or of any animal, or of any part of an animal, combined with the human figure or otherwise; or of any subject being matter of invention in sculpture, or of any alto or basso-relievo representing any of the above-mentioned matters; or any cast from nature of the human figure, or part of the human figure, or any subject containing or representing any of the above-mentioned matters and things, whether separate or combined, is vested in the person who shall make them or cause them to be made, for the term of fourteen years from the time of first publication; provided that the proprietor's name, before publication, with the date, be put on such original sculpture, model, copy, or cast, &c. The sixth section gives an additional term of fourteen years to the person who originally made or caused to be made the sculpture or other matter, if he be living at the end of the first term, and have not divested himself of the copyright by sale or otherwise.1 X. PREROGATIVE COPIES. The prerogative copyrights of the crown of England constitute a peculiar branch of literary property, which has given rise to much controversy, and is involved in some obscurity. It formerly embraced, in practice, the English Translation of the Bible, the Book of Common Prayer, The Statutes, Almanacs, and the Latin Grammar, of which the exclusive right of printing 1 See Appendix. was held to be vested in the king, and was accustomed to be granted by letters-patent. We have seen, in a former chapter of this work, that Lord Mansfield considered this right of the crown to be founded upon property, like the right of a private author or his assigns, and consequently that he held it tenable, in the cases in which the property of the crown could be traced, independent of reasons of state or of naked prerogative.' But the subject is attended with great difficulties, growing out of the fact that the right has at various times been exercised as a naked prerogative, and as founded in reasons of state policy, though it seems to be clear that it was also sometimes rested upon property. It is not my purpose to endeavor to decide the very intricate questions arising under this branch of the subject, but simply to state the doctrines which have prevailed in the law of England, with reference to the principal objects to which this right has been supposed to attach.2 1. The English Translation of the Bible. Sir William Blackstone says, that the claim of the king to the exclusive printing of the English Bible rests upon the two grounds of original purchase, and of his being the head of the church.3 Lord Mansfield held it to be a mere right of property, the king having bought the translation. The translation which the Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2401. 2 For a more full discussion of the prerogative copies, see Godson on Patents, p. 316, 331. 3 2 Black. Com. 410. 4 4 Burr. 2405. In Baskett v. The University of Cambridge, 1 Bl. 105, 113, Yorke, solicitor-general, argued, that the crown has no prerogative at common law over the art of printing, but is merely entitled to some special copyrights, king was supposed to have bought, or to have had printed at his own expense, was that executed in the reign and under the superintendence of King James I. The notion of private purchase seems to be now abandoned; but the right itself, whatever it may be founded on, seems to be fully recognized, although it has been the subject of learned doubts, on the part of respectable authorities. In the case of an application made to Lord Eldon, for an injunction against the king's printer in Scotland, who had a patent for the sale of Bibles, to restrain him from printing or selling Bibles in England, the question was between rival patentees. The injunction was granted upon motion, and before the hearing, upon the ground that possession, under color of title, was sufficient for an injunction, until it was proved at law that there was no real title. Subsequently, the converse of this case came before the house of lords, the question being whether the king's printer in Scotland could interdict the sale in Scotland of Bibles imported from England. In this case, the right of the crown to grant a patent for the exclusive among which he enumerates the translation of the great English Bible under Grafton, performed at the king's expense. Lord Mansfield, who presided, seems to have taken the same view of the king's right, then, and in the subsequent case of Millar v. Taylor, where he expressly asserts the king's right by purchase. 1 Maugham on Literary Property, p. 107. Manners v. Blair, 3 Bligh's S.) 402, 403. 2 Evans's Statutes, 17, 18, notes. Maugham, 107, and the remarks of Lord Chancellor Clare, there cited. Lord Gifford's observations, in Manners v. Blair, 3 Bligh's R. (N. S.) 394, 398. 3 Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson, 6 Ves. 689. printing of Bibles was elaborately discussed by Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, in moving the judgment of their lordships. He defined the nature of the right, as flowing from the duty imposed upon the chief executive officer of the government, to superintend the publication of acts of state, and of the works upon which the established doctrines of religion are founded-a duty imposed upon the king, and carrying with it a corresponding prerogative.' Manners v. Blair, 3 Bligh's R. (N. S.) 391, 402. In this case, the lord chancellor said, "The principal respondents in this case are the king's printers in Scotland. They hold that office under a patent from the crown. The appellants are members of certain Bible societies in Scotland, and have been in the habit of importing Bibles from England; and the material question to be decided in this case, is whether or not the king's printers in Scotland have, by virtue of their office and their patent, a right to exclude persons from importing Bibles, and the other works which are contained in the patent from England? "Two important questions were raised in this case. One, which was raised, and which was argued at great length in the court below, and argued very ably at your lordships' bar, was as to the right of the crown to grant a patent, the effect of which shall be, to prevent persons in Scotland from importing Bibles, and other works of the description mentioned in the patent, certain religious works, from England; and the second question turned upon the particular construction of the terms of this patent. "With respect to the first question, it arose out of the case of Manners and Miller v. Blair, which was before your lordships' house two or three sessions ago. When that case came on for argument, and was argued at your lordships' bar, it occurred to the learned lord who then presided here (Lord Gifford), that there was a doubt as to the validity of the patent, and as to the power of the king to grant a patent of that description. I do not mean to suggest that the noble and learned lord expressed any opinion upon that subject, but that he was desirous, before he decided that question, that that point should be argued at your lordships' bar; but which was in fact, never argued in the particular case, because the case in which I am about to propose that your lordships should give judgment, was before the courts below; and being before the courts below, the point was raised before the judges of the court in Scotland, which had not in fact been raised in the case of Manners and Miller v. Blair; and that case having come before your lordships upon appeal, it was considered more convenient and proper that the argument, with respect to the validity of the patent, and with respect to the prerogative of the crown, The effect of these decisions is, that so long as there are separate subsisting patents for England should be on that particular case, than on the case of Manners and Miller; but your lordships' decision in the one case, will be of course governed by the decision in the other. "In conducting the argument, with respect to the prerogative of the crown, reference was made, and very properly made, to the cases of prerogative in England. For two hundred years and more, the kings have, in England, granted patents to their printers here, as extensive as the patent we are now considering, and perhaps more extensive, but extensive enough to raise the question we are now considering. In England, the power of the king to grant patents of this description, or to appoint to such an office, has never been seriously questioned. Those patents have from time to time come under the review of our courts, and the judges have been called upon to decide upon them. One case occurred before Sir Joseph Jekyll, so far back as the year 1720, and others at different periods, both in the courts of equity, and also before this house during the last century; and I would state it as a point not admitting now of doubt or controversy, that as far as relates to the office of king's printer in England, the crown has the prerogative to grant a patent as extensive as that we are now considering, -assuming. for the purpose of argument, that the patent is as extensive as it is contended on the part of the respondents to be. “But_although the power of the king and his prerogative in England has never been questioned, it has been rested by judges on different principles. Some judges have been of opinion, that it is to be founded on the circumstance of the translation of the Bible having been actually paid for by King James, and its having become the property of the crown, and therefore it has been referred to a species of copyright. Other judges have referred it to the circumstance of the king of England being the supreme head of the church of England, and that he is vested with the prerogative with reference to that character. Other judges have been of opinion, and I confess, for my own part, I am disposed to accede to that opinion, that it is to be referred to another consideration, namely, to the character of the duty imposed upon the chief executive officer of the government, to superintend the publication of the acts of the legislature, and acts of state of that description, and also of those works, upon which the estab lished doctrines of our religion are founded, — that it is a duty imposed upon the first executive magistrate, carrying with it a corresponding prerogative. That was the opinion of Lord Camden, as expressed in the case of Donaldson v. Becket, (4 Burr. 2408.) in most direct and eloquent terms in this house: that was the opinion also expressed by Chief Baron Skinner, in the case of Eyre and Strahan v. Carnan ; (Court of Excheq. 1781.) and I think that may be collected or inferred to be the opinion of a learned and noble earl, now a member of your lordships' house, from what fell from that noble and learned lord, in the case of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richard(6 Ves. 704, 5.) son. "If that be so, if that is the true principle upon which this preroga |