The judiciary. council, and in most cities has the power to veto its ordinances. The executive and administrative powers of the mayor are much greater in some cities than in others. He is usually the head of the police department, and in this direction his authority is quite extensive. The judicial system of a city generally includes two kinds of courts: (1) the ordinary State courts (justice and district or superior courts); (2) special city or police courts. The jurisdiction of the latter is usually confined to minor cases, and the division of authority between the two kinds of courts is not always clear. In a town or village government, the local board may have oversight at the same time of public health, charities, streets, sidewalks, and lighting. But as population grows more dense, these public interests increase in exAdministra tent, complexity, and importance until it becomes necesments. sary to make provision for the separate supervision of each one. We then have administrative departments, few in number in small cities, but very numerous in large ones.* tive depart Departments under committees or boards. It is a common practice in small cities to intrust to committees of the council the management of departments. Or it may be that a body of men known as a board or commission is elected or appointed for this purpose. Frequently such a commission or board will employ an overseer to superintend work that may be in progress under its direction. Now, this method of managing administrative departments has serious faults. Much of their work is executive in nature, and a committee composed of several members does not act with * Boston has 33. The eighteen departments of Greater New York are, at present, finance, taxes and assessments, law, police, health, fire, buildings, highways, water supply, bridges, street-cleaning, sewers, public buildings, parks, docks and ferries, education, charities, and corrections. sufficient promptness and unity of purpose. Furthermore, it is difficult to locate responsibility among the members of a committee; these are apt to shift the blame for bad management from one to another, and when responsibility rests upon several no one feels its burden seriously. Because responsibility is not definite and certain the temptation to yield to corrupt influences is strong. Members of such administrative bodies have sometimes entered into "deals" with contractors to furnish materials to the city at exorbitant prices.* When members of administrative boards are councilmen elected by popular vote, they are tempted to give "jobs" to influential politicians and to unnecessarily large numbers of workingmen. Incompetent employees and stuffed pay-rolls are the result. partments. Opportunities for the abuse of official power are especially frequent in the police departments of large cities. Police deWe have, for example, the appointment of men upon a police force for purely political reasons. The adoption, in some cities, of a competitive examination system in this department has resulted in higher physical standards and more intelligent officers. In several of the larger cities there has existed the systematic protection of law-breakers by the police, under a well-understood scale of prices. There is no department of city government which may become more serviceable to the people and reflect more credit upon the city, than the police department; and its power for evil, in the corruption of public morals, is equally great. Unfortunately, police departments are very often managed from the stand * Under the rule of the Tweed Ring, in New York City, a court-house which should have cost $250,000 was still unfinished after the expenditure of $8,000,000. For Tweed Ring see Encyclopedia of Social Reform; Bryce (last edition), II, chapter 88; Conkling, City Government in the United States; Andrews, History of the Last Quarter Century, I, 11–16; Scribner's Mag., 17: 274-276. Nonpartisan boards. The single departmental head. point of party politics, rather than upon the basis of merit and military discipline. In sharp contrast with these are the fire departments of American cities, which are remarkable for their efficiency and the purity of their management. It is the shameless and wide-spread corruption originating in the administration of municipal departments that, more than any other single cause, accounts for the bad government of American cities. Many experiments have been tried for the improvement of this condition. As a device for preventing the entrance of political favoritism into the work of departmental boards, these are sometimes composed of members belonging to different political parties. They are called non-partisan or bi-partisan boards. Experience does not show, however, that this plan is successful in securing nonpartisan control, as the members frequently agree upon a division of the "spoils " for political purposes. When it has seemed desirable to place a municipal department under a single officer, instead of under a board, the manner of appointing this officer becomes a new problem. If he be nominated by the mayor and confirmed by the council, neither of these authorities is willing to assume the responsibility for his conduct. Appointments for political reasons are common because each such appointment strengthens the political position of those who make it. In recent years there has been a tendency toward placing administrative departments under the authority of the mayor alone, as a means of fixing responsibility more definitely. The mayor is given absolute power to appoint and to remove heads of departments.* At the * He becomes in the city what the president is in the National government; whereas, otherwise there is a separation of executive and administrative departments, as in our State governments. Wilcox, 191-192. mayor's same time the other powers of the mayor have been in- find these; for, except in the larger cities, administrative The National Municipal League publish as "A Municipal Program," a model city charter, drawn up by a committee of its members who are recognized as authorities upon this subject. They recommend the organization of a city government upon the following plan: 1. A single-chambered council elected on the general-ticket plan, for terms of six years-one-third every two years. 2. A mayor elected for a term of two years; his salary to be fixed by the council. The mayor is to appoint all heads of departments (except controller). Subordinates are to be appointed under a civil service examination system administered by a commission of three members to be appointed by the mayor. 3. The controller is to be elected by the council and is head of the financial department of the city. We have now reviewed one of the great problems of municipal government. The solution of this, and of other problems that are soon to be noticed, depends not so much upon the adoption of a certain plan of organ increased. A model plan of organization. Primary functions of city government. City officers. ization as upon the creation of correct ideals of city government. Two questions may be asked: What is the primary purpose of municipal government? and, What should be required of those who administer it? The least that may be expected of a city government is that it guard public health, enable citizens to live in security and comfort, and maintain an efficient educational system; and, also, that in doing these things public money be justly collected and honestly expended. If one follows out in detail this necessary work of city government, he will be impressed with the fact that these are matters of business almost exclusively, rather than matters of political policy. The council, being a deliberative body, should determine questions of policy; but no such questions are rightfully involved in the matters of which we have just spoken. Furthermore, it is true, especially in large cities, that many matters, such as sanitation, the water supply, and the construction of public works, are purely technical in their nature and should be in charge of experts. What, then, should be demanded of public officials? Evidently, some should be men of technical training. All should possess the same business capacity and zeal for the interests of their employers (the public) that are required in the sphere of private enterprise. Now when there exist in a city right ideals in these fundamental matters, questions of organization become much simpler. It is not necessary, nor is it desirable, that the framework of municipal government should be the same in all cities of the country. The best arrangements will give evidence of their superiority in the course of time. In the employment of subordinate officers, numerous cities have adopted, within recent years, civil service * * Among them New York, Chicago, Milwaukee. |