It has been already remarked, that the original structure of his mind was in many respects peculiarly adapted to the pursuit of political science. His comprehensiveness and range of thought; his amazing facility of acquisition; his untiring patience of research; his equally astonishing rapidity of comparison, selection, combination, which enabled him, in an incredibly short time, to extricate the great facts and leading principles decisive of an important question from the complicated knot of detail with which they were involved; -all these admirably fitted him for political speculation; and had the excessive activity of his imagination always permitted a calm exercise of his judgment, he would probably have been the most sagacious politician the world has ever seen; as it is, he is entitled to rank amongst the very foremost of them.

As the degree of political sagacity he possessed has often been warmly debated, no apology is necessary for entering on the subject at some length. While some have extravagantly invested him with a degree of foresight which the complexity of human affairs denies to mortal intellect, and have spoken as though he did not proceed on the calculations of a fallible and erring wisdom, but read immediately from the inspired scroll of a sort of political apocalypse, others have as absurdly denied to him any more than the sagacity of an ordinary judgment, and that judgment, too, often overborne by the activity of his imagination and the violence of his passions. Both these opinions are equally remote from the truth. That Burke's views were often erroneous, his predictions hasty and contradicted by the event, sufficiently appears from many parts of his speeches and writings. He who could declare in 1790 that France must " now be considered expunged out of the system of Europe," and who therefore argued that it was useless for England to maintain a large force in opposition, and all this only two years before that power made such extensive and alarming conquests as to induce him to declare that nothing less than the confederacy of all Europe could check the progress of her formidable ambition, undoubtedly shows that, whatever his general sagacity, he is not exempt from the infirmities and the rashness which must always characterize human judgment. It is observable, however, that these infirmities of judgment usually show themselves in subordinate points only, or in an extravagant and exaggerated representation of what was substantially important truth; his general estimate of vast and complicated questions was worthy of the reach and comprehensiveness of his intellect. On the other hand, to represent his sagacity as only on a level with that of ordinary men, is nearly as ridiculous as to invest him with the spirit of prophecy. The whole tenor of his writings bears testimony to the general profundity and accuracy of his speculations. That these qualities distinguish in the highest degree bis earlier political writings, those who are the foremost in impeaching his judgment are not slow to admit. Let any impartial man calmly survey the whole of Burke's political history, and he cannot fail to admit his extraordinary sagacity; let him compare his opinions on the subject of the American war, uttered many years before the termination of the struggle, with the events; let him compare his opinions on the Roman Catholic affairs, with what expediency, as well as justice, has since declared to be enlightened policy; let him compare his sentiments on all the subjects connected with our commercial policy and economical science generally, respecting which the nation was at that period so profoundly ignorant, with the gradual progress of opinion since; or even that which offended his early admirers most-his speculations respecting the character and tendencies of the French Revolution, with the whole subsequent history of that Revolution: let any man do this, and it appears to us impossible not to admit, whatever deductions may be made for subordinate errors or occasional exaggerations, that in the greater number of cases, and those too the most important, he saw much farther and more accurately than any politician of his time. It is no slight confirmation of this, that almost all the politicians of his time concurred in this opinion.

It has been affirmed in a very splendid critique on the character and genius of Burke in

serted some years ago in the Edinburgh Review,* that the admission that the perspicacity of Burke is apt to be disturbed by the violence of his passions, "operates a release from the whole debt of deference and respect." The passage is as follows: "It is said that the sagacity and penetration which we are bid to reverence, were never at fault, unless on points where strong feelings interfered. The proposition must be admitted, and without any qualification. But it leads not to an abatement merely-it operates a release of the whole debt of deference and respect. For one clever man's opinion is just as good as another's, if both are equally uninfluenced by passions and feelings of every kind." We are here told, if there be any meaning in language, that except so far as prejudice or passion clouds the judgment, the speculative powers of all intellects are equal; or, if the reader please, (for it will not mend the matter,) in all clever men. We say this will not mend the matter, since, by clever men, the critic can hardly mean, all men as clever (we detest the word as applied to Burke, but it is not of our choosing) as Burke; for then this proposition would descend from a most startling paradox into the most insignificant of truisms. It would only mean, that where prejudice and passion do not interfere, the opinions of a man as clever as Burke are worth just as much as those of Burke. In other words, that the opinions of Burke are worth as much as those of Burke; a proposition not likely to be denied. To say any thing to the purpose, therefore, the critic must mean, that where passion and prejudice do not interfere, the opinions of men of varying intellectual endowments will be equally valuable; in other words, that the talents for pure speculation are in all mankind equal. Taken in the former sense, the proposition is nugatory; in the latter it is absurd, and contrary to fact.

Happily, however, the reviewer corrects his own fallacy within a few pages, and unconsciously does homage to Burke's prodigious superiority to other "clever" men in political speculation. Speaking of the correctness of his views on all subjects connected with political economy, the reviewer observes," he always, from a very early period, and before sound principles were disseminated on questions of political economy, held the most enlightened opinions on all subjects of mercantile policy. Here his mind seemed warped by no bias, and his profound understanding and habits of observation led him right." To apply, then, the reviewer's former reasoning,-would the opinions of any "clever man" on these most difficult of all subjects, be equally valuable with those of Mr. Burke-especially at the period in which he lived? If not, we may estimate the degree of his superiority to the generality of men, in comprehensiveness and accuracy of judgment, by how much his views were more correct than theirs. Now it is needless to say, that, with the exception of Adam Smith, he was by far the most enlightened economist of his day.

But, in fact, when we estimate the abstract talents for speculation which a man may possess, we never dream of depreciating them because they may be sometimes rendered practically useless by the ascendancy of the passions. One faculty may be overborne by another; but this does not render that faculty abstractedly the less in power. Now in estimating the character and extent of Burke's genius, (the professed object of the reviewer,) this abstract greatness is all that we have to look at. We should not deny the existence of splendid powers, because we may deplore their occasional perversion, or affirm that a man might as well be without them, because they were sometimes practically useless. Extraordinary sagacity is still more than ordinary sagacity, though, when obscured by passion, it may be of no more than ordinary value.

It would be unpardonable not to say a few words on the subject of Burke's alleged inconsistencies. His conduct at the period of the French Revolution subjected him to a charge of a total political apostacy. This charge, so far as affects Burke's integrity, will hereafter come under consideration. We are here concerned with it merely as a change of political opinion, supposed to be sincere, but alleged to indicate a mind in its dotage, a

judgment under the tyranny of a distempered imagination. Now we must confess that we can see nothing like the astonishing revolution in all his sentiments and modes of thinking, which some affect to discover. We are far enough from contending that his consistency extends to every subordinate topic and every particular expression. We would never subject the voluminous works of Burke to the same severe sort of criticism which we should apply to acts of parliament. In the course of so long a political life some changes of opinion might naturally be looked for; and in writings of such extent, produced at such long intervals, composed many of them with much haste, and under the excitement of different and often opposite emergencies, it would be miraculous indeed if there were no discrepancies of statement. Neither is it asserted that, even with respect to the events of the French Revolution, he was not hurried by passion into extravagancies and exaggerations, to defend what was true by illogical argument or plausible sophistry, or that in one or two instances he was not betrayed, as will hereafter be shown, into gross inconsistencies, more especially in his reasonings from the English to the French Revolution. All that is contended for is, that throughout life the general spirit and tendency of his political system was still the same; so much so, that a careful consideration of his conduct and his writings before the French Revolution, would have enabled an impartial observer to predict that that event would not meet with his approbation. The chief characteristics of his whole system of political opinion, were a horror of the abstract principles of political science as applied to the actual circumstances of nations; an opposition to all changes of any magnitude, if proposed to be suddenly accomplished; the application of practical remedies to practical grievances, without any regard to theoretical perfection; and the timely and therefore gradual reform of abuses and corruptions. These are the leading principles, which, if we mistake not, will be found to pervade his whole system of politics; this was the spirit that informed and animated it. We are not now contending that that system was either right or wrong, or if neither the one or the other, how far it partook of both; its general consistency is all that is contended for. His system might somewhat vary in appearance; it was its very character to do so; it might put on different aspects with different circumstances; it might even submit to some important modifications; it might have its youth, its maturity, its period of hoary experience, or, if its enemies will, its dotage; its essential identity through all these changes is all that is at present maintained. It was just these principles which actuated him throughout the whole of the American War. He never debated (till actually compelled) whether it was abstractedly right to tax the colonies or not; he declared that he "abhorred such abstractions;" his arguments constantly were, that it was inerpedient to do so, because it was a great and dangerous innovation; and that "it was best to let well alone." It was this same principle which induced him to oppose parliamentary reform throughout the whole of his long political career; it was these principles which pervaded the whole of his admirable plan of economical reform, and determined him equally both in what he did and in what he left undone. And we hesitate not to say, that the opinions he formed of the French Revolution were not really (though apparently) in stricter harmony with those principles, than his conduct on all the occasions to which we have referred. This we are convinced any close and impartial student of his works will admit.

That these principles, when applied under totally different circumstances, would bear the appearance of inconsistency, may be easily conceived. Now called to resist the encroachments of the Crown, and now the excesses of the people-now employed in defending one part of the constitution, and now another, he would be thought by many to be a traitor to each party, while in fact he was the friend of all, and was but varying his means to maintain the unity of his end.

This appearance of inconsistency would be the greater on another account. It is obvious, that unless the human mind were far more free from the influence of passion than

that of Burke was, or than that of any man can be, and much more cautious and temperate in the expression of opinion than the excitement of politics will ever permit, the natural vehemence with which a man, professing to apply the same general principles under different circumstances, would express himself in any particular emergency, would give him the appearance of deserting his own principles. The moments of passion are not those for scrupulously weighing the abstract and literal consistency of every expression we now utter, with former expressions. Some deduction is to be made in each case for some exaggerations into which the intensity of present feeling has betrayed us. A pure intelligence alone could express itself with such cold caution, and mete out its words with such scrupulous accuracy, as to make the same general principles appear the same under the infinite diversities of times and circumstances ;--not to mention, that even then it would require almost as complete an exemption from prejudice in those who should venture to pronounce on the substantial identity of such principles: without this they would be ill qualified for the office of interpreters.

In maintaining, be it remembered, that the same cardinal principles characterized Burke's political system throughout the whole of his career, it is not asserted that he was not inconsistent on some particular points; points which will hereafter come more specifically under consideration ;-still less, that the vehemence of feeling might not often betray him into serious exaggeration or the utmost intemperance of expression. All this may be believed without affecting the general consistency of his political opinions. Burke has himself vindicated this general consistency in a passage of such beauty that we cannot refrain from citing it for the benefit of the reader.

"I pass to the next head of charge, Mr. Burke's inconsistency. It is certainly a great aggravation of his fault in embracing false opinions, that in doing so he is not supposed to fill up a void, but that he is guilty of a dereliction of opinions that are true and laudable. This is the great gist of the charge against him. It is not so much that he is wrong in his book (that however is alleged also) as that he has therein belied his whole life. I believe, if he could venture to value himself upon any thing, it is on the virtue of consistency that he would value himself the most. Strip him of this, and you leave

him naked indeed.

"In the case of any man who had written something, and spoken a great deal, upon very multifarious matter, during upwards of twenty-five years' publick service, and in as great a variety of important events as perhaps have ever happened in the same number of years, it would appear a little hard, in order to charge such a man with inconsistency, to see collected by his friend, a sort of digest of his sayings, even to such as were merely sportive and jocular. This digest, however, has been made, with equal pains and partiality, and without bringing out those passages of his writings which might tend to show with what restrictions any expressions, quoted from him, ought to have been understood. From a great statesman he did not quite expect this mode of inquisition. If it only appeared in the works of common pamphleteers, Mr. Burke might safely trust to his reputation. When thus urged, he ought, perhaps, to do a little more. It shall be as little as possible, for I hope not much is wanting. To be totally silent on his charges would not be respectful to Mr. Fox. Accusations sometimes derive a weight from the persons who make them, to which they are not entitled for their matter."

"A man, who, among various objects of his equal regard, is secure of some, and full of anxiety for the fate of others, is apt to go to much greater lengths in his preference of the objects of his immediate solicitude than Mr. Burke has ever done. A man so circumstanced often seems to undervalue, to vilify, almost to reprobate and disown, those that are out of danger. This is the voice of nature and truth, and not of inconsistency and false pretence. The danger of any thing very dear to us removes, for the moment, every other affection from the mind. When Priam had his whole thoughts employed on the body of his Hector, he repels with indignation, and drives from him with a thousand reproaches, his surviving sons, who with an officious piety crowded about him to offer their assistance. A good critick (there is no better than Mr. Fox) would say, that this is a master-stroke, and marks a deep understanding of nature in the father of poetry. He would despise a Zoilus, who would conclude from this

passage that Homer meant to represent this man of affliction as hating, or being indifferent and cold in his affections to the poor relicks of his house, or that he preferred a dead carcass to his living children.

"Mr. Burke does not stand in need of an allowance of this kind, which, if he did, by candid criticks ought to be granted to him. If the principles of a mixed constitution be admitted, he wants no more to justify to consistency every thing he has said and done during the course of a political life just touching to its close. I believe that gentleman has kept himself more clear of running into the fashion of wild, visionary theories, or of seeking popularity through every means, than any man perhaps ever did in the same situation.

"He was the first man who, on the hustings, at a popular election, rejected the authority of instructions from constituents; or who, in any place, has argued so fully against it. Perhaps the discredit into which that doctrine of compulsive instructions under our constitution is since fallen, may be due, in a great degree, to his opposing himself to it in that manner, and on that occasion.

"The reformers in representation, and the bills for shortening the duration of parliaments, he uniformly and steadily opposed for many years together, in contradiction to many of his best friends. These friends, however, in his better days, when they had more to hope from his service and more to fear from his loss than now they have, never chose to find any inconsistency between his acts and expressions in favour of liberty, and his votes on those questions. But there is a time for all things."

As efforts have been made to prove the inconsistency of Mr. Burke, on some fundamental points, by comparing certain detached sentences from his earlier and later writings apparently involving important discrepancies, we think it but just to his memory to cite some more unequivocal passages from the very same works tending to show the substantial identity of his political creed; that is, with due allowance for the wide diversity of circumstances in which he acted. It will be seen that our citations will have this incontestable advantage over those to which we have referred, that whereas the latter are the most intemperate expressions in favour of those opinions which, at the time he wrote, demanded (as he thought) the most strenuous defence, the former on the contrary will contain the unequivocal recognition of those opinions which at such times were most alien from the objects he had immediately in view. Our citations will have all the force of admissions. And first a few sentences from the "Thoughts on the Present Discontents."

"If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troublesome to me as to another, to extol these remedies, so famous in speculation, but to which their greatest admirers have never attempted seriously to resort in practice. I confess, then, that I have no sort of reliance upon either a triennial parliament, or a place-bill."

"Our constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a risk of oversetting it on the other. Every project of a material change in a government so complicated as ours, combined at the same time with external circumstances still more complicated, is a matter full of difficulties: in which a considerate man will not be too ready to decide; a prudent man too ready to undertake; or an honest man too ready to promise. They do not respect the publick nor themselves, who engage for more than they are sure that they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform. These are my sentiments, weak perhaps, but honest and unbiassed; and submitted entirely to the opinion of grave men, well affected to the constitution of their country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt it."

The following sentences are from the "Speech on American Taxation."

"Again, and again, revert to your old principles-seek peace and ensue it—leave America, if she has taxable matter in her, to tax herself. I am not here going into the distinctions of rights, not attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy contest, will die along with it. They and we, and their and our ancestors, have been happy un