by the place of its origin or the status of the parties. The added clause, giving each court exclusive jurisdiction over such suits when the parties defendant reside within the city where the court is held is not necessarily nor most reasonably to be regarded as detracting from the previous grant, but possesses merely a force quite consistent with it. The office of this clause is to secure to the residents of these cities the privilege of having suits against them within the act brought only in that tribunal which is convenient for them. It indicates simply the persons who may not be compelled to submit to other jurisdictions. The exemption granted thus appears to be a mere personal privilege, and therefore those who have it may waive it at pleasure. If a defendant so favored be sued before some other tribunal, and designs to avail himself of his privilege, he must either plead to the jurisdiction (3 Bl. Com. 298) or move in time to be discharged. Pleading generally or going to trial without objection renders the authority of the court complete. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; McCormick v. P. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 303. Funck v. Smith. Opinion by Dixon, J.

NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY ABSTRACT.*

STATUTE-IMPLIED REPEAL.-Where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the frame work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system in itself, the last act must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail, and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed. United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88. Mr. Justice Van Syckel, in Roche v. Jersey City, 11 Vr. 257, 259, said: "This rule does not rest strictly upon the ground of repeal by implication, but upon the principle that when the Legislature makes a revision of a particular statute, and frames a new statute upon the subjectmatter, and from the frame-work of the act it is apparent that the Legislature designed a complete scheme for the matter, it is a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new law shall prevail, and whatever is excluded is discarded. It is decisive evidence of an intention to prescribe the provisions mentioned in the later act as the only ones on that subject which shall be obligatory." Bracken v. Smith. Opinion by Van Fleet, V. C. [See 30 Alb. L. J. 238.]

MARRIAGE--DIVORCE-PRESUMPTION OF ADULTERY REBUTTAL MAY DUTY OF

SHOW

DECOYING

-

HUSBAND. (1) A visit by a married woman to a brothel will, unless satisfactorily explained, justify the presumption that she went there for a criminal purpose. Lord Stowell said, in Williams v. Williams, 4 Eng. Ec. 416 (1 Hagg. Con. 299), that it was almost impossible to believe that a woman would go to a brothel for any but a criminal purpose; and therefore in his opinion it had been properly held that such conduct on the part of a wife furnished sufficient evidence of adultery to justify a decree that she was guilty. And Dr. Lushington, in Astley v. Astley, 3 Eng. Ec. 303 (1 Hagg. Ec. 714), held that such conduct on the part of a wife must constrain a court to conclude that she had committed adultery. (2) Such conduct will evidence of not however afford guilt if it wife that the was decoyed there by the procurement of her husband, and for the purpose of making a case against her. (3) A husband who seduces his wife before marriage, and

is

shown

* To appear in 39 N. J. Eq. Reports.

after marriage sees her in a situation of temptation, and does nothing to rescue her, and she yields, will be understood as having consented to her adultery. Chancellor Zabriskie declared in Hedden v. Hedden, 6 C. E. Green, 61, that if a husband sees what a reasona ble man could not see without alarm, or if he know that his wife has been guilty of ante-nuptial incontiuence, or if he has himself seduced her before marriage whereby he is put upon his guard respecting her weakness, he is called upon to exercise peculiar vigilance and care over her, and if he sees what a reasonable man could not permit, and makes no effort to avert the danger, he must be supposed to see and mean the result. Cane v. Cane. Opinion by Van Fleet, V. C. WILL-WIDOW RECEIVING RENTS-ACCOUNT-TAXES AND INSURANCE.-A decedent left no property, except a lot with an unfinished house thereon, which his widow occupied for about three months after his death, and then leased and received the rent. In a suit by the children for partition thereof, held, that she was entitled to reimbursement of moneys paid by her for taxes thereon, and also for repairs of damage to the house by a tempest, but not for the premiums on insurance policies taken in her own name, and that she must account for the rents. Houston v. Houston. Opinion by Chancellor.

LIEU-FAILURE TO

debts be paid, and

WILL-DOWER-PROVISION IN DISSENT.-After directing that his making a specific devise, a testator gave the "balance and residue" of his estate to his wife, declaring that that gift to her was in lieu of her dower. In the settlement of the estate and the payment of the testator's debts, all his personal estate was exhausted, and all his lands, other than those specifically devised, sold by order of the Orphans' Court. Held, that his widow was not deprived of her right of dower in those other lands by her failure to file her dissent to the devise to her within the time limited by the statute. Thompson v. Egbert, 2 Harr. 459; Chiswell v. Morris, 1 McCart. 101. Osmun v. Porter. Opinion by Chancellor.

OF FRAUDS.- -W. was indebted to plaintiffs, and defendants were indebted to W. By W.'s request defendants promised to pay the amount which they owed W. to plaintiffs instead of to him, and plaintiffs relinquished their claim in consideration of such promise, and defendant charged the amount to it on its own books. Held, that the transaction rested upon a sufficient consideration, and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amount from defendants. 2 Whart. Cont., § 853. The statute of frauds has no application to a case like the present. Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 883; Dearborn v. Parks, 5 Greenl. 81; Rowe v. Whittier, 21 Me. 545; Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Den. 45; Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432; Rice v. Carter, 11 Ired. 298; Files v. McLeod, 14 Ala. 611; Robbins v. Ayres, 10 Mo. 538, Bowen v. Kurtz, 37 Iowa, 239. The rule has been stated to be that where a party who was not before liable undertakes to pay a debt of a third person, and as a part of the agreement, the original debtor is discharged from his indebtedness, the agreement is not within the stat Packer v. Benton, 35 Conn. 343; Fairlie v. Denton, 8 Barn. & C. 395; Wilson v. Coupland, 5 Barn. & Ald. 228. The defendant's counsel claims that no recovery can be had under the common counts. The testimony tended to show, and we think established the fact, that defendant was indebted to Weller in the amount of his indebtedness to plaintiffs, which was re

ute.

tained by them and constituted a fund in defendant's hands with which to pay plaintiffs, and in such case the defendant would be liable under the count for money had and received. Moreover the amount to be paid by defendant under the agreement was a sum certain, and it is elementary law that when a sum certain is due on a simple contract, indebitatus assumpsit will lie to recover it. Packer v. Benton, 35 Conn. 343. Mulesone v. American Lumber Co. Opinion by Champlin, J.

[Decided Jan. 14, 1885.]

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR-FOREIGN-DOMICILE-PERSONALTY GOVERNED BY LAW OF.--S., a bachelor, who had previously been a citizen of Michigan, went to St. Louis, Mo., where he engaged in business, and on March 27, 1876, died intestate at the hotel where he boarded. He left heirs in New York, Minnesota | and Michigan. He owned lands and claims, secured by mortgage, in Michigan, amounting to $50,000; one mortgage, executed by A. and wife, for $1,125 and interest, being payable at St. Louis, Mo., or at any other place that S. might elect, in five years from date. L., as public administrator, claimed the right to administer on the estate in St. Louis, and notified by telegraph the heirs in Michigan of the death of S., and sent his body to them, as requested. R., a brother-inlaw of S., on May 29, 1876, took out letters of administration in Michigan, and called on L. for the property, which L. refused to deliver, insisting on his right to act as public administrator. In June, 1876, L. made public sale of the securities belonging to the estate for a mere nominal price, and F. became the purchaser of the A. mortgage, with knowledge of the appointment of R., and subsequently assigned the mortgage to B., who executed a discharge thereof on payment of $600. M. afterward bought the land. R. died in September, 1878, complainant was appointed as his successor, and a suit was instituted to foreclose the mortgage. Held (1), that although S. was at the time of his death domiciled in St. Louis, L. was not authorized by the Missouri statute to take charge of his estate as public administrator; and (2) that as public administrator he had no authority, after the appointment of R. as administrator, to sell and assign the mortgage in suit, and that the mortgage should be foreclosed. The general principle relied upon by defendants, that personal property, in contemplation of law, accompanies the person of the owner, and that its disposition on his death is to be determined by the laws of his domicile. But while the rule of distribution is thus determined, the steps to reach it may be otherwise prescribed; and when the property is in one jurisdiction and the domicile in another, the necessity for distinct proceedings in administration may be imperative. The proceedings, when taken in this class of cases, are governed and regulated by certain rules of interstate comity, which are thus stated by the Court of Appeals of New York: "It is an established doctrine, not only of international law, but of municipal law of this country, that personal property has no locality. It is subject to the law which governs the person of the owner, as well in respect to the disposition of it by act inter vivos as to its transmission by last will and testament, and by succession on the owner dying intestate. The principle no doubt has its foundation in international comity, but it is equally obligatory as a rule of decision in the courts as a legal rule of purely domestic origin. It does not belong to the judges to recognize or deny the rights which individuals may claim under it at their pleasure or caprice; but it having obtained the force of law by user and acquiescence, it belongs to the political government of the State to change it whenever a change becomes desirable. But the right which an individual may claim

to personal property in one country under a title from the person domiciled in another can only be asserted by the instrumentalities which the institutions of the country where the claim is made have provided. The foreign law furnishes the rule of decision as to the validity of the title to the thing claimed; but in respect to the legal assertion of that title it has no extraterritorial force. As a result of this doctrine it is now generally held everywhere, and is well settled in this State, that an executor or administrator appointed in another State has not, as such, any authority beyond the sovereignty by virtue of whose laws he was appointed. Denio, J., in Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y., 103, 112; citing Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 152; Vroom v. Van Horne, 10 Paige, 549. The same general doctrine is also concisely stated in a case in the Federal Supreme Court: "A grant of administration is strictly confined in its authority and operation to the limits of the territory of the government which grants it, and does not de jure extend to other countries. It cannot confer, as a matter of right, any authority to collect assets of the deceased in any other State, and whatever operation is allowed to it beyond the original territory of the grant is a mere matter of comity, which every nation is at liberty to yield or withhold, according to its own policy and pleasure, with reference to its own institutions and the interests of its citizens." Story, J., in Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 2, 5. L. then, if legally administrator in Missouri, had no official authority in this State except such as by comity would be recognized; and the rules of comity might be determined either by usage, of which the judicial decisions would be evidence, or by statute. Some of these rules are general, and are well settled. There are cases, for example, where it has been held that a foreign administrator has a right to collect and take possession of administration (Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns. Ch. 45; Brown v. Brown, 1 Barb. Ch. 189; Vroom v. Van Horne, 10 Paige, 549; S. C., 42 Am. Dec. 94; Riley v. Riley, 3 Day, 74; S. C., 3 Am. Dec. 260; Smith v. Gould, 34 Me. 443; Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Metc. 252; Marcy v. Marcy, 32 Conn. 308), and where there are no domestic creditors or other claimants, there will be no occasion to question such cases. There may also be cases of payments to a foreign administrator which may be recognized, there being no conflicting administration. Williams v. Storrs, 6 Johns. Ch. 353; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 16, 33; Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740; Vroom v. Van Horne, supra; Citizens' Bank v. Sharp, 53 Md. 521. And where an administrator in the forum of his appointment has assigned demands bona notabilia there, it may be correct to hold that his assignee may sue thereon here in his own name; as was held in Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239, and Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y. 21, and cases cited; as to which see Knapp v. Lee, 42 Mich. 41; S. C., 3 N. W. Rep. 244. But this case involves the validity of the assignment of a debt secured by real-estate mortgage on lands in this State. It was decided in Cutter v. Davenport, 1 Pick. 81, that the foreign administrator had no authority to make such an assignment; and this is followed in the recent case of Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C. 573; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 737. Whether these decisions would be followed in this State if there were no statute bearing upon the question, we do not care to inquire, because we think if the power to assign would exist independent of statute, it does not exist under the statutes now in force. The statutes provide for recognizing the authority of a foreign administrator when it becomes necessary to make sale of lands in this State, and prescribes the steps to be taken for that purpose. How. St., §§ 6057-6061. If administration is needed in this State for other purposes, new letters must be taken out; and an administration ancillary to one in another State would proceed like any

other up to the time of accounting. And for the purpose of selling lands it seems very clear that a public administrator could not be recognized in this State at all; for the statute contemplates the case of an administrator "appointed" in some other State or country, who shall produce and file in proper court": an authenticated copy of his appointment." § 6057. A public administrator having no appointment for the special case would not be within the terms of this statute. No case has been called to our attention in which it has been held that after letters issued in one State or country a foreign administrator can be recognized there even for the purposes of a voluntary payment; and the cases like Vaughn v. Barret, 5 Vt. 333; Young v. O'Neal, 3 Sneed, 55; and Ferguson v. Morris, 67 Ala. 389, which deny the validity of such a payment generally, if questionable when no domestic appointment exists, are perfectly sound and reasonable if there is at the time a valid administration in the State. See Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394, 405. It is the duty of the citizens of the State to recognize and defer to the judicial determination of its own tribunals, as much when they concern matters of administration as in other cases (Henderson v. Clarke, 4 Litt. 277), and this is especially true in a case like the present, where nothing existed to bring in question the judicial determination of the Michigan court, except the bare assertion of his own authority by the foreign official. By the law of this State the title to this demand, for all purposes of administration, was in the Michigan administrator, who might put it in suit when due, or assign it of record or discharge it of record. He was therefore the only person who could be safely dealt with in respect to it. Reynolds v. McMullen. Opinion by Cooley, C. J. [26 Eng. Rep. 12; 37 Am. Rep. 737; 36 id. 700.-ED.]

[Decided Jan. 14, 1885.]

NEGLIGENCE-RAILROAD-PERSONAL INJURY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-STREET CROSSING.-Where in an action against a railroad company for a personal injury the evidence shows that the plaintiff exercised no care to avoid the danger, and there is no dispute in the testimony on this point, the court may instruct the jury to find for the defendant; but when the evidence shows, or tends to show, that the plaintiff was negligent in his efforts in the right direction to avoid the danger, but they did not go to the extent for any reason of securing his escape, it is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances, whether he was negligent in not exercising more care, or in making greater efforts to prevent the injury complained of; and especially in the case where, if the defendant had performed his duty, the plaintiff would have been likely to have avoided the danger altogether. Palmer v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co. Opinion by Sherwood, J. [Decided Jan. 21, 1885.]

ASSIGNMENT-CHATTEL MORTGAGE-BONA FIDE PURCHASER.-Where a partnership firm, in contemplation of their insolvency, execute a chattel mortgage of their stock in favor of a near relative, and a few days after ward make a common-law assignment of the same, upon a bill filed by her against the assignee for relief, and for payment of her claim, if it appears that she knew of the insolvency of the firm when she took her security, and that this knowledge induced her to ask it, she is not entitled to preference as a bona fide secured creditor. Cron v. Cron. Opinion by Sherwood, J.

[Decided Jan. 21, 1885.]

CHATTEL MORTGAGE-SALE-SATISFACTION-PLEADING.-(1) A woman who held a bill of sale of personal property in security for a debt proceeded to sell the property. Part of it was covered by a chattel mort

gage, and at her request this mortgage was purchased by a third person and held for her. She sold property enough to pay both debts, aud of that which was sold enough was included in the chattel mortgage to pay that off. Afterward her son, who was cognizant of all the facts, took an assignment of the chattel mortgage. Held, that the chattel mortgage must be deemed satisfied. (2) If there were any facts to excuse the failure to apply the moneys received on the sale in sat isfaction of the mortgage, they should have been affirmatively established, as the sale prima facie paid it, under the circumstances stated. Long v. Moore. Opinion by Cooley, C. J.

[Decided Jan. 21, 1885.]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION PARTICIPATION OF DE FENDANT-FALSE ARREST-PROBABLE CAUSE.-Defendant had a horse stolen from his pasture. A man of bad reputation, who had served a term in prison, and was then under criminal accusation, told a story connecting plaintiff and his son with the larceny. De. fendant, for some time, took no notice of this story, but after three weeks or so went to a justice and obtained a warrant for plaintiff and his son, on which they were arrested in the night-time, handcuffed, and taken to the jail. Defendant, with others, was with the officer when the arrest was made and the parties taken away. The warrant was obtained without evidence, and the case was continued before the justice for three weeks, and was then voluntarily abandoned. Plaintiff then brought an action for malicious prosecution. Held (1), that the defendant, when he applied to the justice for a warrant, was bound to state to the justice any facts tending to detract from the credibility of the charge against the plaintiff, and if his information came from such a source that he gave it little or no credence himself, he should have stated the fact. (2) The defendant in thus procuring a warrant without evidence, and accompanying the officer who made the arrest in the nighttime, is responsible for the conduct of the officer, and those who accompanied him, in what they did with his apparent acquiescence. (3) A story of crime which in itself or from its source is so incredible or so untrustworthy that a party does not venture to use it as evidence for others to act upon, will not justify him in acting upon it himself to the serious prejudice of others. Chapman v. Dunn. Opinion by Cooley, C. J. [Decided Jan. 21, 1885.]

OHIO SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT* JANUARY TERM, 1884.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE-REFILING-WITHIN THIRTY DAYS.-In order to preserve the lien of a chattel mortgage beyond the first year, the filing of the verified statement and copy required by section 4155 of the Revised Statutes, must be done during the thirty days immediately preceding the expiration of the year. The refiling of the mortgage with such statement be fore the commencement of the thirty days is not sufficient. The claim of plaintiff in error is that the verification and refiling of this mortgage on September 16, 1879, was equivalent to an original filing, and thereby the lien of his mortgage became valid as against subsequent purchasers in good faith, for one full year after the date of refiling; and in support of this claim relies on Swift v. Hart, 12 Barb. 530. This ease holds under a statute similar to ours that a verification and refiling after the expiration of a year from the original filing revives the lien as against subsequent purchasers. This doctrine was questioned in the subsequent case of

*To appear in 42 Ohio State Reports.

MECHANICS' LIEN-HOW CONSTRUED-SERVICE OF NOTICE-DIRECTOR IS OFFICER OR AGENT. '-Under the provisions of "An act to secure pay to persons performing labor or furnishing materials in constructing railroads," passed March 31, 1874 (71 O. L. 51) which provides that "Any person performing said labor or furnishing said materials, who has not been paid therefor, shall serve a notice in writing upon the secretary or other officer or agent of said railroad company, stating in said notice the kind and amount of materials furnished," etc., the service of such notice upon a director of the railway company to be affected by it is sufficient. It seems clear to us, upon both reason and authority, that the design of the statute was to facilitate the methods by which the laborers and material-men chiefly affected by it are to secure their claims by charging the companies with them, and is entitled to such reasonable and liberal construction as will best carry out its purpose. Railway Co. v. Cronin, 38 Ohio St. 127; Barnes v. Thompson, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 315; Buck v. Brian, 2 How. (Miss.) 880; Phillips Mech. Liens, § 16. There certainly was a literal compliance with its requirements. When we reflect that "the corporate powers, business and property of the[railway] corporations *** must be exercised, conducted and controlled by the board of directors "(§ 3248, Rev. St.), we cannot question that a director of such company is an "officer" of it. We are at liberty to suppose also that a director of a railway corporation is one who is sufficiently interested in its affairs to see to it that any fact which comes to his notice affecting his company will with promptness be brought to the knowledge of the latter. To hold that class of persons who are chiefly affected by this provision to a strict rather than liberal construction of it, would tend rather to defeat than to effectuate it. Railway Co. v. McCoy. Opinion by Owen, J.

COVENANT-ASSIGNEE OF LEASE -LIABILITY FOR RENT -RUNS WITH LAND.-(1) The lessee of a perpetual leasehold estate is liable, upon an express covenant to pay rent to the lessor, his heirs and assigns,during the term, in an action by the assignee of the reversion for accruing rents, whether such rents accrue before or after an assignment by the lessee of all his interest in the leasehold estate. (2) Such covenant for rent runs with the land, and an assignee of the reversion may, under our Code, sue thereon in his own name. (3) The receipt of rents from the assignees of the leasehold estate does not absolve such lessee from liability on his express covenant. See Crawford v. Chapman, 17 Ohio, 449; Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340. A perpetual leasehold estate is not a fee-simple, although by our statutes it has many incidents of a fee-simple estate. Taylor v. De Bus, 31 Ohio St. 468. The fee simple remains in the lessor, his heirs and assigns, the principal value of which is the right to the rents reserved by the lease. And the right to sue for and recover rents follows the fee-simple estate, and the action therefor must be in the name of the owner of the fee at the time the rent accrues. As to the fact that the plaintiff below, as well as her predecessors in interest, had received rent from the owners of the leasehold after the defendant bad assigned and transferred all his interest therein, it will be sufficient to refer to Sutliff |

v. Atwood, 15 Ohio St. 186, where it is said: "The liability of the lessee arising from his express contract is so permanently fixed during the whole term that no act of his own can absolve him from the lessor's demands in respect to it." That was an action by the lessor against the lessee; but the principle applies in any case upon the lessee's covenant where the plaintiff is entitled to the rent secured by the covenant. It was also decided in that case that an assignment by the lessee, with the lessor's concurrence and his subsequent receipt of rent from the assignee, will be ineffectual to discharge the lessee from his liability. "The lessor, when there is an express agreement of the lessee, may sue at his election, either the lesse or the assignee, or may pursue his remedy against both at the same time, though of course with but one satisfaction." The foundation of the action by the assignee of the reversion against the assignee of the leasehold is the privity of estate between them. The principle is that the latter shall not enjoy the former's property without the payment of rent. The action against the lessee is upon this express covenant to pay rent during the term which, as we have above said, runs with the land and vests in the assignee of the reversion the right to receive the rents accruing during his ownership of the fee. Smith v. Harrison. Opinion by Mollvaine, J. [26 Am. Rep. 311.]

EMINENT DOMAIN-PUBLIC USE-QUESTION OF LAW -REV. STAT., § 4511.-The facts being ascertained, the question whether or not a ditch will conduce to the public health convenience or welfare within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, section 4511, so that it will be of public use, is a question of law; and the mere fact that larger and better crops may be raised on two farms sought to be drained does not authorize the establishment of the ditch. Article 1, section 19, of the Constitution provides that "private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare;" thus placing beyond question that private property cannot be taken for a mere private use. McArthur v. Kelly, 5 Ohio, 139; Shaver v. Starrett, 4 Ohio St. 498; Reeves v. Treasurer Wood Co., 8 id. 345. Two petitioners sufficient, and one petitioner is all the law requires; and the land through which the ditch is to pass need not be owned by more than two persons, and if owned by one person only the ditch may be made. Reeves v. Treasurer Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 333; Kent v. Perkins, 36 id. 639. Whether or not the use for which property is proposed to be taken is a public use is a question of law, to be settled by the judicial power. Coster v. Tide-Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 55; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341; Anderson v. Turbeville, 6 Coldw. 150; Channel Co. v. Railroad, 51 Cal. 269. The use must be for the public at large. Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor, 4 Coldw. 419. The use that will justify the taking of private property by the power of eminent domain is the use by or for the government, the general public or some portion of it; and not the use by or for particular individuals, or for the benefit of certain estates. The use may be limited to the inhabitants of a small locality, but the benefit must be in common,and not to a very few persons or estates. Costar v.Tide-Water Co, supra; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 424; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. The prosperity of each individual conduces in a certain sense to the public welfare, but this fact is not a sufficient reason for taking other private property to increase the prosperity of individual men. The draining of marshes and ponds may be for the promotion of the public health, and so become a public object; but the drainage of farms to render them more productive, is not such an object. Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199. Quillen v. Hatton. Opinion by Follett, J.

Mc