tion ever since. From that great princi- | The Earl of Aberdeen defended the expedition to Copenhagen; and maintained, that self-protection was a leading principle of the law of nations. There wanted no greater proof of the inability of the Danish government to resist the power of France, and the determination of the latter power to compel it to join in hostility against this country, than their joining the Northern confederacy, in 1801, and alleging as a reason for it, their inability to resist the power of Russia. It was in vain, therefore, to urge, that Denmark might have resisted the power of France, and thus draw an inference against the expedition, as it was evident she could not; added to which, she had repeatedly evinced hostility against this country. Much had been said against the extraordinary and unprecedented nature of this expedition; but there was a precedent of a very recent date, in the conduct of the late administration, with respect to Turkey; and he did not conceive it more probable that the Turkish fleet should sail into the English channel than the Danish. Lord Grenville rose and spoke as follows:-There are so many points, my lords, in the speech which has been this day delivered to the house, that appear to me necessary to be adverted to, that I should do injustice to my feelings if I did not endeavour to state them to your lordships. No noble lord could come into this house with a more anxious wish and expectation, with a more sincere desire than I did this night, that at a period like the present, every petty contest and private difference should be sacrificed to the greater object of unanimity, in an address to the throne. At a period which, as the speech expresses it, may be called the crisis of our fate; when it becomes now a question, whether the British empire, the growth of so many ages; whether the British constitution, which has for so long a period promoted and extended the interests and happiness of the empire, whether these shall now be overthrown and crumbled into ruins. such a period, I was led anxiously to expect, it was my most earnest wish and desire, that every petty triumph, that every little feeling, would have been given up. and merged in the great cause of the country; that the house would not have been called upon to pledge itself upon disputed points, or to approve of measures without any evidence of their necessity or utility. It was to have been expected, particularly from those who were the friends of our illustrious statesman, now no more (Mr. Pitt), whose name can never be mentioned without that tribute which is due to his great and exalted merits, that they would have followed his example, in abstaining from those points which so immediately At tend to prevent that unanimity so desirable at the present crisis. From the commencement of the war in the year 1793, down to the termination of the administration of that illustrious statesman, in no speech delivered to parliament at the commencement of a session were parliament called upon to pledge themselves in support of measures, without evidence before them of the propriety or utility of such measures; in no case were they called upon to approve of measures, before the papers relating to them were produced, whereon a judgment might be formed, according to the evidence of the case. Yet, in this instance have ministers, departing from so salutary a rule, and in violation of every principle that ought to actuate their conduct upon such an occasion, not only called upon parliament to approve of measures which nothing but absolute necessity could justify, and respecting the necessity of which not a tittle of evidence is produced, but have even called upon parliament to applaud other measures now, respecting which papers are hereafter to be produced, upon which alone the propriety of such measures can be justified. Thus have they called upon this house to approve of the expedition to Copenhagen, although not the slightest evidence is before your lordships, to enable you to judge of its necessity, and to congratulate his majesty on the refusal of the Russian mediation, respecting which the documents, proving the grounds of that refusal, and upon which alone we can form our judgment, are promised to be laid before the house. Even were we to give our approbation of the former measure without any evidence before us, it would be no sanction; it would be no testimony of its necessity, or its policy; for even a righteous judgment would be an unrighteous one, if given without evidence; nor can I conceive any thing more incongruous, than to call upon your lordships already to approve of a measure, before the documents respecting it, which are promised, are laid before the house. With respect to Denmark, my lords, I have hitherto refrained, as was my duty, from expressing an opinion; I have refrained from even forming an opinion, willing to believe that there were circumstances which justified the expedition to Copenhagen, and anxiously expecting, that at the meeting of parliament, evidence respecting those circumstances would be laid before your lordships' house; or, at least, that some information would be proVOL. X. duced, enabling your lordships to judge of the necessity of that measure. It is truly said, my lords, in the speech, that the eyes of Europe and of the world are fixed upon the British parliament. There is on the continent of Europe a great reliance in the integrity and in the justice of the British parliament; they look with anxiety for its decision upon the motives and the policy of that expedition. It has already made an impression throughout the continent unfavourable to this country. How much greater will that impression be, if parliainent gives its decision, approving of that expedition; and still more, if it does so, without any evidence or information upon the subject. What must then be the opinion on the continent of Europe, when they find the British parliament not only approving of such an expedition, but giving their approbation without an iota of evidence before them, without the slightest information that could tend to establish its justification? When I first heard of the expedition, I conceived that there might exist circumstances to justify it, although none but those of the most urgent nature could. I received, at a considerable distance from town, his majesty's Declaration respecting that expedition, and found that secret articles were stated to exist in the Treaty of Tilsit, which proved the determination to form a hostile confederacy against this country, of which Denmark was to form a part. Then came the Declaration respecting Russia, in which we were told not of secret articles, but of arrangements made at Tilsit; and now the speech, which we have this day heard, says not one word about either. When the grounds upon which the expedition to Copenhagen is justified, are thus shifted, isit not of the utmost importance, that we should have some information as to the real state of the case? We find ministers making a strong assertion in the outset ; that assertion is afterwards weakened, and now, is not at all mentioned in the speech this day; namely, respecting the secret articles or arrangements at Tilsit, which formed the ground-work of the justification of the Copenhagen expedition, and yet no information upon the subject is laid before the house. Ministers have asserted, that there were secret articles in the Treaty of Tilsit, affecting the interests of this country, and the French government have asserted that there were none. Here, then, was a challenge; and it was incumbent upon ministers to prove their former assertion; C tended, that acts, long since buried in oblivion, are now to be raised up again to prove the hostility of Denmark? Is it because she was hostile in 1801, that she must be hostile in 1807? But, it is said, that Denmark was not disposed to resist the demands of France, and yet it was owing to her sending her troops into Holstein to resist the encroachments of France, that our expedition conquered Zealand, and seized the Danish fleet. It is said, however, that, had Denmark been disposed to resist France, she was unable; and an inference of this nature has been drawn from an allegation, stated to have been Lut this they have not attempted to do, and have given up the assertion in the speech. I am well aware, that there might be circumstances which would imperatively justify an expedition like that to Copenhagen: it is laid down by the most approved writers on the law of nations, that where you have certain evidence of the intention of an enemy to seize upon a Leutral territory, neutral vessels, or property, such neutral being incapable of resisting, and thereby to place you in imminent danger, you have a right to seize such neutral territory, vessels, or property, in order to insure your own safety. The same writers, however, state the dreadful conse-made by that power in 1801, that she quences which would result from the application of such a doctrine, unless the imperative circumstances are clearly proved and accurately defined; the danger ought to be clearly established, and the incapability of the neutral to defend itself. We are told in the speech, that his majesty had information that France intended to collect a large force to bear against this country. My lords, can any one of us doubt this, or that this country would be equally desirous to bring a large force to bear against France? But how does this bear upon the point? Even if Denmark had become a party to a treaty against this country, could that be a justification for seizing her fleet or her territories? We know how France has acted upon this principle on the case of Naples which became a party to the coalition against France, which I fear is lost to its sovereign for ever; and in the case of Hesse, where there was only a suspicion that the sovereign was favourable to the cause of the coalition against France. it is said, however, that the hostility of Denmark is clearly proved; and in what manner? because her fleet was in a state of preparation, and because she had, at different times, evinced a hostile feeling towards this country. With respect to her fleet, was it not natural, when all the powers around her were at war, that she hould be in a state of preparation? But, my lords, if I am not grossly misinformed, So far from that being the case, the greater part of the Danish ships were laid up in ordinary. Upon this part of the subject, however, I trust that parliament will call for information, as in this respect information may be easily obtained, and may ertainly be imparted without the slightest danger. As to the acts evincing the hostile feeling of Denmark, is it to be con joined the coalition against this country, 21] [22 PARL. DEBATES, JAN. 21, 1808.-The Lords Commissioners' Speech. enemy, I can day to parliament; a conduct highly reprehensible, and deserving the severest reprobation. It has been argued, how-ward with great anxiety to the future.--ever, by the noble earl who spoke last, that the expedition to Copenhagen had a precedent in the expedition to Constantinople. If it is meant to be contended, that the expedition to Constantinople was an instance of bad faith, how is that to justify another instance of bad faith? If the late ministers were wrong in advising the expedition to Turkey, let them be condemned; but do not let them have the mortification of having it quoted as a justification of an act of bad faith. The facts, however, are, that the expedition to Turkey was chiefly in conformity with the treaty with Russia, and that its object was, not to seize the Turkish fleet, but to compel the execution of treaties.-With respect to the other points of the speech, I cannot help lamenting, that, on the subject of peace, it should be so worded as to tend to induce a belief that peace would be rejected. Upon this subject the noble viscount (Sidmouth) has nearly anticipated all the arguments which I meant to urge. When we contemplate the crisis in which we are placed, and the information derived from the speech, by which we learn, that in addition to the hostility of France, Spain, Holland and Italy, which we knew before, Russia, Austria and Denmark are also hostile, and Portugal lost, we surely may be excused for considering, whether any means exist of obtaining a just and honourable I agree perfectly in the praise peace. given by the noble viscount to the noble lord (Milton), who, in spite of clamour and delusion, manfully declared sentiments which evinced a just and magnanimous, as well as a judicious and correct mind. would be the last man to call in question the right of the people to petition, but I do not think that peace is to be obtained Petitions of by petitioning the throne. such a nature are injurious, not because they impart to Bonaparte any new fact with respect to the situation of the country; but, because they tend to convey to the enemy an exaggerated representation of that situation, which rather tends to retard than accelerate peace. Anxiety must, however, naturally be produced, when in addition to the enemies already enumerated, when nearly the whole coast of the continent is a hostile shore, we find that there is a probability of a war with Such an the United States of America. unexampled crisis calls for the exertion of With regard to the two propositions asserted by ministers; first, that we should not enter into a negotiation, unless the basis of that negotiation be previously stated; and, secondly, that we should not avail ourselves of the mediation of any power, not perfectly impartial, or suspected of partiality to the not conceive any thing more preposterous. The second proposition is peculiarly untenable, because we do not accept a mediator as an umpire, but merely as a medium for facilitating our communications with the enemy. If the mediator be partial to the enemy, what injury can result to us? we are not bound by his sentiments; and we may avail ourselves of his interposiSuch, pretion, by rejecting which we may provoke him to declare against us. cisely, has been the case with respect to Russia. That there might be reasons for rejecting the mediation of Russia, and that we had the right to make that rejection, if adequate reasons existed, I do not mean to deny. But let us not promulgate new doctrines, which are equally irreconcileable with practice and principle. Now, as to the first proposition, I contend, that in the whole history of this country, or of the negotiations of other civilized nations, no precedents can be found to sustain `it. If ministers can produce me one instance in which the statement of a basis has been insisted upon, as a preliminary to negociation, I pledge myself to produce ten instances of a contrary practice; and, as to the precedent of the last negociation, I should draw from it quite a different conIclusion from that which ministers seem disposed to press; for I think it must be manifest, that the case of that negociation proves how unimportant it is to the object of a negociation to obtain the previous statement of a basis. In fact, such a thing is a matter of no consequence, and ought not to be insisted upon.-As to that topic of the speech which relates to Portugal, it appears to me, that ministers have appreciated the subject very erroneously indeed. The simple questions are, what have we lost, and what have we gained by the emigration of the court to the Brazils? We have lost, as a publication of the enemy recently stated, two of the most important ports for us on the whole coast of the continent of Europe (Lisbon and Oporto). And what have we gained? sir George Staunton c 2 states, that when he was at Rio de Janeifo, the shops were glutted with English goods. What then are we to obtain in addition by the presence of the prince of Brazils in that settlement? How, I would ask ministers, are the Brazils to be made more productive for this country, than they have been, by any other means than those which would tend to the consummate ruin of our own colonies? I do not mean to revive the question of the Slave Trade with this or any other topic. But, I contend, that the increased culture of the Brazils, far from being of service, would be injurious to you; and I cannot conceive how the emigration of the court of Portugal to that territory, can extend the market for your goods, which it had already afforded you. Indeed, I am rather of opinion, with a late demi-official declaiation of the enemy, that the transfer of the Portuguese government to the Brazils will turn out more advantageous for France, than for this country. In so far as this emigration shews any friendship for us, or as it presents a contrast to the conduct of other powers, it certainly forms a grateful subject for the contemplation of mankind. But, as to the commercial or political advantages to be derived from it to this country, I cannot consent to delude my countrymen by holding out such an idea. In all that I have said, my lords, I have carefully abstained from any personal reference to the conduct of those by whom his majesty's government is at present directed. My object is to consider their measures, and by those measures to appreciate their merits. I must, however, take notice of some at least apparent contradictions in the language and conduct of the noble lords on the other side. In reviewing the dreadful catalogue of evils which menace this country, I do believe that I speak the universal sentiment when I say, that the greatest additional calamity for us, and the greatest advantage for France that can well be imagined, would be a war with America. Such, indeed, is the language of ministers themselves; and yet what has been their conduct? Why, at the very time when it is most material to avoid such a war, they, as I am ready to maintain, absolutely alter the law of the land to promote it. Ministers state, and in that I agree with them, that no difficulty or danger can befal the country equal to that of acquiescing in the surrender of our maritime rights. If America were to put forth such a claim, then a call upon parliament and the country to resist it would be unanimously answered in the affirmative. But America has not asserted any such claim. It has, indeed, been stated that she has, and we have been told by some noble lords on the other side, that too much concession has been already made to that power. What do noble lords mean by concession? I wish when such assertions are made, those who make them would state some particulars. If they refer to the late Treaty with America, which the American government refused to ratify, I contend, that so far from too much concession being made in that treaty, it absolutely went to impose restrictions upon American commerce far greater than those mentioned in the Declaration of the Secretary of State. But, yet, the late ministers felt the force, and were alive to the importance of all the reasons which should urge this country to avoid a war with America. The identity of language, the similarity of habits, the old, the commercial, the family connections, had all their just weight in our consideration of the jubject. We, therefore, determined to preserve the old laws which regulated our intercourse; and I entertain not the smallest doubt, that had the course we commenced been consistently pursued, it would have answered the end in view, by preserving the amicable relations and just interests of both countries.—The speech, I observe, studiously separates the two questions involved in our controversy with America; namely, that of the affair of the Chesapeake, and that relating to our Orders of Council. But, does any man suppose, that those questions will be separated in America? No: nor can they be separated in discussion here. In examining the Orders of Council, they must be considered in three points of view; first, as they affect our commerce; secondly, as they affect the constitution; and lastly, as they affect our negociations with America. When all the papers relative to this important question are laid before the house, it will be for us particularly to inquire, whether his majesty's government can constitutionally enact such prohibitions, as these Orders of Council contain; next, whether the time chosen for issuing those orders was not peculiarly exceptionable, as they must serve so much to inflame the minds of the Americans, already so strongly excited against us; and also, whether we had any right thus to annihilate the whole trade of America-thus to say to that power, as our Orders |