this intelligence is, to me, of a nature light horse, and of the Hanoverian hussars; and he says, that three officers and 150 horsemen with their horses remained prisoners in the hands of the French; to It appears strange to most people, that which he adds, that ten other- squadrons General Blake should not have remained of English horse remained at a distance, with our army; and to account for this, and did not choose to engage. These the Morning Post informned its wise readers, stories differ very widely, and I should be that Blake had been sent off by Lord Tain no great hurry to give implicit confi- lavera into the rear of the Duke of Daldence to the statement of the French matia. This assertion was repeated by. general, but, the reader will bear in mind, another venal print, the Courier, of the that this regiment of the Vistula, who ap- 15th of July, when it asserted that our pear to have been engaged here, are part of General, by a masterly manœuvre, had those same Polish lancers who made such thrown a large force in the rear of the bloody work of it in the battle of Albuera. enemy; that he had detached Brake with The Courier news-paper, in speaking of the Spaniards towards Seville; that Blake, these lancers, says, upon the authority of with 15,000 men, was pushing on, in that a private letter from an officer in our direction, and that General Grahain was army, that, they are a set of brutal savages advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with who butcher all they can come near, and Blake. This manœuvre, the venal writer who never give any quarter.Indeed! said, reminded him, of a similar one, pracupon my word, it is dangerous to have to tised by that consummate General, Gustavus deal with fellows of this description; fel- Adolphus. But, we must take the article lows who do not know when they have itself: it is not long, and it is a pretty inenough of it; fellows who seem to under- stance, enough, of the, at once false and stand nothing at all of that civility and stupid publications by which this "most mutual forbearance, which is, sometimes," thinking nation,' suffers itself to be practised in war. No wonder that this amused: "We hear that Lord Wellinggentleman should speak of them in such "ton has, by a musterly manœuvre, thrown a harsh terms, but they know, I suppose, "large force in the rear of the enemy. Soult best what suits their employer; and the having boasted that he had entirely reonly thing that we can do, is, I should "lieved the Southern Provinces from all think, to get, as soon as we can, some danger of attack, Lord Wellington, as a horsemen of the same description; for, it "commentary upon that boast, has detached is very provoking, to see these lancers "General Blake with the Spaniards under carry off whole squadrons at a time, of his command towards Seville. Blake, our cavalry, in spite of all their furs and their tippets and their whiskers. If these lancers are resolved to give no quarter, why should not we have men that will give no quarter? I have no notion of this species of liberality in the field. If we "with 15,000 men, crossed the Guadiana, "while the French were advancing, and "then, by a counter-march, re-crossed, taking the direction of Seville. As Vic"tor has joined Soult with the larger part "of his force, General Graham is advanc"ing from Cadiz to co-operate with Gen. "Blake. The effect of this will be the 64 obliging Marmont to detach a force to "the southward to overawe Blake, or the increasing the difficulties of drawing supplies for the subsistence of so large "an army. This manoeuvre of Lord "Wellington's, reminds us of a similar "one practised by that consummate General, "Gustavus Adolphus. When Wallenstein "with a vastly superior force was advanc are to have war, let it be war; and let us deal the enemy as hard blows as he deals us. On the 28th of June (see page 153) we have another dispatch from the Duke of Dalmatia, in which His Grace tells us, that the English General has sent off 8,000 sick and wounded, with all his baggage, to Lisbon; he says, besides, that great numbers of deserters from the English army come in to him. This is intelligence of a very serious aspect indeed; and if it be true, it accounts for a great deal of what ing against him, he retreated, intrenched I could not, otherwise, account for. himself, and sent off half his army to This dispatch has been published in Lon- "Wallenstein's rear, to ravage the coundon about a fortnight, and has received" try and cut off his supplies. The effect no contradiction from any body. Let us hope, that it will receive a contradiction from the head quarters of our army; for, "of this was, that Wallenstein was at length forced to retreat with all possible "speed to prevent his troops from being " starved.”—A string of falshoods, of | pure unmixed falshoods, from the beginning to the end! No troops did Lord Talavera send in the rear of the enemy; never did he detach General Blake towards Seville, or towards any other point; General Blake never made any movement in that direction; Marshal Victor (the Duke of Belluno) never moved from Madrid; General Graham, so far from advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Blake, had, at that time, actually quitted his command at Cadiz, and was coming round to Lisbon, by sea; and Lord Talavera, so far from having imitated, upon this occasion, the manœuvre, said to have been practised by that consummate General, Gustavus Adolphus, had collected around him, all his forces, and had put his army on the high road towards Lisbon. These facts have, now, been proved to us. It appears, from Lord Talavera's own dispatches, that so far from detaching Blake, he hardly knew what was become of him, for, in his dispatch of the 27th of June, he says that he understands, that Blake was at Castillegos on the 24th of that month. And in his dis patch of the 4th of July, he says, that he has no authentic account of General Blake's movements, since the 27th of June. It appears, that Blake, so far from marching towards Seville, intended to embark his troops for Cadiz, but, says Lord Talavera in his dispatch of the 11th of July, "Neither General Castanos nor 1 "have heard from him, since the 18th of "June!" This was the General, who, as our hireling prints told us, was detached, after the manner of that consummate General, Gustavus Adolphus, into the rear of the enemy, by the same commander that has since told us that he did not know what was become of him. It appears that Blake made an attempt to obtain possession of a place, garrisoned only by about 300 men, and failed in the attempt, though we are told, by the above writer, that he had under his command, 15,000 men. From Lord Talavera's dispatch of the 18th of July, which is the last yet received, or, at least, the last that I have seen, it appears, that Blake actually embarked, with his army, on the 6th of July; so that he and his Spaniards have entirely quitted the grand scene of action.I have thus gone over rather in detail some of the most prominent circumstances of the war, down to as late a period as our intelligence reaches; and let me, now, appeal to the reader, whether I was not more correct than Mr. Perceval, as to the prospects of that war, at the time when Massena retreated out of Portugal; whether the public would not have been wise if they had followed my advice and had hesitated, before they believed that Portugal was delivered, and that the deliverance of all Europe was about speedily to follow. At that time, when the motion for a vote of thanks was made by Mr. Perceval, he stated several advantages which would arise out of what he called the triumph, which had then taken place, but the principal advantage was this, that "we now "know, that we shall have a British army "to defend our country, if ever the battle "should be brought to our own shares; an army that has uniformly beaten the army of the enemy, commanded by "Generals who have out-Generaled the "Generals of the enemy."At the time when this was delivered, by the minister, and when the huzzas were spreading through the country, I endeavoured to give a check to the exultation by observing, how degrading it was for us to acknowledge that we had not, till now, discovered that we had an army able to defend our own shores against the French; but, I more particularly dwelt on the dangerous tendency of such exultation; because, if it should finally turn out that our army in Portugal was unable to withstand that of the French, the inference, upon Mr. Perceval's principle, would be, that we had not an army to defend our country if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores. This danger, events have now made apparent; for, we see that our army has had ample opportunities to cope with the enemy; we have seen it engaged in two battles with that enemy; we have seen it twice the besieger of that enemy; we have seen it blockading Almeida; we have seen it at the breach at Badajoz; and we have seen the result. Now, then, if we were to adopt Mr. Perceval's mode of reasoning, what a disheartening conclusion, must we draw? I told him, at the time, not by any means, to make the question, whether we had an army capable of defending our country against the French, if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores; I told him, not to make the affirmative of this question rest upon any success that had been gained by our army in Portugal, because, said I, if that army should be beaten by the French, or should be obliged to retreat before them, the conclusion upon your own principles will be, that we have not an army to defend our country, and that, in case of invasion, by France, we may give the thing up at once, without a struggle.Of the same dangerous tendency are all the flattering pictures which have been drawn, relative to the situation of affairs in Spain as well as Portugal; and, if those pictures be true, I hesitate not to say, that our situation is most desperate indeed.We have been told repeatedly, and from what ought to be the best authority, that the Emperor Napoleon is detested and abhorred through the whole of the peninsula; that he has no partizans amongst the people in any part of those countries; that the people are every where the cordial friends of England; that they so sincerely detest the French, that they voluntarily destroy their corn fields, their cattle, their barns, their mills, their houses, their furniture, and almost the very clothes upon their backs, rather than leave a chance of any part of them falling into the hands of the French. One would suppose, from even the official accounts that we receive, that a pretty girl would regret her beauty and would almost lacerate her visage, hammer out her teeth, and flatten down her bosom to the shape, and give it the colour of an oak board, rather than charm the eyes of a Frenchman. This, would, to be sure, be an instance of most ferocious vindictiveness. But, really, to read the dispatches of our Generals, and the speeches of our ministers, even this, is not more than we might, reasonably expect. Well, then, how stands the case? Here are we, carrying on a war with Napoleon, with all the means, of every sort, that we are able to muster; and the theatre, of that war, is, a country, containing about 13 or 14 millions of people, the whole of whom, we say, are for us and against him. We have in our pay, 60,000 men of Portugal: these are actually in our pay, and make part of our army, and, our Generals have said that they are as good troops as any in the world. Besides these there are, we are told, many thousands of Portuguese militia; there are several Spanish armies; there are, we are told, in every quarter and corner of Spain, Guerillas, or Volunteer Corps, who are very numerous, and who, upon all occasions, behave in the most gallant manner: how stands the case, then? Here we are, with all our own means, of every kind, and with all those other means, that I have now been speaking of, carrying on a war, with Napoleon, in the midst of a people, nearly equal in population to England, Scotland and Ireland, all put together, all those people being for us and against him, and, yet, we see, that he still holds his ground; that his brother is in possession of the metro. polis of Spain; that, he, in fact, reigns in Spain; that the Spanish regency are cut off from the land, being besieged in a little island, by a French army; and, that, our main army, under the General which our Minister and Parliament have lately thanked, have, recently, been com pelled to raise the siege of a very important fortress, upon the approach of a part of the forces of Napoleon, and have actually been compelled to place themselves in a state, in which, it is evident that a safe retreat is the main thing provided for.- Now, how disheartening are the reflections which this picture is calculated to excite! For, if this be the state of the case, in the peninsula, what must we expect to be the lot of England or Ireland, in case of invasion? This is a thought that seems never to have occurred to those who have been boasting of the zeal and enthusiasm and valour and perseverance of the "universal Spanish nation." If it had occurred to them, they would have perceived, that such assertions taken into view with the events of the war, formed the greatest possible compliment to the French armies, and the most serious grounds of alarm for any country liable to be invaded by those armies. For, what can the people of any nation be more than our ministers and their writers have asserted of the people of the peninsula; what can the people of this country be more, than zealous, enthusiastic in their country's defence, brave, persevering, and implacable in their hatred against the enemy: what can they be more than this? and yet we see, that all these excellent qualities united in the people of Spain and Portugal, do not drive the French out; there are 13 millions of these people, and yet, a French army remains in the heart of their country, has been there for three years, still holds their metropolis, has established a government sufficient for the imposition and collection of taxes over a large part of the country, and, in short, rules a much greater half of the two kingdoms. What a fearful thing, then, must a French army be, if all that we have been told, in the dispatches of Generals and the speeches of ministers be true? We are often told, that if we are true to ourselves (a favourite expression of Pitt and George that I have always endeavoured to inculRose when they were proposing new cate the opinion, that the war in the Pentaxes); if we are true to ourselves, if insula is not of such great importance as we are united, if we join heart and hand, the ministerial writers would fain perwe have nothing to fear from the enemy, suade us that it is. They represent it as land when he will. But if what our Ge- all in all; as every thing to us; as a thing nerals and Ministers tell us be true, the for the success of which we ought to Spaniards and Portuguese are true to grudge no sacrifices, whether in men or in themselves, they are united, they have money. It is true, that unless we do rejoined heart and hand; and yet we do gard it in this light, we cannot easily resee, that their country is, in great part, concile ourselves to the enormous cost commanded, possessed, and governed which it occasions; but, whatever those by a French army, and that army under sacrifices may be, it is far better that they the command of men, who, seventeen should be incurred uselessly, and it is far years ago, were either private soldiers, better that they should be regarded as or were labourers or mechanics. Ob- pure waste, than that the people of this serve, too, that the 13 millions of people country should believe, that the fate of in the peninsula, have not only all their England depends, even in the smallest own means for their support, but are as- degree, upon the fate of Spain and Portusisted with the means, the mighty means gal; because, and I cannot repeat it too of England, who has, for the last three often, if they once imbible that opinion, years, expended more, in the assisting of from the hour that Spain and Portugal Spain and Portugal, than half the total shall be subdued, from that hour will amount of the revenues of France, ex- England be plunged in despair. I do not tended as her dominion is over 50 or 60 say, observe, that the danger to England millions of people. If a French army would not be increased by the subjugation were to invade England or Ireland, from of Spain and Portugal; for, I am conwhat foreign arm should we receive as- vinced, that that danger would be greatly sistance? Manifestly, then, if what we increased; but I well know, that there is have been told of the disposition of the no danger equal to national despair.people in Spain and Portugal be true, our If the war, in those countries, should fate would be certain, if invaded by a end in the deliverance of them from the numerous French army. Therefore, what French, and in a complete establishment we have to hope, is, that the dispo- of their independence, it certainly will sitions of the people of the peninsula, have greatly contributed to the safety of have not been truly described to us; that this country against the designs of Napothe people do not universally detest and leon. But, if the war finally terminate in abhor Napoleon; that the hatred of the the subjugation of the peninsula by French is not so outrageous as to induce a France, then the more that termination is pretty girl to tear her cheeks and hammer distant, the worse it will be for us; beout her teeth, lest, perchance, she should cause, the longer the war continues the be so unfortunate as to charm the eyes and more we shall be exhausted; and, of win the heart of a Frenchman. Let us course, the less able to withstand the rude hope that this is not quite true; and, in- assaults which we may then reasonably deed, the success of the French, in the expect. And, it should always be borne first instance, as well as their having re-in mind, that these wars do not exhaust mained so long in the Peninsula, pretty the enemy in the same way that they exclearly prove, that is not true.--I do haust us. He has 50 millions of people, not, and I never have, liked the notion, from amongst whom he draws his armies; that our safety, that our means of defence, he makes those armies find the means of is to be judged of by any thing that has their own support in the countries where passed, or can pass, in Spain and Portu- they are; he neither gives nor talks of gal; because, as I have more than once said, compensation; he comes amongst the peowe may ultimately fail there, and, then, ple as a conqueror; to those who submit there is nothing left for us but despair, a he offers protection, to those who resist shocking state for any nation to be in, he offers the sword, but from all he exacts and, assuredly, the fore-runner of its sub- the means of maintaining his armies; his jugation; because, from the moment it declared object is to destroy the old godespairs, it will, of course, take no mea- vernments, and, of course, he seizes upon sures for its safety.It is for this reason, all the property of those governments, he confiscates that of the church, of the no- | Napoleon well knows. Eight years ago, bility, and of all public establishments. he called out to us: " Pay your bank notes We, on the contrary, have to draw our "in gold, and then the world will believe in armies from a population of 14 or 15 "the solidity of your resources, without your millions of people; we maintain our ar "going to war to prove it." The Moniteur mies, by the means of taxes levied upon said this in answer to a fine flaming speech the people of England; we make com- of the then minister (Addington); and, pensation, to some extent, at least, for the from that day to this the Emperor seems injuries we are compelled to do to the to have had his eye pretty steadily fixed inhabitants; we go not as conquerors, but upon the work going on in Threadneedle in the character of friends; we profess Street. If he has, it is impossible that he not to inflict punishment on any part of should not wish to protract the war in the the people, but hold them to be unani- Peninsula, which creates such a quantity mous in our favour; our declared object of bank notes. And, indeed, is there not is not to destroy the old governments, but every appearance that his generals are to maintain them, or to re-establish them, acting upon this plan? The Duke of. and to preserve or restore, all the former Belluno lies very quietly before Cadiz; orders, ranks, and properties. So that, Marshal Suchet having got possession of we contend with most fearful odds, in Tarragona, has sit himself down there; whatever way the comparison is made. King Joseph is quiet at Madrid; and the. Let it be observed, too, that time, which army under their Graces, Soult and Marworks against us, works with equal force, mont, having rescued Badajoz from danger, for our enemy, who is daily gaining seem to have taken care not to discourage strength, by the internal arrangement, the Conde de Vimiera (the new title which and consolidation of his power, in every has just been given to Lord Talavera, it part of his dominions. We feel impatient seems, by the Prince Regent of Portugal) at the lagging of the war in the peninsula: from receiving reinforcements and supplies, he need feel no such impatience: war is which, if the news papers speak truth, he a state, which, at present, is necessary to is continually receiving in great abundance. him: peace would thwart his views against The movements of the French Generals us: it would give rise to an intercourse are precisely such as are calculated to enand to discussions adverse to his vast pro- courage the Conde to call for more troops. jects to kindle a new war might not be The French Generals push on towards him so easy a matter; and, as his chief object with a formidable front: he draws back, now must be, and evidently is, to form feeling himself not strong enough for them: a fleet, that work could not go on so fast they stand and look at him, and seem to in peace as in war. It is impossible to be afraid to attack: this induces him to take this view of the war without being of wish for more troops; and, as far opinion, that it is the wish and the inten- as the government is able, that wish is intion of Napoleon to protract the duration of stantly gratified. The French harrass it. His interest so manifestly points this him with marches, compel him to expend out to him, that one can hardly suppose it enormous sums of money, wear out his possible, that it should not be his settled men and bis horses, so that, the waste from design. The war is at a distance from mere sickness has greatly surpassed the him; it leaves him at leisure to settle all destruction by the sword.It is imposthe other parts of his empire, at the same sible that any plan of warfare can be, to time that it furnishes him with a fair pre- the French, so advantageous as this. Here tence for keeping on foot great military they have found out a spot, to which we establishments, which are absolutely ne- are resolved to send all the resources of cessary to the consolidation of his sway every kind that we can get together. in several quarters of his dominions; it While we kept upon the sea, or, in our affords him grounds for all his measures islands, guarded by the sea, they could not against our commerce; it serves to habi-touch us. They had no means either of tuate the people of the Continent to dispense with all communication with us; and, above all things, it exhausts, it wastes, it draws out the very life-blood of England, at the same time, that it augments the quantity of her bank-notes, and, of course, hastens their depreciation. All this killing our people or destroying our property. But, they have, at last, found out a spot, to which we cheerfully send men and horses and money and every thing belonging to us, that they can wish to see destroyed or wasted. The MORNING CHRCNICLE of the 8th instant, says: " Our ་་ |