more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public Liberty.

18. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continual mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to difcourage and restrain it. It ferves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with illfounded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party pasfions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another.

19. There is an opinion that parties in free-countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and ferve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical caft, patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the fpirit of party. But in thofe of a popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every falutary purpose. And there being conftant danger of excefs, the effort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it.. A fire not to be quenched; it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, inftead of warming, it fhould confume.

20. It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country, fhould infpire caution, in thofe entrufted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and

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create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotism. A juft eftimate of that love of power, and pronenefs to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this position. The neceffity of reciprocal checks in the exercife of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depofitories, and conftituting each the guardian of public weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern: fome of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preferve them must be as neceffary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the diftribution or modification of the conftitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates. But let there be no change by ufurpation; for tho this, in one inftance, may be the inftrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or tranfient benefit which the ufe can at any time yield.

21. Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, religion and morality are indifpenfable fupports.In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotifm, who fhould labor to fubvert these great pillars of human happiness, thefe firmeft props of the duties of men and citizens.-The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to refpect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be asked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of religious obligation DESERT the oaths, which are the inftruments of inveftigation in courts of juftice; and let us with caution indulge the fuppofition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure; reafon and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclufion of religious principle. 'Tis fubftantially true, that virtne or mofality is a neceffary fpring of popular government,

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The rule indeed extends with more or lefs force to every fpecies of free government. Who that is a fincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to fhake the foundation of the fabric ?

22. Promote then, as an object of primary importance, inftitutions for the general diffufion of knowledge. -In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, is it effential that public opinion fhould be enlightened. As a very important fource of ftrength and fecurity, cherish public credit, one method of preferving it is to use it as sparingly as poffible; avoiding occafions of expenfe by cultivating peace; but remembering alfo that timely disbursements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater difbursements to repel it; avoiding likewife the accumulations of debt, not only by fhunning occafions of expenfe, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned, not ungenerously throwing upon pofterity the burden which we ourfelves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your reprefentatives, but it is necessary that public opinion fhould co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is effential that you fhould practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts their must be revenue: to have revenue there must be taxes: that no taxes can be devised which are not more or lefs inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinfic embarrassment infeparable from the selection of the proper object (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decifive motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a fpirit of acquiefcence in the measures for obtaining revenue which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

23. Obferve good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no diftant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example

of a people always guided by an exalted juftice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the courfe of time and things, the fruits of fuch a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be loft by a steady adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impoffible by its vices?

24. In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more efsential than that permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and paffionate attachments for others fhould be excluded; and that in place of them juft. and amicable feelings towards all fhould be cultivated. The nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in fome degree a flave. It is a flave to its animofity or to its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. Antipathy in one nation against another difpofes each more readily to offer infult and injury, to lay hold of flight caufes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of difpute occur. Hence frequent collifions, obftinate, envenomed and bloody contefts. The nation, prompted by ill will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the beft calculations of policy. government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adepts through paffion what reafon would reject; at other times, it makes the animofity of the nation fubfervient to projects of hoftility instigated by pride, ambition and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations has been the victim.

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25. So likewife a paffionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illufion of an imaginary common intereft, in cafes where no real common intereft exists, and infufing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quariels and

wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or jufti fication. It leads alfo to conceffions to the favorite: nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the conceffions; by unneceffarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealoufy, ill will, and a difpofition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld : And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray, or facrifice the interefts of their own country, without odium, fometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous fense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the bafe or foolish compliances of anbition, corruption or infatuation.

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26. As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, fuch attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of feduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils! Such an attachment of small or weak, towards a great and pow erful nation, dooms the former to be the fatellite of the latter. Against the infidious wiles of foreign influence, (I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens) the jealoufy of a free people ought to be CONSTANTLY awake; fince hiftory and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial: else it becomes the inftrument of the very influence to be avoided, infead of a defence against it.-Exceflive partiality for one foreign nation, and exceffive diflike of another, caufe thofe whom they actuate, to fee danger only on one fide and ferve to veil and even fecond the arts of influence on the other.-Real patriots, who may refift the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become fufpected and odious; while its tools and dupes ufurp the applaufe and confidence of the people, to furrender their interefts. The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations,