BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

185

his artillery, and collect his whole army at Trux- CHAP. IV. illo, where he gained possession of the mag- 1809. azines of the Spanish army.

Cuesta, having retired to Santa Cruz, was reinforced by a detachment of about four thousand men, under the Duke del Albuquerque, and at length determined to give battle. With this view, he took up a position near Medellin, forming his whole force in a single line, about a league in extent, without any reserve. The ground thus occupied, was singularly ill-chosen. It consisted of a wide and open plain, without cover of any kind; and the same unhappy qualities which had distinguished Cuesta at Rio Seco, were again conspicuously displayed at Medellin.

The Spanish army consisted of about twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. The left wing was commanded by Henestrosa, which occupied ground somewhat higher than the rest of the position. The centre was commanded by Don Francisco Trias; the right by Don Francisco de Equia. The cavalry were on the left, where the enemy presented the greatest force.

The army of Victor, though infinitely superior

March.

186

BATTLE OF MEDELLIN :

CHAP. IV. in the quality of the troops, was somewhat

1809.

numerically inferior. It consisted of about March, eighteen thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse, and was formed in an arc, extending between the Gaudiana and a cultivated ravine, which reaches from Medellin to the village of Mengabril. Victor placed his cavalry on the right, and the front was covered by six batteries, each of four guns.

Mar. 28.

The action commenced by an attack on the Spanish centre, supported by a brigade of cavalry. This was gallantly repulsed, and the Spanish line advancing, succeeded in taking one of the enemy's batteries on the left. The French left wing gave way, and was followed with effect for two hours. The cavalry was ably manoeuvred by General Lasalle, who retired slowly, and having gained a favourable position, turned on the Spanish horse, and put them to the rout. The attack on the centre was then renewed, and the infantry disheartened gave way. Panic spread through the ranks, and the soldiers, casting away their arms, sought safety in flight. Every effort of Cuesta to restore order proved abortive. The French followed up their success, giving no quarter in the pursuit.

ITS CONSEQUENCES.

187

1809.

March.

In this disastrous battle the loss of the Span- CHAP. IV. iards was very great. It has been stated at twelve thousand killed, and seven or eight thousand prisoners; but this is probably an exaggeration. Nineteen pieces of cannon were taken by the French, whose loss in the action amounted, by their own account, to four thousand.

The

Calamitous as the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real unquestionably were, neither the Supreme Junta nor the people were disheartened by the misfortunes of their armies. proceedings of the former evinced no symptom of alarm or despondency; a vote of thanks was passed to Cuesta and his army; and so little had that General declined in the opinion of his countrymen, that he speedily received the appointment of Captain-General of the province. In the meanwhile, he retired to Almandrelejo, where he succeeded in collecting a force nearly as imposing as that with which he had encountered the enemy at Medellin.

188

ARRIVAL OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

CHAPTER V.

1809.

April.

ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF OPORTO

BY THE BRITISH.

CHAP. V. On the twenty-second of April, Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Lisbon, and was invested with the supreme command in Portugal. From the period of that event a new era commences in the war. His appointment gave unity of action and purpose to the British and Portuguese forces, and at once put a stop to those unfortunate jealousies and distractions, which had already occurred but too frequently between the leaders of the allied armies.

The forces of the enemy, against whom he was to act, were on the other hand divided. Soult had concerted with Victor a combined attack on the unconquered provinces of Portugal. The former was preparing to advance through Coimbra upon Lisbon, while Victor was to co

ATTACK ON THE BRIDGE OF AMARANTE.

189

operate by marching from Alcantara on Abran- CHAP. V. tes, and, having secured that fortress, to continue his progress to the capital.

Many delays occurred, however, in the execution of this project, which, had it been promptly carried into effect, must, in all probability, have caused the embarkation of the English and given a new aspect to the war. army, But Soult remained long inactive at Oporto, influenced at once by the dread of committing his army by an unsupported operation, and by the increasing embarrassments of his position. The bridge of Amarante was in possession of the Portuguese, and thus his only line of communication with Spain to the east had been cut off.

A body of six thousand men, under Delaborde and Loison, were accordingly despatched with orders to gain possession of the bridge, at any sacrifice. General Silveira was at Penafiel, from which town he withdrew on the approach of the enemy, and fell back to the Campo de Manhufe. On the two following days some skirmishing took place, and Silveira deemed it prudent to fall back to Amarante, and limit his efforts to defending the passage of the bridge. The town, which stands on a declivity on the right bank of the

1809. April.