the cessation of the civil commotions. It seems even to have increased not a little, in the reign of Henry IV. It has been computed, (according to Sully's Memoirs), that from his accession, to the year 1607, a period of eighteen years, no fewer than four thousand French gen tlemen were killed in duels.

"In 1578, a combat was fought by six French noblemen, three against three. Two of them were killed on the spot, two died of their wounds, and a fifth was severely wounded. In 1600, a private combat was fought between twenty French, and as many Flemish. Voltaire informs us, that the coinbat of the La Frettes, four against four, in 1663, determined Louis XIV. to pardon duelling no longer.

"Duelling with small swords was first introduced into England, 29th Elizabeth, 1587. In the reign of James I. it became an object of attention to government; and afterwards a proclamation was issued by Charles II. 1679, that no person should be pardoned who killed another in a duel.”

The preceding facts I have extracted from a valuable recent publication, "Essays on the Art of War," a work essentially necessary to every officer in the British army.

There have been in England many trials for killing in a duel, and many verdicts for manslaughter; but there appears only one trial on record, where killing in a fair duel has produced a capital verdict that was the case of Major Oneby, who prevented a public execution, by suicide. In the late case of Major Campbell, in Ireland, there is no doubt but the jury who found him guilty, did so, under the impression that he shot his adversary unfairly. No small check has of late been given to the practice of duelling, from the great nun.ber of respectable individuals, who have had the courage, instead of meeting their challengers in the field, to prosecute them in courts of justice; nor does it appear, that in any such cases the public have deemed it a stain on their character, but the

reverse.

The judicial trial by battle was established in England, France, and various parts of Europe. The reason for its continuing so long, seems to have been, that the lord in most districts had the appointment of the ordinary judge, who, (either himself, or his lord) was interested in favour of one of the parties litigant; which might, perhaps, drive the

other party, from a suspicion of this prejudice against him, to appeal to the chance by combat. There is a story in Grafton's Chronicle, which must have made this trial infinitely ridiculous. A citizen of London, in the time of Henry VI. was of a strong make, but of a faint heart. He happened to be obliged, by this kind of decision, to enter the lists against an antagonist, who was both weak and puny.. The friends of the citizen, to give him courage, plied him with wine and aqua vitæ, so that he was drunk when he began to engage, and fell an easy prey to his adversary.

The last instance but one, of trial by battle, in England, is that of Lord Rea and of David Ramsden, in the reign of Charles I. when the court was held by the constable, and the earl marshal of England. Of this case, Rushworth gives an ample account, and the legal pleadings and proceedings of the appeal; it being in the arbitrement of the court, whether it should be granted, or not. In his answer, the defendant, Ramsden, alledges that the bill and appeal (which was for having had treasonable inten tions) was and is false, and that the appellant Lord Rea did lie falsely; which is by some, supposed to account for the lie direct being followed by duels to this day. In Rushworth's, account, we find farther, that the court, on the petition of Lord Rea, permits him to have, whilst in the lists, counsel, and a surgeon with his ointments; they likewise allow him a seat, or pavilion, to rest himself, and wine for refreshment. He is besides, to have iron, nails, hammer, file, scissars, and bodkin, together with needle and thread. After two or three adjournments, the king superseded his commission to the constable and marshal, so that the combat did not ac tually take place. Shortly after a trial by battle was brought on a writ of right, but set aside for irregularity.

In France, the form of proceeding was this:-The accuser and the accused threw down a gage, usually a gauntlet, which the judge took up. The two combatants, on this, were taken into custody, after which the affair admitted of no accom modation, but by the judge's consent. The chief judge, having fixed the day, named the field, and furnished the wea pous, which were carried to the spot, preceded by fifes and trumpets. Here a priest blessed them with a multitude of ceremonies. The action began by giving the lie to each other, till gradually

they

usually held necessary for academical discussion in the public schools of our universities.

OF THE STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF SYLLOGISMS.

A syllogism may be defined to be a sentence made up of three propositions, su disposed, that the last is necessarily inferred from those that precede.

EXAMPLE.

Our Creator must be worshipped.
God is our Creator;

Therefore God must be worshipped. The three propositions are called the Major, the Minor, and the Consequence. The theory of all syllogisms is the same, two ideas are compared by means of a third; as the ideas of God and worship are by the intervention of the idea of Creator, for at first we see no connection between them.

The kinds of syllogisms now in use, are reduced to three, viz. the hypothetical, categorical, and disjunctive.

The hypothetical is that wherein the major includes some condition or supposition, and is known by its begin ning with if.

The Major affirms something conditionally,

The Minor confirms that supposition;

and

The Consequence affirms peremptorily what the Major affirms only conditionally.

EXAMPLE.

Major.If Cæsar be a King, he must be honoured.

Minor.-But Cæsar is a King;
Cons.-Therefore Cæsar must be honoured,

In hypothetical syllogisms sometimes the Minor, and sometimes the Consequence is to be denied: the Minor, when the second proposition is false; the Consequence, when the second proposition is true, yet the Consequence does not necessarily follow from it.

A categorical or positive syllogism is that in which the Major includes a positive assertion; thus the Major asserts or denies the agreement between two ideas.

truth of the rest. The Consequence affirms that one to be true.

EXAMPLE.

Major. The world is either self-existent, or tramed by chance, or the workmanship of an infinitely powerful and wise being.

Minor. But it is neither self-existent, nor formed by chance.

Cons. Therefore it is the work of an infinitely powerful and wise being.

In disjunctive syllogisins, sometimes the disjunctive and sometimes the minor may be denied; the former when all the possible suppositions are not enumerated; the latter, when any of the suppositions are true which are denied to be so.

An Argument is a series of syllogisms, when each succeeding syllogism proves what was denied in the preceding one. Suppose the question, to be defended by the respondeut, was this:

Duo latera cujuscunque trianguli sunt majora tertio,

Argument against this:

Major.-Si quadratum hypothenusæ trianguli rectanguli, summo quadratorum laterum sit equale, cadit questio.

Minor.-Sed quadratum hypothenusæ, &c.
Cons.-Ergo cadit questio.

Here, as the Minor is true, the Consequence must be denied; the opponent therefore proceeds to prove the conse quence in the following manner in the next syllogism.

Major.-Si ubi quadrata quantitatum sint æqualia quantitates ipsæ sint æquales-valet consequentia.

Minor. Sed ubi quadrata quantitatum, &c.
Cons. Ergo valet consequentia.

This syllogism being true, he proceeds in his argument thus:

Major. Si ex præmissis sequatur hypothenusam trianguli rectanguli duobus lateribus qualem, valet consequentia et argumen

Minor. Sed in statu præsenti sæpenumero bonis miseria, malis vero felicitas, impertitur. Cons-Ergo justitia Dei non patet, &c. Here the Consequence must be denied, and therefore the opponent must endeavour to prove in the following syllogism: Major.—Si justitiæ Dei consentaneum sit bonos præmiis remunerari, malus vero affici, tum justitia Dei non patet ex lumine naturæ. Minor. Sed justitiæ consentaneum est, &c. Cons.-Ergo justitia Dei non patet ex lumine naturæ, et proinde neque status futurus.

This is the conclusion of the argument, but for conciseness sake it is usual in the schools to read it in the following man

ner:

Aur cadit questio, aut justitia Dei patet etiam ex lumine naturæ.

Sed justitia Dei non patet ex lumine naturæ.

Ergo cadit questio.

Si in statu rerum præsenti bonis miseria impertiatur, malis vero felicitas; valet Minor. Sed in statu, &c. Ergo valet Minor.

Si justitiæ Dei consentaneum sit bonos premiis remunerari, malis vero premiis affici; Valet Consequentia.

Sed justitia Dei, &c. Ergo valet Consequentia et Argumentum.

The argument being concluded, the respondent proceeds to refute it; to do which, he examines, whether the conclusions be fairly deduced from the premises, and if so, whether it affects the question; how far it affects it; and whether the opponent does not suppose more to have been granted than really was in the former syllogisms. Thus, in the last argument, we may grant, that it is agreeable to the divine justice to reward the good and to punish the bad, but then we should add, either in this world or a future one; for the divine justice does not necessarily require, that it should be done in the present state; as this attribute of the

Deity may be deduced in general from his infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence, which may be from the works of the creation, and the abundant provision made by him for the happiness of mankind.

Rules to be observed by the Respondent.

1. To understand the syllogism before he denies it; and if it be not intelligible, to ask the opponent for an explanation.

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2. To deny the Minor, in preference to the Consequence, if the truth of it be at all suspicious.

3. If what is asserted in the Minor generally be only true in particulur cases, to restrict it to those cases.

be quoted by the opponent, to quote 4. If authorities against the question other authorities in favour of it.

5. If at the conclusion of the argument any of the foregoing steps be forgotten, or their connection be not preserved, to require the opponent to enumerate and explain them.

Rules to be observed by the Opponent 1. To see that the arguments be drawn up distinctly and intelligibly.

2. To be able to explain the several parts of them clearly and precisely.

3. To have in readiness a proof for the Minor, in case it should be denied, when the next syllogism is in proof of the Consequence.

4. In quoting authorities, to give the true meaning of the authors.

5. At the conclusion of the argument, to be able to sum up the several steps in clear and concise terms; to explain their connection; and to shew how the arguments affect the question.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

Tunder the signature of Common HE request of your correspondent, Sense," having drawn forth the communications of several popular remedies, as detailed in your Magazine for March, I beg leave to offer a few observations on such remedies, and how far a reliance upon them may be attended with success, or disappointment.

From the present advanced and diffused state of general science, with the more just and accurate reasoning, as applied to almost all the concerns of life, the almost universal belief in the ethicacy of nostrums in the cure of diseases, which prevailed in the more unenlightened periods of our history, has very much abated; yet there is a large portion

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of credulity still remaining, with regard to the medicinal powers of various substances, which are actually inert and powerless This is kept up by the occasional occurrence of cases of disease, which could only be removed by time, apparently giving way to very simple means. There are many disorders which are not to be cured at once by the mere agency of medicinal substances, and bid defiance to the best efforts of the medical practitioner; the patient, finding his disorder obstinate, and disappointed at the fruitless endeavours made for its removal, becomes wearied with the use of medicine, as prescribed by the regular practitioner, and gladly catches at the offered remedy with the greater eagerness, as being so much the more strange. The patient, after the trial of a variety of peans, gets well, which he does by time and the natural powers of the constitution; and the remedy last used, whatever it may have been, ob tains the credit of having worked a cure, of which, in reality, it is perfectly in

nocent.

It may be alleged, that the means usually recommended in this way, can do no harm, if they do no good; and therefore, where other more powerful remedies have failed, these are deserving a trial. So far they may be allowable, where a placebo, to keep the patient's mind amused, is all that is desired; until those changes take place, in the natural operations of the human frame, by which a healthful state is induced, and the patient recovers: but the mischief to be apprehended is, that, in acute diseases of rapid progress, much valuable time is lost in the use of means without efficacy or power; and when they are found to be without avail, the time is gone by, when the patient might have been rescued from destruction by judicious and well applied remedies.

A patient, for instance, in the early perion of true pulmonary consumption, trusting to the use of partridge's eggs, will be woefully deceived in the result; and when convinced of the error, have recourse to medicine, when unhappily the disease is no longer to be cured, or even arrested in its progress.

The common mistake of ascribing results to causes which are obviously inadequate, comes under the daily observation of medical practitioners, and prevails more or less in other forins, whereever ignorance and superstition sway the decisions of those who suffer themselves

to be guided by false and partial views or modes of reasoning.

This fact is treated of in the following correct and elegant manner, in a tract on a different subject, published some time ago by the brother of a late most able and ever to be lamented military officer. "The evidence that is requisite to prove, or disprove, any proposition in the science of medicine, is of a peculiar kind. It differs entirely from that species of proof, which satisfies a court of law. Both direct and circumstantial evidence, which would leave no doubt in the breasts of judges and juries, have often not the slightest tendency to render a medical fact even probable. The de clarations, and even the oaths, of the most conscientious, disinterested, and able men, are all insufficient.

"The reason of this is, that few men, even those of considerable capacity, distinguish accurately between opinion and fact.

"When a man asserts he has been cured of a particular disease, by a certain drug, he is apt to think he is declaring a fact which he knows to be true; whereas, his assertion includes two opinions, in both of which, he may be completely mistaken. The first is, an opinion of his having the disease specified; the second, that the medicine employed removed the disease. Most people are convinced, that they are acquainted with the malady they are afflicted with; they consider it as a mere matter of fact, and when they are cured, they have as little doubt of the remedy that accomplished it. This belief is often strengthened by the con fideat declarations and specious behaviour of the person who exhibits the remedy: and if the patient also pos sesses gratitude, this also heightens the delusion. He is thus easily prevailed upon to swear positively, both to the disease and the remedy, as if they were plain facts, obvious to the senses; whereas, both the one and the other are fre quently beyond the reach of human knowledge."

My object in the above statement, and quotation, is to caution your readers against placing any dependence on po pular remedies, from their supposed virtue in particular cases; the peculiarities of constitution, and the infinite variety in the forms of disease, preclude all rea sonable hope from the use of such means. Your's, &c. T. M.

Reigate, May 14, 1809.

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