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an officer of the government or the law (a), or a private
person (b).
ILLUSTRATIONS.
(A.)

1. In an action of tort for maliciously representing to the government that the plaintiff was about to defraud the revenue, a witness is asked whether he did not, at a certain time, inform the secretary of the treasury that the plaintiff was about to wrongfully import books into the country, and if so, what statements he made. The witness cannot be compelled to answer this (3).

2. On an indictment for counterfeiting, the officer who apprehended the prisoner is asked the name of the person who gave him the information which led to the prisoner's arrest. The answer is privileged (4).

3. On the trial of an information for a breach of the revenue laws, a witness for the crown was asked on cross-examination: "Did you give the information?" The question is improper (5).

4. B., an officer of the army, makes a report to T., the secretary of war, as to the conduct of H., another officer. H. sues B. for libel. The report made by B. is privileged, and inadmissible (6). 5. A. makes to a prosecuting attorney of a county certain statements, involving B. in a charge of larceny, and for the purpose of his detection. In an action by B. against A. for malicious prosecution, these statements are not admissible against the consent of A. (7)

executive in the performance of his duties, they may do so in every instance and at all times. We need not waste time in the attempt to prove that this proposition is not allowable; that the governor cannot thus be placed under the guardianship and tutelage of the courts. To the people, under the methods prescribed by law, not to the courts is he answerable for his doings or misdoings. It is his duty from time to time 'to give to the General Assembly information of the state of the Commonwealth,' but it is not his duty to render such an account to the grand jury of Allegheny, or any other county. * The president of the United States, the governors of the several States, and their cabinet officers, are not bound to produce papers or disclose information committed to them, in a judicial inquiry, when in their own judgment the disclosure would, on public grounds, be inexpedient. 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 251; 1 Wheat. Law of Ev., § 604. Thus, the question of the expediency or inexpediency of the production of the required evidence is referred, not to the judgment of the court before which the action is trying, but of the officer who has that evidence in his possession. The doctrine that the officer must appear and submit the required information or papers to the court, for its judgment as to whether they are, or are not, proper matters for revelation is successfully met and settled in the case of Beaton v. Skene, 5 Hurlst. & N. 838, per Pollock, C. B. It was there held that if the production of a State paper would be injurious to the public interest, the public welfare must be preferred to that of the private suitor. tion then arose, how was this to be determined? It must be determined either by the judge or by the responsible crown officer who has the paper. But the judge could come to no conclusion without ascertaining what the document was, or why its publication would be injurious to the public service. Just here however occurred this difficulty, that as judicial inquiry must always be public, the preliminary examination must give the document that very publicity which it might be important to prevent. The conclusion reached was that from necessity, if for no other reason, the question must be left to the judgment of the officer. Influenced by this and other precedents we have cited, as well as by reason and necessity, we are in like manner disposed to conclude that the propriety of withholding the information required by the grand jury must be determined by the governor himself; and the weight of the reasons influencing him in the conclusion at which he has arrived is for himself, and not for the court to consider."

The ques

RULE. Communications made for the purpose of detecting or punishing crime are privileged, and neither the name of the informer nor the nature of his communication can a witness who has received such information be compelled to disclose (2), whether the witness be 2) Contradictory ruling may be found in R. v. Blackman, 1 Esp. 95; R. v. Cundy, 15 M. & W. 175; R. v. Richardson, 3F. & F. 693; Dickson v. Wilton, 1 id. 419; Blake v. Pilfold, 1 M. & R. 198; Law v. Scott, 5 H. & J.438 (1822). But most of these were at nisi prius, and all of them have been either overruled or dissented from. See Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass.-492 (1872).

6. A. is asked as to what took place in his presence at a certain time. At the time in question A. was acting as State counsel, and was in the jury room. The evidence is privileged (8).

In case 1 it was said: "It is the duty of every citizen to communicate to his government any information which he has of the commission of an offense against the laws. To encourage him in performing this duty, without fear of consequences, the law holds such information to be among the secrets of State, and leaves the question how far, and under what circumstances, the names of the informers and the channel of communication shall be suffered to be known, to the absolute discretion of the government, to be exercised according to the views of what the interests of the public require. Courts of justice therefore will not compel or allow the discovery of such information, either by the subordinate officer to whom it is given by the informer himself, or by any other person, without the permission of the government. The evidence is excluded not for the protection of the witness or of

(3) Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872).

(4) United States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. 726 (1827). In R. v. Ackers, 6 Esp.125 (1808), Lord Kenyon said: "The defendant's counsel have no right, nor shall they be permitted to inquire the name of the person who gave the information of the smuggled goods."

(5) Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 M. & W. 170 (1846).
(6) Horne v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & B. 130 (1820).

(7) Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 141 (1873).

(8) Clark v. Field, 12 Vt. 485 (1839); McLellan v. Richardson, 13 Me. 82 (1836).

the party in the particular case, but upon general grounds of public policy, because of the confidential nature of such communications. *** The question before us is not one of the law of slander or libel, but of the law of evidence; not whether the communications of the defendant to the officers of the treasury are so privileged from being considered as slanderous, as to affect the right to maintain an action against the defendant upon or by reason of them, but whether they are privileged in a different sense, so that courts of justice will not compel or permit their disclosure without the assent of the government to whose officers they were addressed. The reasons and authorities already stated conclusively show that the communications in question are privileged in the latter sense, and cannot be disclosed without the permission of the secretary of the treasury. And it is quite clear that the discovery of documents, which are protected from disclosure upon grounds of public policy, cannot be compelled either by bill in equity or interrogatories at law."

In case 2 it was said that while such a disclosure could be of no importance to the defense, it might be highly prejudicial to the public in the administration of justice by deterring persons from making similar disclosures of crimes which they might have discovered.

In case 3 it was said: "On the part of the crown Hardy's case and Watson's case (9) were cited. *** It was contended on the part of the crown that the rule was general, and that it was founded upon public policy; and that if a question tended to disclose the source of information on which executive government had acted, it could not be put. For the defendant it was contended that the right of the subject to discredit a witness by cross-examination was universal; and the object of the question being to disredit the witness, that it was taken out of the rule. Lord Hale's History of the Common Law was referred to, and several cases were cited, but none directly in point. In Hardy's case, John Groves, a witness for the crown, being asked by whom he was sent to attend certain meetings, the question was objected to on the ground that the channels of information could not be inquired into. The attorney-general, afterward Lord Eldon, stated that the Court of Exchequer would not permit the question to be asked. The court ruled that it was not proper to ask the question, and it was not asked. Subsequently, in the same trial (page 811), the point arose again; it was on the cross-examination of a witness of the name of George Lyram; this question was put avowedly to try or sift the credit of the witness, namely, who was the person to whom they communicated certain facts. Lord Chief Justice Eyre held that although in ordinary cases such a question could be put, yet if it involved the disclosure of the channels of communication with the government it could not be put; and he decided that such was the rule, refer

(9) See ante.

ring to the question asked of the witness Groves, already mentioned. Lord Chief Baron Macdonald, Mr. Baron Holtham, Mr. Justice Buller and Mr. Justice Grose all gave judgments, and on all hands it was agreed that the informer, in the case of a public prosecution, should not be disclosed. All the judges so decided, and the counsel on both sides admitted that such was the law. In Watson's case the same point arose. Hardy's case was cited, and Lord Ellenborough and Mr. Justice Abbott, afterward Lord Tenterden, ruled accordingly. It has been however contended for the defendant that admitting that a witness cannot be asked who was the informer, the informer being a third person, yet he may be asked whether he himself was the informer, and gave the information; on the part of the crown it was replied that such a question, addressed to each witness in turn, might be the means of discovering the informer; and that if the principle and object of the rule were to prevent the informer from being discovered, the question cannot any more be put directly to the witness, whether he himself was the informer, than whether

a third person was. It was alleged, and as far as we can learn or have had any experience, it was correctly alleged, that the practice of this court has been in accordance with this rule. There is no direct authority either way; but the rule clearly established and acted on is this, that in a public prosecution a witness cannot be asked such questions as will disclose the informer if he be a third person. This has been a settled rule for fifty years, and although it may seem hard in a particular case, private mischief must give way to public convenience. This is the ground on which the decision took place in Hardy's case and in Watson's case; and we think the principle of the rule applies to the case where a witness is asked if he himself is the informer, and therefore that the question could not be asked."

In case 4 Dallas, C. J., said: "I will not say that T. would have been compelled to produce the result of this inquiry, but whether if he under a mistake had been disposed so to do, it would not have been the bounden duty of the learned judge before whom the cause was tried, considering that this document was a secret, not the privilege of the party holding it, but of which he was a trustee on behalf of the public, to have interposed, and prevented the admission of such evidence. Now before I examine the few instances alluded to as applying to cases of this description, let us see upon what ground and principle the present case rests. It is agreed that there are a number of cases of a particular description, in which for reasons of state and policy, information is not permitted to be disclosed. To begin with the ordinary cases, and those of a common description in courts of justice. In these courts, for reasons of public policy, persons are not to be asked the names of those from whom they receive information as to the frauds on the revenue. In all the trials for high treason of late

years the same course has been adopted; and if parties were willing to disclose the sources of their in

MARRIED WOMAN'S LIABILITY ON CONTRACT.

N 1884 the New York Legislature passed an act in

formation they would not be suffered to do it by relation to the rights and liabilities of married

women, which provides in substance that a married woman, in all contracts other than those with her husband, may contract to the same extent and in the same form as if unmarried and without charging her separate estate. Chapter 381 of Laws of 1884. This is an almost total abrogation of another of the many

the judges. What is the ground upon which these cases stand, except it be the ground of danger to the public good, which would result from disclosing the sources of such information? — for no person would become an informer if his name might be disclosed in a court of justice, and if he might be subjected to the resentment of the party against legal fictions, as the previous law with respect to the whom he had informed. Does not this reasoning apply closely to the case now before us? This is an inquiry directed to be made by the commander-inchief with a view to ascertain what the conduct of the party suspected might have been; in the course of which a number of persons may be called before the court, and may give information as witnesses which they would not choose to have disclosed; but if the minutes of the court of inquiry are to be produced in this way, or an action brought by the party, they reveal the name of every witness, and the evidence given by each. Not only this, but they also reveal what has been said and done by each member of the existing court of inquiry. It seems therefore that the reception of the minutes would tend directly to disclose that which is not permitted to be disclosed; and therefore independently of the character of the court, I should say, on the broad rules of public policy and convenience, that these matters, secret in their natures, and involving delicate inquiry and the names of persons, stand protected."

subject went probably upon the theory, in most cases so different from the fact, of the unity of husband and wife or her supposed want of free agency by coercion. Whether or not the act is right in theory, it will undoubtedly greatly abridge and simplify this branch of business dealing and lessen litigation. On the ground of lack of legislative power to impair the validity of existing contracts, the act will attach only to those contracts made since its passage, leaving previous contracts to the law as it was. And it is under the law as it was that these remarks and queries are respectfully submitted.

In case 5 it was said: "Public policy requires that a person in making communication to a prosecuting attorney, relative to criminals or persons suspected of being guilty of crime, should be at liberty to make a full statement to him without fear of disclosure."

1. S. is indicted for stealing logs from C. On the trial C. is asked the names of the persons in his employ who informed him as to the theft. C. refuses. His refusal is proper (10).

In case 1 it was said: "The witness was unwilling, from motives of policy, to give the names of men in his employ, and from whom he had received information, unless ordered by the court, though the court was requested by the prisoner's counsel to order it. The witness said the men in his employ were afraid of being mobbed if it were known they gave the information, and if exposed the owners would be unable to get men to arrest them. * * We think the situation of the witness, in the employment of the owner of the logs alleged to have been stolen, would well warrant the court from holding him to disclose the names of those from whom he received the information, as much as in the case of the officer in United States v. Moss (11).

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(10) State v. Soper, 16 Me. 293 (1839). (11) Ante.

JOHN D. LAWSON.

Since the leading case of Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, it has been uniformly held that in order to bind the separate estate of a married woman by a written contract made by her, the intent to so charge it must be expressed therein, unless such contract was made in the line of her trade or business, or for the avowed or actual benefit of such separate estate.

Where the contract is in writing, a parol expression of such intent cannot be proved. Deck v. Johnson, 2 Keyes, 348. But where the contract is verbal, then a parol expression of such intent as part of the contract can be proved and is good and binding. Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247.

To say nothing about the charging of an inchoate interest or estate in expectancy, where it is not expressly prohibited, suppose a married woman, simply as surety, makes a contract in proper form, charging in terms her separate estate when at the time she has no separate estate, but afterward acquires one? Does such after-acquired estate become liable to the contract? That is the question, and after some search I have not been able to find any case satisfactorily determining it.

As to the nature of such charge, it was held in the aforesaid case of Maxon v. Scott not to be a specific lien, but enforceable against all property at the time satisfaction is demanded. Eisenlord v. Snyder, 71 N. Y. 45, holds that an agreement charging a married woman's separate estate for past services is not sufficient, that the agreement must be included in the original contract.

Now what form of language is necessary to constitute such charge? It would seem that no set form would be required, any plain pertinent language clearly indicating such intent would be sufficient. And yet a simple promise to pay, though perhaps coupled with a reference to the means with which the promise was expected or meant to be met, might be held to be of quite different legal effect from an absolute charge upon separate estate. Border cases can be easily supposed.

In Manhattan B. & M. Co. v. Thompson, 58 N. Y. 80, the wife was held not liable upon a written contract

signed by her and in these words:

"To the Manhattan Brass Co.:

"Mr. George W. Thompson is authorized to contract for me, and in my name, with you, for the manufacture of cases for atmospheric oil lamps, and you may hold me responsible for the fulfillment of any contract or obligation made by him with you therefor." In the opinion by Church, C. J., three of the bench

concurring and three dissenting, he says: "It cannot be said that the contract related to any estate she then held, nor in view of the findings was it for the benefit of such estate." This case was argued and decided in 1874. The later case of Tiemeger v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516, where the wife bought groceries for the family including her husband upon her sole credit, charging with the payment thereof her interest in a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband, payable upon his death to her if she survived him, but if not, then to their children, decides that she was liable, although the attempted charge upon her said contingent estate should be considered void as incapable of being legally charged. Finch, J., who delivered the opinion, says: "The amendment of 1862 allows a married woman to hold as her separate property that which she acquires by purchase," meaning of both real and personal property, and without considering her liability in other cases. And yet in the aforesaid case of the Manhattan Co., might it not well be deemed that the wife purchased said lamp cases, through the agency of her husband?

Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 217, holds that the intent to charge the separate estate may be inferred entirely from the surrounding circumstances.

But by force of the act of 1884 the law and learning upon this subject will soon be swept completely away, to join the great mass gone before, never to be resurrected. J. B. DALEY.

TRUST AND TRUSTEE--RULE AS TO INVESTMENT.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. DECEMBER 1, 1884.

LAMAR V. MICOU.*

The war of the rebellion, and the residence of both guardian and ward in the enemy's territory throughout the war, did not terminate the obligation of a guardian appointed before the war in a State never within that territory, nor discharge him from liability to account to the ward in the courts of that State after the war.

A guardian, appointed in New York, before the war of the rebellion, of an infant then temporarily residing there. but domiciled in Georgia, sold bank stock of his ward in New York during the war, and there invested the proceeds in bonds issued before the war by the cities of Mobile, Memphis, and New Orleans, and in bonds issued by a railroad corporation chartered by the State of Tennessee, and whose road was in Tennessee and Georgia, and the railroad bonds indorsed by the State of Tennessee at the time of their issue; and deposited the bonds in a bank in Canada. Held, that if in so doing he used due care and prudence, having regard to the best pecuniary interests of his ward, he was not accountable to the ward for loss by depreciation of the bonds, although one object of the sale and investment was to save the ward's money from confiscation by the United States.

An investment by a guardian, of money of his ward, during the war of the rebellion, and while both guardian and ward were residing within the enemy's territory, in bonds of the so-called Confederate States, was unlawful, and the guardian is responsible to the ward for the sum so invested.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United

States for the Southern District of New York. The opinion states the case.

E. N. Dickerson, for appellant.

S. P. Nash and Geo. C. Holt, for appellee. *S. C., 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221.

GRAY, J. This is an appeal by the executor of a guardian from a decree against him upon a bill in equity filed by the administratrix of his ward. The original bill, filed on July 1, 1875, by Ann C. Sims, a citizen of Alabama, as administratrix of Martha M. Sims, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, alleged that on December 11, 1855, the defendant's testator, Gazaway B. Lamar, was duly appointed by the surrogate of the county of Richmond, in that State, guardian of the person and estate of Martha M. Sims, an infant of six years of age, then a resident of that county, and gave bond as such, and took into his possession and control all her property, being more than $5,000; that on October 5, 1874, he died in New York, and on November 10, 1874, his will was there admitted to probate, and the defendant, a citizen of New York, was appointed his executor; and that he and his executor had neglected to render any account of his guardianship to the surrogate of Richmond county, or to any court having cognizance thereof, or to the ward or her administratrix; and prayed for an account, and for judgment for the amount found to be due.

The defendant removed the case into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and there filed an answer, averring that in 1855, when Lamar was appointed guardian of Martha M. Sims, he was a citizen of Georgia, and she was a citizen of Alabama, having a temporary residence in the city of New York; that in the spring of 1861 the States of Georgia aud Alabama declared themselves to have seceded from the United States, and to constitute members of the so-called Confederate States of America, whereupon a State of war arose between the United States and the Confederate States, which continued to be flagrant for more than four years after; that Lamar and Martha M. Sims were in the spring of 1861 citizens and residents of the States of Georgia and Alabama respectively, and citizens of the Confederate States, and were engaged in aiding and abetting the State of Georgia and the so-called Confederate States in their rebellion against the United States, and she continued to aid and abet until the time of her death, and he continued to aid and abet till January, 1865; that the United States, by various public acts, declared all his and her property, of any kind, to be liable to seizure and confiscation by the United States, and they both were, by the various acts of Congress of the United States, outlawed and debarred of any access to any court of the United States, whereby it was impossible for Lamar to appear in the Surrogate's Court of Richmond county to settle and close his accounts there, and to be discharged from his liability as guardian, in consequence whereof the relation of guardian and ward, so far as it depended upon the orders of that court, ceased and determined; that for the purpose of saving the ward's property from seizure and confiscation by the United States, Lamar, at the request of the ward and of her natural guardians, all citizens of the State of Alabama, withdrew the funds belonging to her from the city of New York, and invested them for her benefit and account in such securities as by the laws of the States of Alabama and Georgia and of the Confederate States he might lawfully do; that in 1864, upon the death of Martha M. Sims, all her property vested in her sister, Ann C. Sims, as her next of kin, and any acccounting of Lamar for that property was to be made to her; that on March 15, 1867, at the written request of Ann C. Sims and of her natural guardians, Benjamin H. Micou was appointed her legal guardian by the Probate Court of Montgomery county, in the State of Alabama, which was at that time her residence, and Lamar thereupon accounted for and paid over all property with which he was chargeable as guardian of Martha M. Sims, to Micou, as her guardian, and received from him a full

release therefor; and that Ann C. Sims, when she became of age, ratified and confirmed the same. To that answer the plaintiff filed a general replication.

The case was set down for hearing in the Circuit Court upon the bill, answer and replication, and a statement of facts agreed by the parties, in substance as follows:

On November 23, 1850, William W. Sims, a citizen of Georgia, died at Savannah, in that State, leaving a widow, who was appointed his administratrix, and two infant daughters, Martha M. Sims, born at Savannah on September 8, 1849, and Ann C. Sims, born in Florida on June 1, 1851. In 1853 the widow married the Rev. Richard M. Abercrombie, of Clifton, in the county of Richmond and State of New York. On December 11, 1855, on the petition of Mrs. Abercrombie, Gazaway B. Lamar, an uncle of Mr. Sims, and then residing at Brooklyn, in the State of New York, was appointed by the surrogate of Richmond county guardian of the person and estate of each child "until she shall arrive at the age of fourteen years, and until another guardian shall be appointed;" and gave bond to her, with sureties, "to faithfully in all things discharge the duty of a guardian to the said minor according to law, and render a true and just account of all moneys and other property received by him, and of the application thereof, and of his guardianship in all respects, to any court having cognizance thereof;" and he immediately received from Mrs. Abercrombie in money $5,166.89 belonging to each ward, and invested part of it in January and April, 1856, in stock of the Bank of the Republic at New York, and part of it in March and July, 1857, in stock of the Bank of Commerce at Savannah, each of which was then paying, and continued to pay until April, 1861, good dividends annually, the one of 10 and the other of 8 per cent.

In 1856, several months after Lamar's appointment as guardian, Mr. and Mrs. Abercrombie removed from Clifton, in the State of New York, to Hartford, in the State of Connecticut, and there resided till her death, in the spring of 1859. The children lived with Mr. and Mrs. Abercrombie, Lamar as guardian paying Mr. Abercrombie for their board, at Clifton and at Hartford, from the marriage until her death; and were then removed to Augusta, in the State of Georgia, and there lived with their paternal grandmother and her unmarried daughter and only living child, their aunt; Lamar as guardian continuing to pay their board. After 1856 neither of the children ever resided in the State of New York. On January 18, 1860, their aunt was married to Benjamin H. Micou, of Montgomery, in the State of Alabama, and the children and their grandmother thereafter lived with Mr. and Mrs. Micou at Montgomery, and the children were educated and supported at Mr. Micou's expense. From 1855 to 1859 Lamar resided partly in Georgia and partly in New York. In the spring of 1861 he had a temporary residence in the city of New York, and upon the breaking out of the war of the rebellion, and after removing all his own property, left New York, and passed through the lines to Savannah, and there resided, sympathizing with the rebellion, and doing what he could to accomplish its success, until January, 1855, and continued to have his residence in Savannah until 1872 or 1873, when he went to New York again, and afterward lived there. Mr. and Mrs. Micou also sympathized with the rebellion and desired its success, and each of them, as well as Lamar, failed during the rebellion to bear true allegiance to the United States.

At the time of Lamar's appointment as guardian, 10 shares in the stock of the Mechanics' Bank of Augusta, in the State of Georgia, which had belonged to William W. Sims in his life-time, stood on the books of the bank in the name of Mrs. Abercrombie as his

administratrix, of which one-third belonged to her as his widow, and one-third to each of the infants. In January, 1856, the bank refused a request of Lamar to transfer one-third of that stock to him as guardian of each infant, but afterward paid to him as guardian, from time to time, two-thirds of the dividends during the life of Mrs. Abercrombie, and all the dividends after her death until 1865. During the period last named, he also received as guardian the dividends on some other bank stock in Savannah, which Mrs. Abercrombie owned, and to which on her death her hus band became entitled. Certain facts relied on as showing that he immediately after his wife's death made a surrender of her interest in the bank shares to Lamar, as guardian of her children, are not material to the understanding of the decision of this court, but are recapitulated in the opinion of the Circuit Court. 7 Fed. Rep. 180-185. In the winter of 1861-62, Lamar fearing that the stock in the Bank of the Republic at New York, held by him as guardiau, would be confiscated by the United States, had it sold by a friend in New York; the proceeds of the sale, which were about 20 per cent less than the par value of the stock invested at New York in guarantied bonds of the cities of New Orleans, Memphis, and Mobile, and of the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad Company, and those bonds deposited in a bank in Canada. Lamar from time to time invested the property of his wards, that was within the so-called Confederate States, in whatever seemed to him to be the most secure and safe-some in Confederate States bonds, some in the bonds of the individual States which composed the confederacy, and some in bonds of cities, and of railroad corporations, and stock of banks within those States. On the money of his wards, accruing from dividends on bank stock, and remaining in his hands, he charged himself with interest until the summer of 1862, when with the advice and aid of Mr. Micou, he invested $7,000 of such money in bonds of the Confederate States and of the State of Alabama; and in 1863, with the like advice and aid, sold the Alabama bonds for more than he had paid for them, and invested the proceeds also in Confederate States bonds; charged his wards with the money paid, and credited them with the bonds; and placed the bonds in the hands of their grandmother, who gave him a receipt for them and held them till the end of the rebellion, when they as well as the stock in the banks at Savannah became worthless.

Martha M. Sims died on November 2, 1864, at the age of fifteen years, unmarried and intestate, leaving her sister, Ann C. Sims her next of kin. On January 12, 1867, Lamar, in answer to letters of inquiry from Mr. and Mrs. Micou, wrote to Mrs. Micou that he had saved from the wreck of the property of his niece, Ann C. Sims, surviving her sister, three bonds of the city of Memphis, indorsed by the State of Tennessee, one bond of the city of Mobile, and one bond of the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad Company, each for $1,000, and with some coupons past due and uncollected; and suggested that by reason of his age and failing health, and of the embarrassed state of his own affairs, Mr. Micou should be appointed in Alabama guardian in his stead. Upon the receipt of this letter, Mrs. Micou wrote to Lamar, thanking him for the explicit statement of the niece's affairs, and for the care and trouble he had had with her, property; and Ann C. Sims, then nearly sixteen years old, signed a request, attested by her grandmother and by Mrs. Micou, that her guardianship might be transferred to Mr. Micou, and that he might be appointed her guardian. And on March 15, 1867, he was appointed guardian of her property by the Probate Court of the county of Montgomery and State of Alabama, according to the laws of that State, and gave bond as such. On May

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