6

he could but offer the opinion, that if Peter's corps, with the remains of Barney's and the two battalions of the 36th and '38th regular regiments, (who had not yet fired a gun,) were 'made to occupy the wings of the Capitol, and the covered 'space between these, (with such exterior support as would 'furnish a supply of bread and water, and ammunition,) the enemy might be checked, and the post defended.* This advice was not relished by either the General de jure, or the General de facto; the former plead the dispersion of the troops, their dispirited condition and unfitness for a desperate defence, and the utter impossibility of giving to such garrison any exterior support whatever: the latter believed that much would be hazarded by an attempt near the Capitol. I knew,' says he in his letter to the investigating committee, (page 70 of the Documents) that a column of the enemy had advanced from the high 'ground which had been held by our troops, and meeting, as 'they would, with no opposition, might take possession of the heights above the City, and thus force our troops, in case of a 'new disaster, into the plain between the Capitol, the Eastern 'branch, and the Potomac. Whereas, by occupying the heights 'above Georgetown, the enemy must either attack us to disad'vantage, or entering the city, expose his right flank and rear to an attack from us.'t

In presenting these instances of Col. Monroe's military interference, from the 20th to the 24th of August, not selected to serve a particular purpose, but taken indiscriminately, and in succession, the dispassionate inquirer cannot overlook the fact, that every interposition involved an error-and that every error directly contributed to the disgrace of our arms and the destruction of the Capitol.

Fifth. We have at length happily reached the last cause assigned for the capture of Washington, viz. the rejection of our historian's services, tendered on the 18th of August; and as the public will no doubt sufficiently appreciate this cause, we shall content ourselves with giving the text, without thinking it at all necessary to add a commentary.

'Being interdicted,' says the historian, the use of my sword,

and produced a renewal of the injunction, that "Military functionaries should "be left to the discharge of their own duties, upon their own responsibility." * We find this proposition referred to, and argued, in Gen. Winder's narrative, (page 168 of the Documents) but he omitted to state the quarter from which it came. That the question was started by himself, or by Mr. Monroe, will not be asserted.

The column of the enemy, which Mr. Monroe knew had advanced 'from the high grounds which had been occupied by our troops,' and which he so much feared would drive the American army into a cul de sac, was, in medical language, a mere hallucination—a conceit, of a disordered brain No column of the enemy approached the City till sunset.

I had left the City of Washington, for the summer; but a domestic misfortune carried me back in the beginning of August, and I found every thing quiet in respect to the defence of the place. On the 18th of the month, observing the parade of several volunteer companies of the City and Georgetown, I inquired the cause, and was informed advice had reached the City of the approach of the enemy by the Patuxent. On the evening of the same day, I received a note from Col. Monroe, advising me that the menacing movements of the enemy up the bay had determined him to reconnoitre them, for which purpose he intended leaving the City the next morning. I had before been apprised of the arrival of Admiral Cochrane in the Chesapeake, and the increase of the enemy's shipping, and made no doubt the attack I had long expected was now to be carried into execution. I could not discover that any precautions had been taken to obstruct the march of the enemy, and I knew that no efficient preparations had been made to resist them. I was, at this time, quartered with a revolutionary officer, who had spilt his blood in the cause of his coun⚫ try, and he will recollect my solicitude for the safety of the City; my ideas of the route by which the enemy would approach it, and the best mode of resisting them. I felt most sensibly for my country, and, with agony of mind, in my answer to colonel Monroe's note, proposed-that, could my arrest be suspended, and my sword be restored for a short period, I would take the command of the militia, and save the City, or forfeit my life. This was a proffer of dire responsibility at so late an hour: but I preferred death, to inaction, at such a crisis.

Having received no reply to my note to colonel Monroe, I left the metropolis on the 20th, being persuaded President Madison would have hazarded the burning up of the whole district, sooner than discompose the harmony of the Cabinet, by giving offence to Secretary Armstrong.[*] I am indeed shocked when I take a retrospect of the evidences which fell under my own observation, at that time, of the terror in which that minister kept more than one great man at Washington; for I would sooner cease to exist, than live in fear of an equal. Sick and disgusted, I retired to the mountains, for the restoration of my health.'

[*] The General could not believe that his friend Monroe had any views of his own that could interfere with this patriotic proposal, and therefore lays the blame on the President, and Secretary of War, who never heard of it until the General himself told the story. We do not, however, mean by this remark, to insinuate that if they had known, they would have accepted, the proposition. They knew well, already, that in the General's vocabulary, as in his practice, promising and performing were things not at all connected with each other.

ART. IX.—Remarks on the present state of Currency, Trade, Commerce, and National Industry, in reply to an Address of the Tammany Society of New-York. By OLIVER WOLCOTT, Governor of the State of Connecticut, pp. 45. New-York, 1820.

2. Review of the Trade and Commerce of New-York, from 1815 to the present time; with an inquiry into the causes of the present distress, and the means of obviating it. By An Observer, pp. 43. New-York, 1820.

3. Thoughts on Political Economy, in two parts. By DANIEL RAYMOND, Counsellor at Law, pp. 470. Baltimore, 1820.

OUR country can no longer boast of the trade she once enjoyed. In our eastern cities commerce has declined apace, real estate has suffered depreciation, commodities have fallen in value, while industry, no longer finding its former employment, languishes without reward. In our Western country, the value of land has experienced a great decline, its produce remains unpurchased, and a depreciating currency is spreading its destructive influence, and laying the foundation for permanent distress.

In the Review of the Trade and Commerce of New York, the writer recurs to the period commencing with the French Revolution, during which we realized such large profits from the trade of the world which then fell into our hands. He conceives that the causes which created the nominal high prices existing after that period, and which, although reduced, have not yet fallen to their lowest ebb, are to be traced to the circumstances-that the whole wealth and credit of the world were called into forced activity, and kept in circulation-and that the paper system lent its efficient aid to create a nominal capital, and vastly to increase the circulating medium: and by a table giving the prices of the articles of necessity, it appears, that from 1770 to 1790 they had increased one fourth; whereas, from 1790 to 1815, they had more than doubled. The author very properly ascribes the failures and consequent distress that took place after the peace, in a great measure, to that system of over-trading which our Banks contributed to promote; and gives a correct view of the manner in which these facilities were obtained, and of the evil consequences that resulted to our trade from the system of management they adopted. He correctly ascribes the losses that were sustained in 1817, to a fall in the price of foreign commodities, occasioned by a supply disproportioned to our means; and the losses of 1819 to a fall in the price of our own produce in consequence of a general reduction of the nominal value of commodities throughout the commercial world. We have noticed this pamphlet, not because there is any thing profound in its reasonings, or labour

ed in its investigations, but because, without any pretensions of the kind, it furnishes a plain statement of useful facts, and presents a sound and practical view of some of the principal operations connected with the trade of our city. It would therefore hardly be necessary to stop to refute any errors into which the author may, perhaps inadvertently, have fallen, did not the general correctness of his remarks require that they should be noticed.

He says the precious metals have no intrinsic value. That value, it is true, may be considered in some respects as artificial, which depends upon public opinion; but when gold and silver have been adopted as the standard of value, and the sound medium of exchange, by the common consent of the civilized world, the value that this circumstance alone bestows upon them is real and intrinsic, in the fullest sense of the term; apart from their known and acknowledged value as articles of luxury when used in the form of plate and ornaments, and the uses to which they are applied in manufactures and the arts. This writer also thinks that the India trade has had a constant tendency to drain us of the specie which the balance of trade in our favour had brought into the country:-we had hoped that this chimera of having our country drained of its specie, not to pay debts which extravagance had incurred, but to purchase commodities for which there was a constant demand, had ceased to exist. It cannot be denied, that it would be more advantageous to us, if China would take our produce altogether in payment for her productions-an extensive market would thereby be gained, and its value would be enhanced by an increased demand. But it by no means follows, because it is less advantageous to send her specie instead of produce, that therefore the loss of specie renders the trade injurious. While there is a continued demand at home for the productions of China, they would, in case we did not obtain them directly, be procured elsewhere, and through other channels, and with additional expense, and we should have to pay for them with that portion of our produce for which other nations now furnish us an equivalent; and whether we are paid for this surplus produce in specie or in China goods, in this point of view, is perfectly immaterial. We know, however, that a large portion of the goods we purchase in China, goes direct from Canton to Europe; and a considerable quantity is re-shipped to South America and other ports, after its arrival in the United States. It is true, that with a depreciated and redundant paper currency, any trade or any circumstance whatever, that tends to drain the country of its specie, may be injurious-only, however, because it reduces the value of the paper by lessening the chance of its convertibility, for the place of every specie dollar in such case, would have to be supplied by a paper dollar; but this does not apply to our

reasoning-we have alluded to a state of wholesome currency and of regular trade.

Mr. Wolcott, in his reply to the address of the Tammany Society of this city, proceeds to consider the cause of our present distress and embarrassment; and reverts to the state of our trade, and the situation of our country, from the adoption of the constitution: And in the view he takes of the state of our currency, he very truly says, that reference must be had to that of Great Britain; with the state of whose currency our own must always be compared, in consequence of the intimate and extensive commercial relations subsisting between the two countries, which occasion nearly all our funds to be remitted to England, and our exchange to be regulated by the money market of London. Mr. Wolcott says, that in 1797 an important event took place, of which the consequences are still felt, and of which the most important results are perhaps yet to be developed,-the suspension of cash payments by the Bank of England, in consequence of excessive issues of paper. Now the fact appears to be, according to Mr. Thornton, that for two years ending in December, 1795, the issues of the Bank amounted to nearly twelve millions sterling, whereas in February, 1797, the day before it suspended payment, they amounted only to eight millions and a half The necessity, therefore, for suspending cash payments, is not to be attributed to the cause that Mr. Wolcott assigns; but to the distress that then existed throughout the country, increased by the fear of invasion, and the want of confidence, in general, consequent upon this state of things; every one feeling anxious to provide himself with as much gold and silver as he could procure against the hour of need, and every one believing that if he parted with his specie, it would not return again to his hands, the circulation became lessened or suspendedand so soon as a deficiency of the precious metals occurred in the general circulation, the Bank was naturally called on for specie in exchange for its notes. There was therefore as strong a necessity for the Bank of England to suspend its payments at that time, as there was, in the opinion of Mr. Wolcott, for our Banks to adopt the same measure during our late war. After the Bank of England had refused to pay its notes, it did what Banks will ever do in the same situation, when they possess the power. It is true, it facilitated the operations of government by assisting its loans, keeping up the price of its stock, and enabling it to collect the taxes with more ease; but at the same time the Bank increased the issues of its paper to nearly four times their amount when it first suspended its payments. It should here be noticed, that in 1800, three years after the Bank had stopped payment, its issues had only increased to fifteen millions; foreign exchange did not, therefore, rise materially against England, until the effects of the continental system began to be felt,