and if our imagination adds to these the innumerable creeks that reach out, traversing almost every square mile of the country, what nature has done for the land in this particular becomes apparent.

Closely correlated with the abundant water supply in this favored region is a soil unsurpassed in its productiveness and a climate borrowed from the location of the valley in the heart of the north temperate zone which is at once adapted to a wide range of vegetation and to the stimulation of human energy-a very potent factor in the development of civilization. For variety of productions useful to man perhaps no spot on earth excels the Mississippi valley, and this value is enhanced by the adaptability of the soil to vegetation that is not indigenous, many of our products today being of exotic origin. This fertility and adaptability of the soil, says Livingston Farrand in his "Basis of American History," "must be regarded as among the chief contributing causes to the stupendous growth of the American nation."

The stock that peopled our section has, of course, been an immeasurable factor in the extraordinary development of the country. What self-government is in the hands of an untrained Latin race is demonstrated by South American history. The AngloSaxon tide that poured into our Middle West after the Revolutionary war was not only the offspring of the most staid and substantial race on earth, but it had back of it nearly two centuries of training in self-government. It was a race hardy, independent and capable, jealously guarding its institutions and the best that it had inherited politically. Above all, its individuals were ardent lovers of their land and permanent home-makers. Add to this a national policy evolved through the same people that fostered the settlement and development of the public domain along wise lines that had been thought out by some of the most patriotic and most able statesmen of the age, and we have in rough outline the fundamental factors of that particular phase of civilization in which our State shares. To appreciate well the character and meaning of our local history we should consider these antecedent causes explaining the larger history of which we are a part. A long and interesting chapter on these preliminaries might well be written, but the aim here is to touch upon them in a cursory way only, as an introduction to our nearer theme.'

The French in the Wabash Valley.§-The French occupancy of the Mississippi valley, lasting nearly a century, or from the time of the explorations of La Salle and Joliet till the French and Indian war, is for the most part, as a tale that is told, with little

permanent sequence. This is true of the early invasion of the Wabash valley, and while French life there, from the establishment of the first posts in the first half of the eighteenth century till the American invasion early in the nineteenth, affords a picturesque and romantic preliminary chapter to our history, it can scarcely be called an integral part of it, and its influence in modifying our development is scarcely appreciable. The story of Indiana as a State is a story of Americanized Anglo-Saxon stock pure and simple. The isolated, straggling French life, little ethnological fragments, as it were, left stranded here far from their kind, was not strong enough to tincture the incoming population with that wonderful French race persistence that is notable in Canada, and in short time they were incontinently swallowed up.

It can be said, however, that the previous French settlement at Vincennes determined the startingpoint of the American occupancy, and the beginning place of Indiana politics. The treaty of Greenville, in 1795, secured from the Indians along with certain strategic points on the Wabash river and a large tract at the falls of the Ohio, for George Rogers Clark and his soldiers, the lands adjacent to "the post of St. Vincennes," to which the Indian title had already been extinguished. This reservation, which was rather indefinite as to boundaries, in turn determined the first of the series of Indian purchases that ultimately comprised the whole State. By a treaty consummated in 1803 William Henry Harrison secured an extension of the 1795 reservation, with defined boundaries, that reached some fifty miles westward from Vincennes. was the first part of the new territory to be surveyed by the rectangular system adopted by the United States government, and was the first to be thrown open for general settlement. This and the existence of Vincennes as the one town in the territory that was to be the future Indiana, logically determined the location of the territorial seat of government and the first center of American population.

This tract

Incidentally, in this connection, in order to establish in the newly acquired isolated tract surveys that would align with future surveys to the east, that must, in turn, meet the Ohio surveys, a meridian and base lines were made to intersect at the western boundary of the tract, and thus our survey ranges ran east and west from a meridian near the middle of the State instead of advancing westward from 1 the Ohio line in orderly continuation.

One great preliminary service that the French did for their successors was in the first explorations of the country. First the professed explorers and then

L

the coureurs de bois, employed by the fur traders, traversed our streams, penetrating to the remoter parts of the virgin wilderness, and the maps left us by the old French cartographers are not only curious as revealing the growth of the geographical knowledge of our region, but are particularly informative as to the location of Indian tribes in those days.§

An interesting geological story, apropos here, which illustrates how remote natural causes may sometimes enter into human history, is given by Mr. Charles R. Dryer in the Sixteenth Geological Report of Indiana (1888). The French in their intercourse with the Mississippi valley, as even the casual reader of history is supposed to know, passed into the interior valley from the basin of the great lakes by the rivers of the two systems, making the connections over various short portages at watersheds where the navigable waters of opposite-flowing streams almost met. There were six or seven of these trade routes, and one of the most direct, with a comparatively short and easy portage, was from Lake Erie up the Maumee to the point where Fort Wayne stands, thence about nine miles by level land to the Aboit, or Little Wabash, thence down the Wabash. An examination of the map reveals a peculiar natural feature at this portage. The St. Joseph and St. Mary's rivers, flowing, respectively, from the northeast and southeast, unite at the point farthest west, then, as the Maumee, double curiously on their previous courses and flow back to Lake Erie. The three, presenting a sagittate or arrowhead form, reach into the fork formed by the branches of the Wabash, thus bringing the waters of the two systems almost together at navigable points. This odd situation Mr. Dryer explains in terms of glacial deposit, the explanation being that vast lakes of ice in the glacial period crowding each other from north and east heaped up their ridges of morainic matter in such fashion as to determine the subsequent river outlets.

In view of this theory it is not fanciful to say that the blind forces of nature, long before the advent of man, predetermined very definitely the little chapter of French history in the Wabash valley, and whatever relics of it may have survived in our later history. More than that, it determined at a later day a very important trade route (the Wabash & Erie

canal, which followed the Maumee and Wabash valleys) that played no little part in peopling and developing the Wabash valley.

The Acquisition of Our Territory. When the American colonies were fighting for their independence, very much engrossed with the desperate strug

gle immediately at hand, their political future territory hanging in the balance, it was a provia tial thing that in far-off Kentucky there was a young "Hannibal of the West," who had the statesmanship to see the importance of the great wilderness north of the Ohio river, the ambition to plan its conquest and the resolution and ability to attain his ends. This person was George Rogers Clark,§ a Virginian by birth, but a Kentuckian by adoption, who, by his strength of character, had become a leader in the new settlements. At that time Kentucky, a province of Virginia, was the extreme western frontier. Between it and Canada, where the English were firmly entrenched, stretched the territory in question, in English possession by virtue of small military forces at Detroit, Vincennes and Kaskaskia. Clark's reasons for the invasion of this half-possessed land were defensive as well as acquisitive, for its savage inhabitants and the French settlements established there were utilized by the British as a perpetual threat against the American frontier. peated Indian depredations on the Kentucky settlements were instigated by Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton, stationed at Detroit, who was even accused of offering premiums for American scalps, and the garrisons at the French towns on the Wabash and Mississippi were but bases for the red marauders to operate from.

Re

The Federal Congress was not ignorant of or indifferent to this state of affairs in the far West, and it probably would, sooner or later, have moved in the matter, but none the less opportune was the rise of a frontiersman like Clark, who knew intimately the conditions and the character of the foes to be

dealt with. The elements that come into relief when we examine his famous campaign and its successful outcome are this unerring, fundamental comprehension of conditions and men, a grim will that no obstacle could daunt and a sagacity that gave greatness to his leadership; and for this combination. of qualities five great commonwealths of subsequent days owe him perpetual gratitude.

Like most men who elaborate plans of magnitude, Clark did not wear his heart on his sleeve. After the

inception of his idea he digested it well, but shared it with few, one good reason for this being that the undertaking he contemplated must, for its success, fall as a surprise on the enemy. As revealing at once the slow incubation of his scheme and his thoroughness in preparing the way, as early as the summer of 1777 he sent two spies into the northern territory for the purpose of gathering more explicit information concerning the British in relation to the Indians. His plans finally thought out, his next

step was to bring them before the powers that could give the necessary authority and backing, and to this end he went to Virginia, where he conferred with such men as Patrick Henry, then Governor of Virginia; Thomas Jefferson, George Mason and George Wythe. The boldness of Clark's scheme captivated while it challenged doubts. The hazard and chances of disaster were great, but the possible benefits to the country in the future, aside from the present question of annoyance and danger to the Kentucky country, after careful consideration, outweighed the risk, and in the end the Council of Virginia advised the appropriation of twelve hundred pounds for the purpose of an "expedition against Kaskaskia," to be undertaken "with as little delay and as much secrecy as possible."

This advice was acted upon by Governor Henry and Clark was authorized to raise a force of three hundred and fifty men for the campaign.

At this point the adventure takes on a truly dramatic character. With a view to the secrecy necessary to the hopefulness of the enterprise, a set of instructions which was made public, and the aim of which was "to divert attention from the real object," commanded Colonel Clark to enlist seven companies of men to act as militia, the further language of the instructions conveying the idea that the purpose was for the protection of Kentucky. Under cover of this Clark received from Governor Henry a private letter of instructions which read as follows:

Virginia, Sct.

In Council, Wmsburg, Jany 2d, 1778. Lieut. Colonel George Rogers Clark:

You are to proceed with all convenient speed to raise seven companies of soldiers to consist of fifty men each, officered in the usual manner and armed most properly for the enterprise, and with this force attack the British post at Kaskasky.

It is conjectured that there are many pieces of cannon and military stores. to considerable amount [?] at that place, the taking and preservation of which would be a valuable acquisition to the State. If you are so fortunate, therefore, as to succeed in your expectation you will take every possible measure to secure the artillery and stores and whatever may advantage the State.

For the transportation of the troops, provisions, etc., down the Ohio you are to apply to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt for boats, etc. During the whole transaction you are to take especial care to keep the true destination of your force a secret. Its success depends upon this.

Orders are therefore given to Captain Smitht secure the two men from Kaskasky. Similar con duct will be proper in similar cases. It is earn estly desired that you show humanity to such British subjects and other persons as fall in your hands. If the white inhabitants at that post and the neighborhood will give undoubted evidence of their attachment to this State (for it is certain they live within its limits) by taking the test provided by law and by every other way and means in their power, let them be treated as fellow-citizens and their persons and property duly secured Assistance and protection against all enemies whatever shall be afforded them and the commonwealth of Virginia is pledged to accomplish it. But if these people will not accede to these reasonable demands they must feel the miseries of war under the direction of that humanity that has hitherto distinguished Americans, and which it is expected you will ever consider as the rule of your conduct, and from which you are in no instance to depart.

The corps you are to command are to receive the pay and allowance of militia, and to act under the laws and regulations of this State now in force. The inhabitants of this post will be informed by you that in case they accede to the offer of becoming citizens of this commonwealth a proper garrison will be maintained among them and every attention bestowed to render their commerce beneficial, the fairest prospects being opened to the dominions of both France and Spain.

It is in contemplation to establish a post near the mouth of Ohio. Cannon will be wanted to fortify it. Part of those at Kaskasky will be easily brought thither or otherwise secured as circumstances will make necessary.

You are to apply to General Hand for powder and lead necessary for this expedition. If he can't supply it the person who has that which Captain Lynn brought from Orleans can. Lead was sent to Hampshire by my orders, and that may be delivered you. Wishing you success, I, am, Sir, Your h'ble serv.

P. HENRY.

One who wishes to enter intimately into the ro mantic story of Clark's campaign should carefully read this letter as it fixes clearly and authoritatively the policy and program of the campaign-a program that was carried out with little deviation although Governor Henry in private conversation with Clark implied that his written instructions

cretion.

Thus empowered and provided with money for the expenses of the expedition Clark, with characteristic energy, proceeded to the execution of his plans. His first base of operations was a western settlement on the Monongahela river some distance above Pittsburg, known as Red Stone or Red Stone Old Fort. His officers were appointed and commissioned to raise recruits in western Pennsylvania, Virginia, Carolina and the Kentucky country, and in this preliminary business the first serious difficulty developed. It must be remembered that the real reason for this recruiting was not divulged. Secrecy, be it repeated, was essential to success, and the instructions made public by Governor Henry conveyed the impression that the force to be raised was for the protection of Kentucky. The proposition to draw off from the other parts of the frontier "for the defense of a few detached inhabitants who had better be removed" met with an opposition that threatened to nip the whole scheme in the bud and that probably would have stopped short a less determined leader. As Clark himself expressed it: "Many leading men in the frontiers. bined and did everything that lay in their power to stop the men that had enlisted, and set the whole frontier in an uproar, even condescended to harbor and protect those that deserted. I found my case desperate the longer I remained the worse it was."* Out of the men that Captains Joseph Bowman and Leonard Helm had succeeded in recruiting "twothirds of them was stopped," we are told, those that were left numbering about 150. Clark, however, was not to be thwarted, and equipping himself with boats and supplies at Pittsburg he put down river with his little force, accompanied by several adventurous families from the Pennsylvania country, borrowing hope from the information sent him that one of his recruiting officers, Major William Smith, would join him at the falls of the Ohio with nearly two hundred men, from the Holston river country, in what is now eastern Tennessee. But he was doomed to bitter disappointment-a part of one company was all that ever appeared of Major Smith's two hundred men.

* * *

com

At the falls of the Ohio, Clark established his second base of operations on a long, narrow island afterwards known as "Corn Island," that then lay above the falls where the Pennsylvania railroad bridge now spans the river.§ The falls, as being the dividing place between the upper and lower river, was deemed the logical point for a permanent. defensive post. Clark's reason for settling on the

*Clark's Memoir.

protection from hostile bands of Indians and the more effective guarding against desertion, which danger would probably follow the announcement of the commanders real plans. The sagacity of the latter surmise was not at fault in this, as the sequel showed.

The settlement on Corn Island consisted of a sufficient number of rude cabins built from the timber growing on the island and it took on the character of a real "settlement" by virtue of the families that had thus far accompanied the expedition, which were now apportioned ground for gardens, and an interesting passage in Clark's Memoir is to the effect that when word was carried back to the people on the Monongahela "great numbers moved down,” and that this was "one of the principal causes of the rapid progress of the settlement of Kentucky."

Clark lingered at Corn Island the better part of June, 1778, still hoping to swell his little force, but with disheartening results. According to William H. English, who is the leading authority on all relating to this campaign, "it is probably a fair conclusion that Clark brought with him to the falls about one hundred and fifty men; that thirty-five or forty were added to his forces while at the falls; that he left not exceeding ten guards on Corn Island and took with him on the Kaskaskia campaign about one hundred and seventy-five men. It is possible that the officers should be added to the number, but it is the author's belief that the effective force with him in the campaign against Kaskaskia did not at any time exceed two hundred, which was certainly less than half the number he at one time expected."*

Clark's own words reveal at once the situation and the character of the man. and the character of the man. "I was sensible," he says, "of the impression it would have on many, to be taken near a thousand [miles] from the body of their country to attack a people five times their number, and merciless tribes of Indians, then allies. and determined enemies to us. I knew that my case was desperate, but the more I reflected on my weakness the more I was pleased with the enterprise."

* * *

To quote Mr. English again: "He had encountered unexpected obstacles and disappointments from the time his recruiting commenced. He had estimated that the complete success of his enterprise required a force of five hundred men.* and here he was with less than two hundred. It was a turning point, not only in his life, but, possibly, in the destiny of his country, for if the expedition had broken up then who knows what would have been the future of the vast territory *Conquest of the Northwest.

* * *

northwest of the Ohio river, or where would have been the present boundaries of the United States? * * * He realized that inaction was now his greatest danger, and that an immediate movement against the enemy was the best and only way to hold his forces and win success."

It was not until the eve of the day set for departure that Clark divulged to his men his real object. He says:

"After my making known my instructions almost every gentleman espoused the enterprise and plainly saw the utility of it, and supposed they saw the salvation of Kentucky almost in their reach; but some repined that we were not strong enough to put it beyond all doubt. The soldiery in general debated on the subject, but determined to follow their officers. Some were alarmed at the thought of being taken at so great a distance into the enemy's country, that if they should have success in the first instance they might be attacked in their posts without a possibility of getting succor or making their retreat. * * * Some dissatisfaction was discovered in Captain Dillards company, consequently the boats were well secured and sentinels placed where it [was] thought there was a possibility of their wading from the island. My design was to take those from the island down on our way who would not attempt to desert, but got out-generaled by their lieutenant, whom I had previously conceived a very tolerable opinion of. They had, by swimming in the day, discovered that the channel opposite their camp

might be waded, and a little before day himself and the greater part of the company slipped down the bank and got to the opposite shore before they were discovered by the sentinels. Vexed at the idea of their escape in the manner they did, as one of my principal motives for taking post on the island was to prevent desertion, and intending to set out the next day I was undetermined for [a] few minutes what to do, as it might take a party several days to overtake [them], and, having no distrust of those who remained, the example was not immediately dangerous but might prove so hereafter; and recollecting that there was a number of horses [belonging] to gentlemen from Harrodsburg, I ordered a strong party to pursue them, and for the foot and horse to relieve each other regularly, and so put to death every man in their power who would not surrender. They overhauled them in about twenty miles. The deserters, discovering them at a distance, scattered in the woods; only seven or eight were taken. The rest made their way to the different posts; many who were not woodsmen almost perished. The poor lieutenant and the few who remained with him, after suffering almost all that could be felt from hunger and fatigue, arrived at Harrodstown. Having heard of his conduct [they] would not, for some time, suffer him to come into their houses nor give him anything to eat. On the return of the party the soldiers burnt and hung his effigy.""

The French Period.-The exact dates of the first French explorations of the Mississippi valley are so variable, as given by various historians, that it is hardly worth while to give any as really authentic. According to the researches of Mr. J. P. Dunn, who may be accepted as careful and thorough-going, La Salle, the first white man in this region, probably "traced the entire lower boundary of Indiana in 1669-70," by way of the Ohio river, and passed through the northwest corner of the State in 1671 or 1672. From this time until 1679 (still drawing upon Mr. Dunn) there was no recorded exploration of Indiana, though it is argued that in that interval more or less fur trading was carried on in this region. The portage between the St. Joseph and Kankakee rivers, where South Bend stands, was first used by him in 1679, while in 1682-3 "he was all through Indiana and Illinois." Who was the first to traverse the Maumee-Wabash route by way of the site of Fort Wayne is not recorded, but it was probably used by the fur traders at a very early date, as the Wabash threaded

a rich and extensive fur country, besides being one of the most direct highways to the Mississippi. The first post planted in this valley was Ouiatanon, which was a fort as well as a trading post. There has been controversy as to the exact location of Ouiatanon, but according to Prof. Oscar J. Craig, formerly of Purdue University, who has written a monograph on the subject, it is now pretty well established that it stood on "the west side of the Wabash river and four miles below the present city of Lafayette." The date of its establishment is given as 1719 or 1720. Its purpose was to "counteract the influence of the English and to keep ascendancy over the Indians." The logic of the location was that at this point on the river "the lighter barks and canoes that were used in the carrying trade between Canada and the southwest were changed for larger ones, to be used on the deeper waters of the lower Wabash and the Ohio"-the same cause, practically, that operated in the locating of Lafayette more than a century later. The post took its name from the Ouiatanon

*

*