respect to measures with which it is wholly sian minister, that this government is ing to the emperor, the king's congratula- | either as an inducement or a threat, with tions on an event so glorious to the Russian arms, and so advantageous to the cause in which the two sovereigns are engaged. It is painful to me to pass from this to a less pleasing topic; but I am under the necessity of expressing to your excellency the increased disappointment and regret which his majesty has experienced in learn-proaching; and you may assure the Rusing that so many unforeseen objections are still urged against the renewal of the commercial treaty. The proposed extension of this treaty for two years, upon the conditions annexed to this proposal, is by no means satisfactory; nor does there seem to be any good reason for not coming to a definitive arrangement, which his majesty is willing to conclude without any alteration in the terms of the present treaty. Had any new proposal been made on the part of his majesty, there might have been some pretence for delay; but in a case where the interests of the two countries are so well understood, and in which experience has proved the advantage to both, of the treaty which is now about to expire, his majesty feels himself entitled, upon all the grounds of mutual interest and friendship, to renew his instances with his august ally, for an immediate compliance with so equi- No. 23.-Dispatch from visc. Howick to table a proposal. Though your excellency Alex. Straton, esq. his majesty's envoy will urge this in the strongest terms, you extraordinary and minister plenipotenwill however consent to the offered exten- tiary at the court of Sweden, dated sion for two years, it being understood Downing Street, March 10th, 1807. that the advantages at present enjoyed by Sir; Your dispatches have been received ́ the British commerce are to suffer no dimi- and laid before the king.-Though the nution, rather than allow the treaty to ex-king of Sweden does not appear to have pire. I cannot, however, dismiss this sub-renewed with you the question of an adject without some remark upon the man- ditional subsidy, that subject has beeu ner in which this concession, as it is termed, pressed upon nie in repeated conversations on the part of Russia, is made to depend by M. Rehausen.-From the communicaupon an immediate assurance of a power- tion which that minister has made to me ful military diversion being made by this of the instructions he has received from his country. The insinuation conveyed in this court, a good deal of dissatisfaction appears part of the baron de Budberg's note, is so to be felt there at our supposed backwardlittle justified by the former conduct of ness in assisting the exertions which the this government, that it cannot be passed king of Sweden is willing to make.--There over without notice. It is unnecessary to certainly is no ground for such an imputastate the obvious tendency of such language tion. In the instructions of your predeto produce mutual discontent, and excite cessor you will find that he was uniformly adverse pretensions, destructive of the har- directed to state the importance which his mony and confidence which ought to pre- majesty attached to the undertaking of ofvail between the two governments. In re- fensive operations on the side of Pomerania, newing your representations, therefore,upon and that he was even authorized to give as the necessity of a speedy conclusion of this surances of pecuniary assistance from the treaty, which your excellency will remark moment the Swedish troops should have is no less advantageous to Russia than to passed their own frontier: But it was addEngland, you will protest against any ated, that before any thing could be conclutempt to make use of it in this manner, sively arranged, it was necessary that his thousand men.-From M. de Rehausen's statements to me, it appears that the chief deficiency of the Swedish army is in cavalry. This is certainly the description of force which his majesty could best spare from his own army. If a brigade of dragoons would enable his Swedish majesty to bring into the field a force of the amount above stated, you may state that this proportion of cavalry might probably be furnished from hence.-With regard to the last point, viz. that of subsidy, you will state that his majesty will be disposed to contribute to the support of the proposed operation, by a subsidy regulated according to the proportion of that which was given to Austria in 1805; but that this proportion cannot be exceeded, except as to a sum usually furnished as a " première mise en campagne," which, as soon as the measures in contemplation shall be conclusively agreed upon, may be advanced to the amount of two, or at most three, months subsidy.Having communicated these proposals to the king of Sweden, you will request his majesty to authorise his ministers to enter upon the immediate discussion of them; and to prevent the loss of time, you will suggest the expediency of sending to this country some confidential military officer, fully instructed upon all the points above-mentioned, who might assist Mr. de Rehausen in giving the necessary explanations, and in bringing this business to a prompt termination. I know it is unnecessary for me to recommend to you the utmost diligence in the execution of these instructions, and in obtaining and transmitting to me the most accurate information respecting the present state and disposition of the Swedish government, and the condition and numHOWICK. Swedish majesty should communicate generally to this government his plan of operations, and more particularly the amount of force which it might be in his power to employ.-M. de Rehausen has urged the impossibility of stating in detail all the measures which it may be necessary to arrange with a view to a future campaign. No such thing however was required. The information asked for, was only what was necessary to enable his majesty to judge of the general expediency of the measures proposed, with respect to which it is evident that no satisfactory opinion could be formed without a knowledge of the force destined to execute them, and of the time when it would be ready to act. Even further details, when they cou'd be conveniently communicated, his majesty, considering how largely he is expected to contribute his support, would have a right to expect; and such communication would be obviously necessary to enable his majesty to direct any efforts, which on his side he might have an opportunity of making, to the advancement of the common objects of the two powers.-In order to come to a right understanding upon this point, you will, with as little delay as possible after the receipt of this dispatch, request an audience of his Swedish majesty. You will state the sincere pleasure with which his majesty has seen the king of Sweden's steady resistance to the common enemy. You will repeat the opinion already expressed on the part of this government, that a diversion by a Swedish force on the side of Pomerania, would be at the present moment of the utmost importance, and with a view to bringing the discussion to a point, you will request particular information on the three follow-bers of its army. ing heads-1. What is the amount of force which the king of Sweden could employ, exclusive of the garrison of Stralsund? In addition to which information, it is desirable to know, where it is now stationed, and how soon it could be ready to I have been repeatedly pressed by the act? 2. Whether any, and what addition of Prussian government, with whom the RusBritish troops would be required? 3. What sians have also co-operated, to write to amount of subsidy the king of Sweden your lordship on the subject of a diversion would demand in proportion to the num- to be made by the British troops, which ber of troops employed?-Should the might occupy the French essentially, and Swedish government be willing to enter in- force them to withdraw a part of their to this discussion, you will state upon the troops from this quarter. M. de Zastrow two first points, that it does not appear to made me yesterday a formal proposition. his majesty that any effectual operation-Marshal Mortier now blockades Stralcould be undertaken without a force sund with about twenty thousand men; it amounting at the very least to twenty-five is therefore proposed that the British and No. 24.-Extract of a Dispatch from lord Hutchinson addressed to visc. Howick, dated Memel, March 9th, 1807.--Received April 18th, by Mr. Secretary Canning. Swedish troops should in conjunction force | them to raise that blockade, and moving on the left bank of the Oder, threaten the communications in the rear of the French army. They might besiege Stettin which is a large place with a small garrison, and in a bad state of defence; were it taken, the communication with Berlin, the Elbe, and the rest of Germany would be at once open. If the French remain in Poland, a considerable force acting in this manner on their rear would create the most serious embarrassments, and probably force them to evacuate Poland, or at least oblige them to detach such a number of troops as would soon leave them inferior to the allies. Should even the French occupy the line of the Oder, this diversion would be of the greatest importance, as the Russians would in that case probably march with the greater part of their army into Silesia.-This proposed operation would be attended with little danger, as the British Army would always have a retreat upon Stralsund open to them, and from thence into the Island of Rugen, from whence they might be re-embarked. Stralsund in summer, is, I believe, a very strong place. -I have informed Monsieur de Zastrow that I would undoubtedly make the proposition; that I was convinced the British government meant to make a strong diversion in favour of the allies, and was empowered to give them the strongest assurances on that subject; but that I could not exactly pledge myself as to the quarter in which it would be made. The one now proposed appeared to me to be highly advantageous, and only attended with the ordinary risques of war, as in every event the retreat of the troops employed in that service would not be an hazardous one.Your lordship will probably receive a communication on this subject from baron Jacobi; lord Douglas has also, I understand, written to you on the subject from Petersburgh. No. 25.-Extract of a Dispatch from the marq. of Douglas, dated Saint Peters burgh, March 19th, 1807, addressed to visc. Howick.-Received by Mr. Secretary Canning, April There is reason to suppose that it has been forcibly put to the emperor by some people here, little partial to England, that Russia is abandoned by her friends; that the whole contest is left to her, and that that even her intimate ally, G. Britain, neglects to support her at a crisis when any reverse of fortune might endanger the empire itself. It is the more painful to me that such insinuations should appear, for a moment, to be justified by fact, because I know how little they are deserved, and how different they are from those feelings that both actuate the government and the country at large. It is for his majesty's government to decide what are the objects of their present policy, and what are the means most likely to secure those objects: but I should neglect my duty if I did not observe, that should no effort be made this spring by the British troops, it is more than probable that the above observations will recur in full vigour to his imperial majesty's mind; if so, I need not point out what will be the probable result. England, I am aware may secure herself; but I am convinced that his majesty's government feels to much for the honour of the country, and the future happiness of Europe, to compromise for partial views a prospect of general and permanent welfare. No. 20. Extract of a Dispatch from the marquis of Douglas, dated Saint Petersburgh 22nd March (3rd April,) 1807, addressed to viscount Howick.-Received by Mr. Sec. Canning, May 13th. The activity of England I have frequently expatiated upon; but I must not conceal from your lordship that this court, alive to the embarrassments that surround her, is determined, in spite of every argument, to consider no act as directed towards their particular support, that does not, by occupying a part of the French forces, relieve her from their concentrated attacks. No. 27. Extract of a Dispatch from the marquis of Douglas, dated Saint Petersburgh, April 27th, -1807; addressed to visc. Howick.-Received by Mr. Sec. Canning, June 1st. I am thoroughly convinced of the sincere and honourable intentions of the emperor; and yet as it is impossible that I should be deaf to the murmurs that surround me, to the expectations of thousands, to the intrigues of a few, all more or less beginning to seek the same object; so I cannot without some jealousy look to the possible consequences. Should any diversion however take place on the part of G. Britain, or assisted by her troops, there is a great probability that in that case the emperor, from a point of honour, would consider himself bound to act with all possible energy. Council. He could not conceive, that there could be any danger in laying the substance of the information received by ministers upon the table. table of the house. HOUSE OF LORDS. Thursday, February 18. ORDERS IN COUNCIL.] Lord Grenville alluding to the expressions contained in the Orders in Council, which stated The Duke of Montrose opposed the moamongst the reasons for issuing them, that tion, and observed, that it would prevent the French Decree had been executed persons from giving information to gowith increased rigour, said, that it was vernment, if an example was given of important the house should be in posses-laying information so obtained upon the sion of the information on which this assertion was founded, particularly as a contrary statement was contained in the Note of the American plenipotentiaries, which was on the table, and as a contrary inference was to be deduced from those circumstances which were publicly known. He did not wish that any secret should be revealed, which it would be dangerous to disclose; but, merely that the substance of such information should be laid on the table, and which might be disclosed without any danger. He therefore moved for Copies or Extracts of all information received by government, previous to the 11th of Nov. 1807, shewing that the French government had begun to execute its Decree with increased rigour. · Lord Hawkesbury said, it must be obvious, that it was scarcely possible there could be any information upon this subject received from any accredited person, or in any official shape. The information received by ministers, had satisfied them with respect to the increased rigour exer-cised by the French government; but it might be attended with serious inconveni-ence and danger to many persons, if information received through the medium of commercial houses, or various other sources, was to be laid on the table of -that, house. It was besides, he contended, a matter of notoriety from the answers of M. Regnier, which were mentioned in all the newspapers two or three days after the 18th day of Oct. that the French -Decree was then executed with increased Tigour. Earl Grey was surprised to hear the noble secretary of state contend, that it must be obvious it was scarcely possible to have any accredited information upon this subject. He, on the contrary, thought, that it was precisely that subject on which if there was any neutral minister remaining, or any British minister at a neutral court, it was likely to receive information from accredited persons. He had never understood, that the increased rigour of the French government was a matter of notoriety previous to issuing the Orders in VOL. X. Lord Erskine contended, that the objection of danger did not apply in this case, all that was desired being the date and substance of the information received. The term, increased rigour, implied that there had been not only a rigour, but afterwards an additional rigour, and he thought the house ought to be in possession of the substance of the information which had authorised the use of this term. The Lord Chancellor contended, that communicating the date and substance, would in many instances as'effectually betray the source from which such information was derived, as if the names of the parties had been given, and might be productive of great danger to individuals, and prevent government from' in future receiving important information.—The house then divided Contents... 27 Proxies 20-47 Gloucester, Norfolk, Jersey, Ellenborough, Somerset, Selkirk. Bulkeley, Spencer, Lucan, Ossory, Cowper, Carnarvon, St. Vincent, Shaftesbury, Blandford, Guilford, Buckinghamshire, Cholmondeley, Grey, Stawell, Derby, Southampton, Foley. RESTITUTION OF THE DANISH FLEET.] Lord Sidmouth desired that the clerk should read the proclamation issued by two noble lords prior to the attack upon 2 T Copenhagen, and his majesty's Declara- | be argued, that that prince refused to ration. Both documents having been read tify the capitulation, and that by so doing accordingly, the noble lord said, that he he had precluded himself from any advanrose to submit to their lordships the mo- tages derivable from the proclamation of tion of which he had already given notice. our commanders, or the summons previous The purport of that motion referred to the to the commencement of the bombardeventual restoration of the vessels cap- mént. It was certainly true, that that tured at Copenhagen to Denmark; he high-minded personage had refused to would say, the eventual restoration, for it ratify the capitulation; but did it appear was possible that circumstances might arise that he acted in any manner to impede it? which would render such an arrangement We were, he would contend, bound to act impracticable. It was not impossible but upon that principle upon which we had that Denmark might fall as much under set out, namely, that of taking the Danish the power of France as any of the conti- navy in deposit. To this we were no less nental states, in which case no one would bound by honour and policy than by the think of advising the restoration of the strictest interpretation of the law of naDanish navy; for to restore it to Denmark tions. He would, with the permission of would be to place it at the disposal of their lordships, read to them an extract France. In the proposition which he had from the ablest writer on that important to make, it was far from his intention to subject, and which, though an extract, had interfere with that incontrovertible prero- nothing he could assure them in it which gative of his majesty which placed at his was not warranted by the context. His disposal all captures; neither was it his lordship here read several passages from intention to contravene any expressed opi- Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, tending to nion of that house. Their lordships, by support his argument. The conduct of their vote on the first day of the session, the court of Denmark, he contended, could had recognized the justice of the measure not be considered as hostile. The war which placed the navy of Denmark in the began from us. We left the Crown possession of this country, and they had Prince no alternative but that of war. sanctioned and corroborated that decision There was another reason which made by their subsequent vote, that no further him anxious that their lordships should papers were necessary. He was not, he adopt his motion at present. He had would repeat, disposed to contravene these learned, that the Danish ships were ordered determinations. He was only acting on to be fitted out for the service of this counthe principles of his majesty's Declara- try. He was anxious to prevent so precition; on the principles of the Proclama- pitate and impolitic a measure. The ships, tion issued by the two noble lords who by what he had heard, were quite unquacommanded the expedition against Copen-lified, or at least not qualified in the manhagen; and on the principles upon which ministers justified that expedition, when he endeavoured to persuade their lordships, that the honour, the character, and the interests of this country were involved in the eventual restoration of the Danish navy. Necessity and self-protection were the grounds upon which the seizure of the fleet of Denmark was justified. The rejection of an inadmissible offer was assigned as the reason for destroying the capital of a neutral state. We offered to take the fleet in deposit-an arrangement to which the court of Denmark could not possibly listen, without compromising its honour, and exposing itself to the resentment of France. To this principle, he conceived, we were in honour bound to adhere. The offer of restoring the Danish navy upon the re-establishment of peace, was even made a fortnight after the declaration of war by the Crown Prince. But it might ner our ships were, for the wear and tear of our service. To render them so, would require an expence which could be applied, with far greater advantage, to the various ships now constructing, or under repair in our own dock-yards. But even if the Danish ships were in a state fit to proceed upon any service, he would still protest against their being employed. There was but one circumstance, the destruction of a great part of the navy of England, which would induce him to consent to our making any use of the Danish navy, with our present maritime superiority. We did not want ships. We had enough to contend with the united navies of the world. He could not perceive, therefore, the policy of fitting out this new accession to our maritime strength; but he could anticipate some probable advantages from following another course: he could devise no system of policy more likely to conci |