Grief and difappointment give rife to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generofity, courage, pride, and other refembling affections.

In the third place, it is obfervable of these two kinds of affociation, that they very much affift and forward each other, and that the tranfition is more eafily made, where they both concur in the fame object. Thus, a man, who, by any injury received from another, is very much discomposed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of hatred, difcontent, impatience, fear, and other uneafy paffions; especially, if he can discover thefe fubjects in or near the person, who was the object of his first emotion. Those principles, which forward the tranfition of ideas, here concur with those which operate on the paffions; and both, uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse.

Upon this occafion I may cite a paffage from an elegant writer, who expreffes himfelf in the following manner*: “ As the fancy delights in every thing, that

is great, ftrange, or beautiful, and is ftill the more "pleased the more it finds of thefe perfections in the "fame object, fo it is capable of receiving new fatisfaction by the affiftance of another fenfe. Thus, any ❝continual found, as the mufic of birds, or a fall of

ઃઃ waters, awakens every moment the mind of the be "holder, and makes him more attentive to the several "beauties of the place, that lie before him. Thus, if "there arifes a fragrancy of fmells or perfumes, they

heighten the pleasure of the imagination, and make " even the colours and verdure of the landscape appear 66 more agreeable; for the ideas of both fenfes recom"mend each other, and are pleasanter together than "where they enter the mind feparately: As the different "colours of a picture, when they are well difpofed, fet "off one another, and receive an additional beauty from "the advantage of the fituation." In these phænomena, we may remark the affociation both of impreffions and ideas; as well as the mutual affiftance thefe affociations lend to each other.

4. It feems to me, that both thefe fpecies of relation have place in producing Pride or Humility, and are the real, efficient caufes of the paffion.

With regard to the first relation, that of ideas, there can be no question. Whatever we are proud of muft, in fome manner, belong to us. It is always our knowledge, cur fenfe, beauty, poffeffions, family, on which we value ourfelves. Self, which is the object of the paffion, must still be related to that quality or circumstance, which caufes the paffion. There must be a connexion between them; an eafy tranfition of the imagination; or a facility of the conception in paffing from one to the other. Where this connexion is wanting, no object can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the connexion, the more you weaken the paffion.

5. The only fubject of enquiry is, whether there be a like relation of impreflions or fentiments, wherever pride or humility is felt; whether the circumftance, which caufes the paffion, produces antecedently a fentiment

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fimilar to the paffion; and whether there be an easy transfufion of the one into the other.

• The feeling or fentiment of pride is agreeable; of humility, painful. An agreeable fenfation is, therefore, related to the former; a painful, to the latter. And if we find, after examination, that every object, which produces pride, produces alfo a separate pleasure ; and every object, which caufes humility, excites in like manner a separate uneafinefs; we must allow, in that cafe, that the prefent theory is fully proved and afcertained. The double relation of ideas and sentiments will be acknowledged inconteftable.

6. To begin with perfonal merit and demerit, the most obvious causes of thefe paffions; it would be entirely foreign to our prefent purpose to examine the foundation of moral diftinctions. It is fufficient to obferve, that the foregoing theory concerning the origin of the paffions may be defended on any hypothefis. The moft probable fyftem, which has been advanced to explain the difference between vice and virtue, is, that either from a primary conftitution of nature, or from a fenfe of public or private intereft, certain characters, upon the very view and contemplation, produce uneafinefs; and others, in like manner, excite pleasure. The uneafinefs and fatisfaction, produced in the fpectator, are effential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character, is to feel a delight upon its appearance. To difapprove of it, is to be fenfible of an uneafinefs. The pain and pleasure, therefore, being, in a manner, the primary fource of blame or praise, must also be the causes of all their effects; and confequently, the caufes of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that diftinction.

But fuppofing this theory of morals fhould not be received; it is ftill evident that pain and pleasure, if not