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must be met, and an appropriation made to a contingency reserve fund to cover occasional losses incurred from the circumstance that the companies usually become surety, by indorsement, for the final payment of all the loans which they have placed with lenders. These deductions determine what may be safely paid to eastern purchasers of the paper, usually 5 or 6 per cent.

Holders of cattle paper have never suffered in times of financial panic from failure to pay at maturity. Cattle, like grain, are a cash commodity purchased by retailers and sold by them, largely for cash, to satisfy a relatively constant consuming demand. This characteristic is retained even in time of panic.

Maturities are usually six months for feeding purposes; and less often of two and one-half years for developing twoyear-olds for market. This two and one-half year paper is occasionally converted into the six-month variety by the sale of notes running for six months, based upon the two-and-onehalf year mortgage. These notes are taken up at maturity by the loan company and reissued or renewed for like succeeding periods until the original loan is repaid.

In the past this form of loan has not been so desirable as it will be in the near future. It has been a relatively long-term investment; and while perfectly liquid at maturity and enjoying a good rate of return, it has not possessed a sufficiently wide market to insure salability at those times when the demands of depositors and local customers for accommodation press in upon the investing bank. This difficulty will be fully corrected by the expected operations of the Federal Reserve Act. Eastern bankers possessing these six-month notes will probably find them readily rediscountable with the local federal reserve bank at any time up to maturity. And a considerable amount of two-and-one-half year notes may be held to advantage, since, if properly selected with successive maturities, one-fifth of their total amount will be immediately rediscountable when necessary.

By rendering this form of agricultural paper liquid before maturity the Federal Reserve Act will have become a most important influence for enlarging the amount of capital de

voted to this branch of industry. Already eastern bankers have scouts touring the Western States to study this form of banking with a view to investing several millions of dollars each. Interest rates upon these loans will unquestionably be reduced in time through such increased competition of lenders. The loan companies will hardly suffer, however. While charging the cattle-grower less, they will be enjoying a larger turnover and should welcome this new development. The four or five million dollars placed in such loans yearly by the average loan company, as at present constituted, is but a fraction of the loans that may be placed by them within a few years.

By reducing the interest cost charged to cattle-growers an important service will have been performed for the consumer. Such a reduction will increase, in the first instance, the cattleman's profit and induce him to increase his holdings. The benefit of increased production at lowered expense should, in time, be passed on to the final consumer of beef.

This phase of the operations of the Federal Reserve Act will be of distinct benefit, and possibly also the least dangerous of all forms of legislation designed to assist American agriculture.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF

MONEY AND CREDIT

HAVE WE A MONEY TRUST?

1 IF by a "money trust" is meant

An established and well-defined identity and community of interest between a few leaders of finance which has been created and is held together through stock holdings, interlocking directorates, and other forms of domination over banks, trust companies, railroads, public-service and industrial corporations, and which has resulted in a vast and growing concentration of control of money and credit in the hands of a comparatively few men —

your committee has no hesitation in asserting as the result of its investigation that this condition, largely developed within the past five years, exists in this country to-day.

The parties to this combination or understanding or community of interest, by whatever name it may be called, may be conveniently classified, for the purpose of differentiation, into four separate groups.

First. The first, which for convenience of statement we will call the inner group, consists of J. P. Morgan & Co., the recognised leaders, and George F. Baker and James Stillman in their individual capacities and in their joint administration and control of the First National Bank, the National City Bank, the National Bank of Commerce, the Chase National Bank, the Guaranty Trust Co., and the Bankers Trust Co., with total known resources, in these corporations alone, in excess of $1,300,000,000, and of a number of smaller but important financial institutions. This takes no account of the personal fortunes of these gentlemen.

1 Adapted from the Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, 62d Congress, 3d Session, pp. 130-33.

Second. Closely allied with this inner or primary group. and indeed related to them practically as partners in many of their larger financial enterprises, are the powerful international banking houses of Lee, Higginson & Co. and Kidder, Peabody & Co., with three affiliated banks in Boston-the National Shawmut Bank, the First National Bank, and the Old Colony Trust Co. — having at least more than half of the total resources of all the Boston banks; also with interests and representation in other important New England financial institutions.

Third. In New York City the international banking house of Messrs. Kuhn, Loeb & Co., with its large foreign clientele and connections, whilst only qualifiedly allied with the inner group, and only in isolated transactions, yet through its close relations with the National City Bank and the National Bank of Commerce and other financial institutions with which it has recently allied itself has many interests in common, conducting large joint-account transactions with them, especially in recent years, and having what virtually amounts to an understanding not to compete, which is defended as a principle of "banking ethics." Together they have with a few exceptions pre-empted the banking business of the important railways of the country.

Fourth. In Chicago this inner group associates with and makes issues of securities in joint account or through underwriting participations primarily with the First National Bank and the Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, and has more or less friendly business relations with the Continental & Commercial National Bank, which participates at times in the underwriting of security issues by the inner group. These are the three largest financial institutions in Chicago, with combined resources (including the two affiliated and controlled state institutions of the two national banks) of $561,000,000.

Radiating from these principal groups and closely affiliated with them are smaller but important banking houses, such as Kissel Kinnicut & Co., White, Weld & Co., and Harvey Fisk & Sons, who receive large and lucrative patronage from the dominating groups and are used by the latter as jobbers or distributors of securities the issuing of which they control, but which for reasons of their own they prefer not to have issued

or distributed under their own names. Messrs. Lee, Higginson & Co., besides being partners with the inner group, are also frequently utilised in this service because of their facilities as distributors of securities.

Beyond these inner groups and subgroups are banks and bankers throughout the country who co-operate with them in underwriting or guaranteeing the sale of securities offered to the public and who also act as distributors of such securities. It was impossible to learn the identity of these corporations, owing to the unwillingness of the members of the inner group to disclose the names of their underwriters, but sufficient appears to justify the statement that there are at least hundreds of them and that they extend into many of the cities throughout this and foreign countries.

The patronage thus proceeding from the inner group and its subgroups is of great value to these banks and bankers, who are thus tied by self-interest to the great issuing houses and may be regarded as a part of this vast financial organisation. Such patronage yields no inconsiderable part of the income of these banks and bankers and without much risk on account of the facilities of the principal groups for placing issues of securities through their domination of great banks and trust companies and their other domestic affiliations and their foreign connections. The underwriting commissions on issues made by this inner group are usually easily earned and do not ordinarily involve the underwriters in the purchase of the underwritten securities. Their interest in the transaction is generally adjusted, unless they choose to purchase part of the securities, by the payment to them of a commission. There are, however, occasions on which this is not the case. The underwriters are then required to take the securities. Bankers and brokers are so anxious to be permitted to participate in these transactions under the lead of the inner group that as a rule they join when invited to do so, regardless of their approval of the particular business, lest by refusing they should thereafter cease to be invited.

It can hardly be expected that the banks, trust companies. and other institutions that are thus seeking participations from this inner group would be likely to engage in business of a

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