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Now, why should you be in such a rage | lost in population or in power? Is she erwith me? If I were to propose that the hausted? Has she become feeble? We are same should be done here as is now doing still struggling with her; and do we find in Austria, what would there be, in my her grow weaker and weaker ? proposition, injurious to either the station or character of the king or the clergy? Am I to suppose, that the Crown depends upon the possession of a parcel of plate by the king and Royal Family; that a throne, the seat of kingly power, is supported by a waggon load, perhaps, of gold and silver dishes and plates and spoons and knives and forks and salvers and candlesticks and sauce boats and tea-pots and cream-jugs? Good heavens! what a vile opinion must they have of the throne, who look upon such things as tending to its support! And, then, as to the Church, what could her sons wish for more earnestly than an opportunity of giving us a proof of their disregard of things temporal? Besides, there would be, in this case, a striking proof of the truth of the good maxim, that "Justice, though slow, is sure;" for, it is well known, that the Paper System, which would thus draw upon the Church, was the invention of A BISHOP of that same Church!

But, the Courtiers and the Clergy may be tranquil; for I do not think it at all likely that such measures will become necessary in England, though they have been adopted at Vienna, and, as would seem, with such singular success. I am of opinion, that there would be found ample mcans, elsewhere, for a due compensation to those Fundholders, who had been compelled to vest their property in that way. In short, I am quite satisfied, that we have nothing at all to fear from the destruction of the paper-system if that should take place; and, as the friends of the system assert, that we have nothing to fear from its continuing to exist, we are, I think, tolerably safe. The RUIN of America and France were foretold because their papermoney was falling; but, the prophecy proved false. They were both victorious; both became prosperous; and, what is odd enough, both have since become receptacles of the coin that is gone from England; aye, from that country, who hoped to triumph over them by the means of that same coin! How many times did PITT predict the time when France would be what he called exhausted, and how was he hallooed on by his numerous understrappers of all sorts, verbally as well as in print! Has she been ruined? Has she

Well, then, this doctrine of RUIN from a depreciated paper-money is a false doctrine. It was engendered in a shallow brain, and brought forth by arrogant emptiness. But, suppose it to be sound as applied to us; suppose, for arguments' sake, that the destruction of the paper system should take place, and should prove the utter ruin of the country; or, suppose, at any rate, that it should send all the Fundholders into beggary, should cause all the Church and Collegiate property to be sold as in Austria, should send the Royal Plate to the Mint, should annihilate all the remaining feudal rights and tenures; and, in short, should produce a species of revolution. I say, that it need do none of this: I say, that not one of these is a necessary consequence of the overthrow of the paper system: but, for arguments' sake, suppose the contrary, and suppose that such overthrow were to take place; WHO, in that case, would be to blame?

This is a question that every man ought, as soon as may be, to answer in his own mind; for, if any of these consequences were to come upon us, it would be of the greatest utility to be able to say, at once, who it was that had been the real authors of the calamity. Certainly, then, the Reformers, commonly called Jacobins and Levellers, have had nothing to do with the matter. They have had no power. They have been carefully shut out from all authority. They have filled no offices of any sort. They have been held forth as a sort of enemy in the bosom of the country. There is no creature who has had power, of any sort, no matter what, who has not employed that power upon them. They have been either killed, banished, ruined, or, at the least, beaten down and kept down. Well, then, they will not come in for any of the blame, if things should turn out wrong at last. They have had no hand in declaring war against the regicides of France; they have had no hand in forming leagues, in voting subsidies, in sending out expeditions; they have had no hand in making loans or grants; and, therefore, they will, surely, not come in for any share of the blame which shall attach to the consequences. They have been re

presented as an ignorant and factious herd, a" low, degraded crew;" while those who have thus described them have had all the powers and the resources of the country at their command; and, therefore, let what will happen, the Reformers will have to bear no portion of the blame. The fullblooded Anti-Jacobins; the members of the Pitt Club; all the numerous herd of the enemies to Reform may be fairly called upon for a share of the responsibility; but, to the Reformers, who have had no power, and who have been hardly able to exist in peace, no man can reasonably look.

I shall now, Gentlemen, after nearly a twelvemonth's correspondence, take my leave of you, and with the conviction, that I have done much towards giving you a clear view of the subject, of which I have been treating. I had long entertained the design to make the subject familiar; to put my countrymen in general beyond the reach of deception on this score; to enable them to avoid being cheated, if they chose to avoid it; and a sufficiency of time for the purpose being furnished me, it would have been greatly blameable in me, if I had neglected to avail myself of it: I have not been guilty of this neglect; I have, with great care and research, brought together what appears to me to be the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the useful information relating to the paper system; I have laboured most zealously and anxiously for the accomplishment of the great object in view; and it more than repays me for every thing to hear, to see, to know, that I have not laboured in vain.

In the course of these Letters, I have elearly expressed my opinions as to the fate of the paper-money: those opinions are in direct opposition to many of those persons, in parliament as well as out of parliament, who have delivered their sentiments upon the subject: TIME, the trier of all things, must now decide between us; and, if I am wrong, I have, at least, taken effectual means to make my error as conspicuous and as notorious as possible. One thing, above all others, however, I am desirous of leaving strongly impressed upon your minds, and that is, that it is my decided opinion, that, let what will be the fate of the paper-money, that fate, however destructive, does not necessarily include any, even the smallest, danger to the independence of England, or

to the safety of the throne, or to the liber-
ties or the happiness of the people.
I remain, Gentlemen,
Your friend

and obedient Servant,
WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday, 2nd August, 1811.

The

SUMMARY OF POLITICS. TALAVERA'S WARS IN SPAIN AND PORTU GAL. --(Continued from page 82.) There are two facts, connected with this subject, which, by the daily prints, have been passed over almost in silence: I allude to the removal, or movement, of GENERAL GRAHAM and MARSHAL BERESFORD former, we see, is arrived in the army of Lord Talavera, where he is said to be second in command, the post which Marshal Beresford held before; and the latter is gone to Lisbon to form new corps of Portuguese Troops.- -After what we had been before told, this seems, and must seem, somewhat surprizing; for, in cases such as we had been led to suppose to exist with regard to these two officers, it would, one would think, have been natural for both to remain where they had achieved so much glory; glory, in each case, sufficient to entitle them to the thanks of the two Houses of Parliament.—I shall leave these facts, however, to the reflection of the reader, contenting myself with having merely pointed them out; but, at the same time, I cannot refrain from just observing, that there does appear to have been something of a disagreeable nature happened between our commander and the Spaniards respecting the Battle of Barrosa. Indeed, I have now before me a publication that contains proof of this. It is entitled: "A Reply to the Statement "of GENERAL GRAHAM'S Letter of the "24th of March, 1811, on General La "PENA's Manifesto and Representation to "the Cortes. By GENERAL LACY." This paper, which has been printed, in the form of a pamphlet, by VOGEL AND SCHULZE, No. 13, Poland Street, Oxford Street, is a very elaborate and very able performance, and, as a literary production, at least, it certainly discovers great superiority over the Letter of General Graham. I have read it with all the attention I am master of; and, if its facts be true, the Spaniard has, unquestionably, the best of the dispute; and, of this opinion every one will be, I am satisfied, who will take

the pains to read the publication.To return to our army on the confines of Portugal, the reader will see, by the subjoined official papers, what its movements have been since the raising of the siege of Badajoz, of which we must now say a few words. On the 6th of June VISCOUNT TALAVERA informs us (see pages 32 and 50) that the siege is going on in a very prosperous way, under his own eye; and, at the time when this dispatch arrived, the newspapers assured us, that the place could not hold out more than ten days, and that, then, all that part of the country would be swept clean of the enemy's troops. Seven days after this, however, another dispatch (see p. 54,) gives us an account of the actual raising of the siege, and of the loss sustained in two attempts to storm an out-work, called St. Christoval, in which a breach had been made.--This storming attracted my attention, and I cannot help thinking the circumstances very curious. There was, it seems, a breach made, and a detachment sent to storm; but, at each time, when they arrived at the edge of the ditch, they found it emptied, and could not mount the rampart, though they had ladders with them for the purpose. This appears to me very strange; for, if a breach was made, the same battery which made it could still have played upon it, if any attempt had been made to clear out the ditch. Besides, if the ditch was cleared out, the materials must have been thrown up on one side or on the other of the ditch, and, of course, this must have been perceived by the besiegers, who, in that case, ought not to have attempted the storm. But, it appears, that they found the ditch emptied a second time, a thing wholly unaccountable, after the warning they had before received. It does, however, appear to me passing strange, that our batteries, by which a breach deemed practicable had been made, should have allowed the enemy to clear out the ditch. To clear out the ditch of a fortification is no trifling affair; it requires much time and numerous workmen; and as the rubbish must have been thrown up on the one side or the other, the operation must have been visible, and, of course, might (one would think at least) have been put an end to, in a moment, by the same batteries that had made the breach.This emptying the ditch does, therefore, I must confess, puzzle me very much; nor can I account for it unless upon the supposition, that the French work by witchcraft, or by

supernatural means of some sort or other; and, at any rate, the second attempt at storming an impracticable breach must, I think, be regarded as an occurrence, under such circumstances, extremely rare, if not without an equal in the anuals of modern warfare.--The Duke of DALMATIA has, through the French news-papers, given us his account of this siege. He tells us, that there were three practicable breaches (see p. 127), one in the body of the place, and two in the out-work St. Christoval. But, he says, one of the latter was rendered impracticable by the clearing out of the ditch and by an interior entrenchment; and that our assaults were attempted at the other breach in this out-work, which does, indeed, seem very probable. The two attempts were made, he says, on the 7th and on the 10th of June. The first with 1,500 men, who, according to his own account, behaved very gallantly, but who were repulsed with great loss. In the night of the 10th, he says, the English renewed the assault with 2,000 men, the garrison of St. Christoval consisting of only 140 Frenchmen; that every soldier had four loaded muskets by his side; that a vast quantity of charged bombs had been placed on the parapets; that the English had ap-plied 40 ladders at the head of their column, and were mounting the breach, when the bombs and grenades were thrown down amongst them, and, exploding, broke the ladders and spread death and dismay amongst the assailants, while, with the bayonet, the garrison drove them down to the bottom of the breach; the ditch, he says, was filled with killed and wounded; that, in this confusion, some English offi cers demanded succour, and that they were made to ascend their own ladders, now refitted, in order to surrender to the commandant as prisoners of war. He says, that we lost 600 men in this affair, that we begged a truce of three hours to carry off our wounded, and the French did not lose ten men.--That this was a most bloody and disastrous affair no one can doubt; and, there can be as little doubt that the French General has omitted nothing favourable to the besieged; but, the story about the English Officers, at the head of 2,000 men, begging for quarter from 140 meu is not, I hope, to be believed for one single moment; and especially, that they condescended to reft their own ladders for the purpose of ascending into the fortress, there to surrender themselves prisoners of war! Yet, there does, from LORD TALAVERA's

our army got to Almeida, that its retreat from that point must be very speedy; and, for this event, though at the expence of an infinite quantity of abuse, I endeavoured to prepare the public; but I believe that my endeavours were totally useless. One could meet with scarcely a man, who did not look upon it, that the French were in a state of humiliation and disgrace, an opinion which derived much strength from the journey of Massena and King Joseph to France, which journey was looked upon as a flight and which

of a total evacuation of the peninsula by the French, who it was confidently as serted in almost all our news-papers, were preparing to collect the whole of their troops on the north of the river Ebro; that is to say, on the confines of France! This assertion and assertions similar to it, were scarcely dry from the press in England, when we heard of the battle near Almeida, which was immediately follow

account appear, that there were three of ficers missing, a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign; but, let us hope, that they actually mounted the breach, got upon the ramparts, and were made prisoners there.There is one omission in the account of Lord Talavera, which is, indeed, common to all his accounts of battles; and that is, the number of men employed in the enterprize is not stated. It appears that the storming party was composed of men taken from sixteen or seventeen battalions; but it does not, any where, say, how many men. Two thou-flight was looked upon as the fore-runner sand men is a great number for such an undertaking; and it is certain, that, at the mouth of a breach a small number of men, with such means as the French appear to have prepared, would be sufficient to keep back, for a time at least, almost any force; but, still it does appear something wonderful that, the carnage should have been so dreadful, if the number of the enemy was really so small. It would be very desirable to ascertain the numbers employ-ed by what has told for the French more ed by our General upon this occasion. But something still more desirable would be, such information as should enable us to judge of the prudence of making the attempt. The Duke of Dalmatia says, however, that the breach was practicable, and, as the attempt was made, it is evident that Lord Talavera thought it was practicable; but, then, the question comes, how came that attempt to fail? The reader will recollect, with regard to this Town, that it cost the Duke of Dalmatia, a few months ago, less than a week to take it from the Spaniards; and, he will also recollect, the disapprobation of the conduct of the Spaniards expressed by Lord Talavera upon that occasion. But, certainly, from every account, Badajoz is not a place calculated to make a very stout resistance against an army well supplied and ably commanded. I do not say, that it was possible to take the Town before the French army came up; but, this is pretty evident, that, if there was not a moral certainty of taking it, the siege should never have been attempted; because, to commence the siege and abandon it at the approach of a French army was the strongest proof that it was possible to give of a consciousness of inferiority of force on our side; and the reader cannot fail to have perceived, that this abandonment of Badajoz has produced an effect more depressing than any which has been produced by the former untoward events of the campaign.It was easy to perceive from the moment that

than any victory in the field could have told, namely, that wonderful exploit, the evacuation of Almeida by BRENNIER, which exploit not to envy the enemy is impossible. This was immediately followed by a movement on the part of the enemy which compelled Lord Talavera to fly to the assistance of Marshal Beresford; but he came too late, the battle of Albuera had been fought, the army had lost many thousands, in killed wounded and prisoners, and the siege of Badajoz which the French had raised by giving that battle, had, now, to be recommenced with numerous disadvantages.- This siege was going on in the manner we have seen, when the enemy, that same enemy whom the good people of England looked upon as humbled and disgraced, and whom our venal prints described as hastening from all parts towards the north of the Ebro, was found, all at once, to be pouring down towards Badajoz, five hundred miles in the opposite direction, driving, in their way, the remains of our army out from near Almeida, and in a few days raising the siege of Badajoz, and compelling our whole army to re-enter Portugal to place itself on the great road towards the lines of Torres Vedras.In this situation the armies now are, re-inforcements being daily arriving from England, while, on the other hand, the French appear to be collecting together at that point all the troops they can spare from other quarters.--How long our general will be able to maintain this

office of a public writer is more useful to his country than all others put together, it is that of checking the too sanguine expectations of the people. Indeed, there is one and but one safe rule of conduct for him to pursue, and that is, to speak the truth (as far as he dares) upon every sub

dle, let it please or displease whom it may

position, I cannot pretend to say; but, supposing him to remain where he is; supposing him to lose not another inch of ground during this campaign, what has been gained, I should like to know, since he last quitted the lines of Torres Vedras; this is a question which I put to all those who extolled so highly the pursuit of Mas-ject with which he thinks proper to medsena, and especially to all those, who, like Mr. Whitbread, read their recantation with respect to the war in Portugal. What has been gained, then, I say, since our army last quitted the lines of Torres Vedras? I am not one of those who delight in dwelling upon the numbers of killed and wounded, and who speak of men killed in battle as men that are murdered. He who enters the army knows that his business is to fight, and, if necessary, to die. But, one cannot help reflecting on the number of deaths which this campaign has already occasioned; one cannot help reflecting on the number of our countrymen whom it has sent to the grave, and the far greater number that it may have disabled for life, or subjected to great bodily sufferings; and, so reflecting, one cannot help asking what has been gained by all this; and, to put this question those especially are entitled who have constantly endeavoured to convince their readers that the species of warfare carried on in Portugal was not calculated to insure ultimate benefit.For my part, I never could see, in the retreat of Massena, any thing favourable to the English army, nor any thing for that army to be proud of, especially as that same English army, under that same commander, had, not nine months before retreated over nearly the same distance of ground before that same French army, with that same Massena at its head, with this difference only in the circumstances, that our army had in the interim received most abundant supplies, while that of the French, according to our own account, had been able to receive no supplies at all. In the pursuit of Massena, I saw no official account of prisoners taken. I saw none of the usual indications of defeat or dispersion. I saw them moving back, indeed, but I saw them constantly ready to turn about, and I could not persuade myself that there were any real grounds for that exultation, which so generally prevailed, and, for not joining in which I was so atrociously abused here is, however, nothing rare in this: it has been but too often my lot to experience abuse when I ought to have received thanks; for certainly if any

IMPOSTOR PAPER.-Amongst all the symptoms of mortality, which corruption has exhibited of late years, there is none more strong than the imposture, to which it is constantly resorting. ago," the most thinking people" were incessantly plied with intercepted letters from Spain and Portugal, containing the most distressing accounts of the state of the French armies. Some of these letters purported to be written by KING JOSEPH to his brother the Emperor, in which the former complained to the latter of the perilous situation, in which he had placed him. In short, there has not been, for many years past, one week without some attempt of this sort, for the purpose of cheating this "most thinking people." The other day, when the venal press was compelled to confess that Lord Talavera had raised the siege of Badajoz, and had, in fact, retreated before that enemy, whom, it was confidently predicted but a few days before, that he would speedily attack and overthrow; when the venal writers were compelled to confess this, they did, as they always do in like cases, fabricate some most bare faced falsehoods for the purpose of breaking the effect of their bad news. Upon this occasion they fabricated two falsehoods: one was, "glorious news " from the Mediterranean!" And then followed an account of a great victory over a French fleet, with the capture of nine sail of the line. The other falsehood was, that General Blake, who, with his Spanish army, had quitted Lord Talavera, had proceeded towards Seville, and having been joined by General Graham from Cadiz, had entered Seville and there captured an immense quantity of provisions and military stores. No sea fight has there been; General Blake has not moved an inch toward Seville; and General Gra ham was, at the time when this lie was fabricated in England, actually landed in Portugal, and proceeding, as we have been since informed, to take a command in the army of Lord Talavera.It must have been known, to those who fabricated, or who abetted the fabricating, these false

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