256 OBSERVATIONS. 1809. CHAP. VII. highest energy and vigour. All these things are admirable; yet it may be safely asserted, that but a small part of Lord Wellington's military reputation, will be found eventually to rest on the campaign of Talavera. CHARACTER OF CUESTA. 257 CHAPTER VIII. OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. 1809. THE utter incapacity of Cuesta had been CHAP.VIII strongly represented to the Spanish government, and that officer was at length removed from his command. He was a man of strong passions and of narrow mind, who too often mistook rashness for courage, obstinacy for firmness, and procrastination for prudence. Buoyed up under every reverse by the most overweening self-confidence, he was disqualified, by narrow bigotry of opinion, from profiting even by the dear-bought lessons of experience. His measures uniformly failed, because they were uniformly adopted on the dictates of temporary impulse, rather than of any patient calculation of probabilities. Yet with all his defects, Cuesta was a man of upright intentions 258 CUESTA SUPERSEDED BY EGUIA. While too many of CHAP.VIII and untarnished honour. 1809. his associates were disposed to truckle to the October. usurper, Cuesta trod steadily in the path of patriotism and honour. He adhered to the cause of his country through every misfortune; and the sincerity of the zeal with which he laboured to promote its success, has never, we believe, been questioned by friend or enemy. On the retirement of Cuesta, the command of his army was assumed by General Eguia, who, in conjunction with Vanegas, could bring into the field an army of about fifty thousand men. Blake, after his defeat at Belchite, had only been able to re-assemble a corps of about six thousand men, with which his main object was to relieve Gerona. There were in Gallicia about fifteen thousand men, under Noronha, but without cavalry or artillery. The Duke del Parque had nine thousand, at Ciudad Rodrigo. Such was the disposition and strength of the Spanish armies. The disposable force of the French amounted to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, exclusive of garrisons. Of these about thirty-five thousand were occupied in Arragon and Catalonia; the remainder were in the two Castilles and Estramadura. POSITION OF THE ARMIES. 259 1809. October. Ney's head-quarters were at Salamanca; and CHAP.VIII part of his corps was stationed at Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult's were at Placentia; and he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus, to the bridge of Arzobisbo. The corps of Mortier was at Talavera, Oropesa, and Naval Moral. Victor's headquarters were at Toledo, his advanced posts at Daymiel. The corps of Sebastiani extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. Marshal Jourdan had been recalled, and Soult appointed MajorGeneral of the armies. This appointment gave offence to Ney, who, in consequence, solicited leave to quit the army; and the command of his corps was assumed by General Marchand. It was in this state of things, when the enemy had a force of above seventy thousand men immediately disposable for its defence, that the Junta adopted the insane project of advancing on Madrid, with the armies of Vanegas and Eguia. The former leader had been superseded by General Arisaigo, a very young man, without talent or experience; and to this person the command of this perilous enterprize was entrusted. In Arisaigo the Supreme Junta calculated on finding a submissive instrument of their schemes; and by 260 ARISAIGO ADVANCES ON MADRID. 1809. CHAP.VIII these wretched calculators it was thought possible, by a rapid advance, to gain possession of the November. capital, and thus to strike a signal blow, by which the grasp of the invader would at once be loos ened. Without any communication with Lord Wellington, therefore, and without concerting any combined movement with the other armies, Arisaigo put his force in motion against the capital. The French were unprepared for the suddenness of this advance; and Latour Maubourg, who commanded a considerable body of horse at Madrilejos, on learning that the Spaniards were entering the town, with difficulty effected The Spanish army were successful his escape. in several skirmishes; and on the sixteenth of Nov. 16. November Arisaigo reached Santa Cruz de la Zorza, where he encamped his army on the heights. On receiving intelligence of this movement, Joseph Buonaparte immediately advanced with the main body of his forces to bring the enemy to battle. In order to deceive the Spanish General, the French at first made demonstrations of acting only on the defensive; but Arisaigo, learning that a large force |