SAME-PACIFIC BLOCKADE.

94. A common form of restricted use of force consists in the establishment of what in time of war would consti

tute a blockade, without technically destroying the pacific relations of the parties affected.

Pacific blockade ordinarily takes the form of closing by force of one or more ports of a country in order to bring the country to terms. Strictly speaking, blockade is a war measure, and modern tendency has been in the direction of limiting blockade to the time of war.

This measure of enforcing demands by one or more nations was first resorted to in 1827, when France, Great Britain, and Russia blockaded all the coasts of Greece where Turkish armies were encamped. The three powers maintained that this was a pacific measure; but it resulted in the battle of Navarino, and the destruction of the Turkish navy.

The so-called "pacific blockades" established since 1827 have varied greatly in nature. These include: The blockade of the Tagus by France, 1831; Holland by Great Britain, 1833; New Granada by Great Britain, 1836; Mexico by France, 1838; La Plata by France, 1838-1840; Greece by Great Britain, 1850; Menam by France, 1883; Formosa by France, 1884; Greece by Five Great Powers, 1886; Zanzibar by Portugal, 1888; Greece by Six Great Powers, 1897; and Venezuela by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, 1902. The number of cases during the nineteenth century was sufficient to establish the practice of using this method of constraint. Before 1850, it was claimed that ships of third states were bound to respect pacific blockades, and that they might be seized for attempting to violate the blockade, and might be detained without condemnation. Since that time the drift of opinion and practice has been toward the restriction of the effects of pacific blockade so far as possible to the blockading and blockaded parties. When France engaged in the blockade of Formosa in 1884, Lord Granville said: "The contention of the French government that a 'pacific blockade' confers on the blockading power the right to capture and condemn the

ships of third nations for a breach of such a blockade is in conflict with well-established principles of international law." 11 In 1897 the United States distinctly announced that it did not concede the right of the powers to establish without declaration of war a blockade of Crete which would affect third states.12 The United States took the same position with reference to the attempt to extend to states not concerned the consequences of the so-called "pacific blockade" of Venezuela in 1902. While Germany was in favor of maintaining a pacific blockade, "Great Britain insisted that the blockade should be warlike in character," though at first these powers did not intend to declare war. Subsequently acknowledgment was made that a state of war actually existed, and on December 20, 1902, a proclamation of blockade was issued.13

The weight of authority is against the admission of a doctrine of pacific blockade which would affect third states not parties to the difficulties involved. Some authorities doubt the expediency of such a measure in any case.14 General opinion seems to be favorable to the toleration of this form of reprisal,

11 British Parliamentary Papers, France No. 1 (1885), Letter of Nov. 11, 1884.

12 Foreign Relations U. S. 1897, pp. 253-255; Id. 1898, p. 384. 13 Foreign Relations U. S. 1903, p. 417 et seq.

14 Bonfils says:

"The so-called pacific blockade cannot be justified, either in the name of humanity or from the point of view of good sense. The catastrophe of Navarino shows that it may have a bloody ending. In time of peace, reprisals ought to injure only the state which provokes them. The pacific blockade can produce serious results only when neutral states are obliged to respect it. But there can be no question of neutrality, properly so called, in time of peace. No obligation, in the proper and juridical sense, can oblige third states to submit to the conditions of a pacific blockade. But under these limitations the blockade has neither meaning nor value. If it is maintained with regard to third states, it injures their rights and legitimate interests.

"For powers of the first rank, the pacific blockade constitutes a means, little burdensome, therefore more alluring, of making states of the second rank to submit to all kinds of vexations and annoyances. At bottom it is simply an act of war, a fact of hostility. In resorting to pacific blockade, the powers do not endeavor to escape war itself, but only the inconveniences and main obligations which war brings. It is considerations of interest, and not considerations

provided its effects are strictly confined to the blockading and blockaded parties. Such limitation lessens the effectiveness of pacific blockade, which in early days was often an attempt to secure the advantages of war without its obligations. Sometimes resort to pacific blockade has averted severer measures. The name "pacific blockade" is contradictory in itself; but, if the measure is so guarded as not to operate as a war measure against third states, probably little objection will be raised, as the parties concerned have the option of regarding it as hostile if expedient for themselves, and third states should not ordinarily be concerned with measures of reprisal which do not interfere with their rights.15

of humanity, which urge maritime powers to resort to this means of constraint, which causes great losses to commerce in general."

Droit Int. Public (Fauchille's Ed.) §§ 992-993.

15 Hogan, A. E., Pacific Blockade, p. 70.