that are too dangerous to be intrusted. I can only add that desperate diseases require desperate remedies, and I with truth declare that I have no lust after power, but I wish with as much fervency as any man upon this wideextended continent for an opportunity of turning the sword into the ploughshare. But my feelings, as an officer and a man, have been such as to force me to say that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties to contend with than I have. It is needless to add that short enlistments and a mistaken dependence upon militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. We find, sir, that the enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snow-ball by rolling will increase, unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do it for a little while, but in a little while also, and the militia of those States which have been frequently called upon will not turn out at all, or if they do it will be with so much reluctance and sloth as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Pennsylvania! Could anything but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia! Can anything (the exigency of the case indeed may justify it) be more destructive to the recruiting service than giving $10 bounty for six weeks' service of the militia, who come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when, and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment?

These, sir, are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence, this is the basis on which your cause will and must forever depend till you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy. I therefore beg leave to give it as my humble opinion that eighty-eight battalions

are by no means equal to the opposition you are to make, and that a moment's time is not to be lost in raising a greater number, not less, in my opinion and the opinion of my officers, than 110. It may be urged that it will be found difficult enough to complete the first number. This may be true, and yet the officers of 110 battalions will recruit many more men than those of eighty-eight. In my judgment this is not a time to stand upon expense, our funds are not the only object of consideration. The State of New York have added one battalion (I wish they had made it two) to their quota. If any good officers will offer to raise men upon Continental pay and establishment in this quarter I shall encourage them to do so and regiment them when they have done it. If Congress disapprove of this proceeding they will please to signify it as I mean it for the best. It may be thought that I am going a good deal out of the line of my duty to adopt these measures or to advise thus freely. A character to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable blessings of liberty at stake, and a life devoted must be my excuse."

This letter demonstrated to Congress the extreme peril of the country and the sole means of deliverance. Jealous as they had hitherto been of military power they no longer hesitated to place it in the hands of Washington, and on the 27th of December (1776) they passed the following act:

"The Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis, and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of General Washington, do hereby Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry in addition to those already voted

by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry; to raise, officer, and equip 3,000 light horse, three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier-general, and to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American armies; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the Continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and return to the States of which they are citizens, their names, and the nature of their offenses, together with the witnesses to prove them; and, That the foregoing powers be vested in General Washington, for and during the term of six months from the date hereof, unless sooner determined by Congress."

In acknowledging the resolves of Congress Washington assured that body that all his faculties should be employed to direct properly the powers they had been pleased to vest him with, to advance those objects, and those only, which had given rise to so honorable a mark of distinction. "If my exertions," he said, "should not be attended with the desired success, I trust the failure will be imputed to the true cause the peculiarly distressed situation of our affairs, and the difficulties I have to combat — rather than to a want of zeal for my country, and the closest attention to her interests, to promote which has ever been my study."

The powers conferred by the resolve of Congress were

truly dictatorial.. But never before, nor since, did dictator use such powers with such wisdom, moderation, and forbearance. Before this act had received the sanction of Congress, however, events had taken place which gave new life and energy to the friends of liberty.

When Washington (says Gordon) retreated with a handful of men across the Delaware he trembled for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved.* Though they missed the boats, with which they expected to follow him immediately into Pennsylvania, yet Trenton and the neighborhood could have supplied them with materials which industry might have soon constructed into sufficient conveniences for the transportation of the troops over a smooth river, and of no great extent in some places. But they were put into cantonments for the present, forming an extensive chain from Brunswick to the Delaware, and down the banks of the Delaware for several miles, so as to compose a front at the end of the line which looked over to Philadelphia.† Mr. Mersereau was employed by the American general to gain intelligence and provided a simple youth, whose apparent defectiveness in abilities prevented all suspicion, but whose fidelity and attention, with the capacities he possessed, constituted. him an excellent spy; he passed from place to place, mixed *The General's words in his own letter.

+ Marshall, speaking of the importance to Washington of obtaining secret intelligence of the plans of Cornwallis, states that at that critical moment, Mr. Robert Morris raised on his private credit, in Philadelphia, £500 in specie, which he transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, who employed it in procuring information not otherwise to have been obtained.- "Life of Washington," vol. I, p. 130.

After having been employed some time in similar services, the enemy grew suspicious of him, and upon that, without proof, put him into prison, where he was starved to death.

with the soldiers, and, having performed his business, returned with an account where they were cantoned, and in what numbers. General Fermoy was appointed to receive and communicate the information to the Commanderin Chief; upon the receipt of it he cried out: "Now is our time to clip their wings while they are so spread." But before an attempt could be made with a desirable prospect of success Washington was almost ready to despair while he contemplated the probable state of his own troops within the compass of ten days. He could not count upon those whose time expired the 1st of January, and expected that as soon as the ice was formed the enemy would pass the Delaware. He found his numbers on inquiry less than he had any conception of, and while he communicated the fact, thus charged his confidant, Colonel Reed: For heaven's sake keep this to yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us."

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Colonel Reed wrote the next day from Bristol, December 21 (1776), and proposed to the General the making of a diversion, or something more, at or about Trenton, and proceeded to say: "If we could possess ourselves again. of New Jersey, or any considerable part, the effect would be greater than if we had not left it. Allow me to hope that you will consult your own good judgment and spirit, and let not the goodness of your heart subject you to the influence of the opinions of men in every respect your inferiors. Something must be attempted before the sixty days expire which the commissioners have allowed for however many affect to despise it, it is evident a very serious attention is paid to it; and I am confident, that unless some more favorable appearance attends our arms and cause before that time, a very great number of the militia officers here will follow the example of Jersey, and