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other words, to prevent one man taking from another the produce of his labour -to prevent A, the strong man who has wants and desires to gratify but who is too lazy to labour for himself, in order to gain the means of gratifying them to prevent this A from going to B, a weak man, and compelling B to work for him, A, and then living upon the proceeds of B's labour.

From this desire then which all mankind feel to gratify their desires without the pains of toil and labour, arises the necessity of that combination which is termed Government. But although it is true that out of this necessity arises Government, it is not true that the sole end of Government is merely to ensure to every man the produce of his own labour. Other things besides this are, or ought to be, included in the ends of Government; though it may be safely said, that if Government should really ever succeed in completely protecting every man in the quiet enjoyment of the proceeds of his own industry, the remaining portions of its duties will be comparatively light and unimportant.

Men dislike labour, but they desire the produce of labour;-they, therefore, seek to make others labour for them :the strong oppress the weak.

The whole of a Society combines for the purpose of preventing the strong. from thus oppressing the weak.

The body of men whom the Society has intrusted with the powers necessary thus to protect the weak from the attacks of the strong, is called the GOVERNMENT.

But here a new difficulty arises. The Government is composed of men; -they have the desires of other men. Now, what shall prevent the Government oppressing the nation?

Those

who compose the Government, like other men, dislike labour; but, like other men, they have desires and wants, which the proceeds of labour alone can

satisfy. They therefore, like other men, will seek to make others work for them, and will desire to live by the produce of other men's industry. You give them the power to coerce others ;-their business is to exercise power. What will hinder their using it for their own benefit? What will prevent them gratifying their wants and desires at other people's expense?

To give the Government sufficient power to control Society, and at the same time to prevent their using this power for their own purposes, is the great problem to be solved in the science of Government-the grand practical difficulty to be overcome in the actual formation of a Government.

Now let us enquire how this difficulty has been met, and to what degree it has been overcome.

Experience having taught men the necessity of combining to prevent oppression, the first method adopted was the most simple and apparent. Some person was selected from the community who had gained their respect and confidence; this person was endowed with power and authority, and the community submitted to his will. It was soon found, however, that the power thus conferred was misused. The People, therefore, endeavoured to make the person using power in their name, answerable to themselves for the use of it. The whole people in a body thus participated in the business of Government. In a very small community this was possible. Shut up in a small town, surrounded by walls, few in number, the Greek communities, for example, were democracies, or popular governments, of the sort here described. The Magistrates were elected for short periods, by the whole people (the demos, hence the word democracy), and in many cases the People in a body actually administered justice, and in most cases made laws. The inconveniences

of this method, however, were enormous. Nothing was certain; there was great and constant confusion, and thus, in attempting to avoid the mischief arising from oppression by the persons exercising the powers of Government, they actually, in great measure, lost the very benefits, they sought to attain by means of Government.

One thing was, however, clearly perceived by the various people who attempted this scheme, and that was, that some defence was necessary against the Government itself. It was the knowledge of this fact, the acute sense they had of it, and their constant endeavours to avoid the evils resulting from irresponsible power, that so peculiarly distinguished this remarkable people (viz. the Greeks) from all the nations by whom they were surrounded. They, nevertheless, did not succeed in solving the great difficulty in the practical business of Government.

Modern times have seen other and various attempts to get over the same great difficulty, and chance at length suggested a contrivance which seemed to promise success.

To make the rulers responsible, and at the same time to avoid the necessary confusion and mischief that followed from direct interference on the part of the People in the business of Government, was the great object. It was suggested as a means to attain this desired end, that the People should at certain intervals elect persons who should represent them; which persons alone should directly interfere with the conduct of the Government.

This was a happy idea, but in order to make it of service, certain conditions were necessary.

Let us understand the gradations of power necessary in this new scheme.

1. First there was the Government, that is, the body of persons who actually put the laws into execution.

This Government was composed of two distinct classes of persons:

The judges, or persons who adjudicate between disputing citizens;

The administrative officers, who watch over the external and internal interests of the Society, and carry on the ordinary business of the Government.

2. Then comes the body of persons elected by the People to watch over the various functionaries composing the Government. These representatives are the guards, or watch-dogs, so to call them, of the

3. Third portion of the whole set of persons employed in the business of protection; and this third portion is the PEOPLE. The People by the power of election, control their representatives. The representatives check and control the Executive Government, and the Executive Government checks and controls all those persons in Society, who attempt to oppress their weaker neighbours.

Now, then, what are the conditions which are requisite to make these representatives fit and effective guardians of the People.

1. The first necessary condition is, that they be responsible to the People. To be responsible to the People means, that the People have the power of choosing and rejecting them. Without this there is no representation. Unless there be so constant a renewal of election, as to make the elected feel that it is necessary to shape his conduct so as to make it agreeable to the electors, representation is a farce; and no man in his senses will expect to derive from it those advantages which the theory of representative Government promises. So, also, if the People only nominally elect the representative, the condition of responsibility is not fulfilled, and before they can really elect their so-called representatives, there must be secret suffrage.

Thus then the first necessary condition, viz. responsibility, includes the necessity of frequent elections and secret suffrage.

2. The second condition necessary to make the Representative Assembly an efficient control over the Government, is that it truly represent the interests of the People.

There is but one way of attaining this condition :-the whole People must elect the body.

If only a part elect the representatives, that part of the People, having those desires, and that aversion to labour which I have so much dwelled on already, will, like the strong in all other cases, desire to oppress the weak, “Quis custodiet custodes?"-"who shall watch the watchmen?" was the acute question of the ancient in a similar case. What shall prevent this part of the People thus specially favoured, from following out their own interests, and making others minister to their wants and desires. Why do men dread a single despot? Because he will thus attempt to gratify his own desires. Why do they dread an oligarchy, but for the same reason? What is the meaning, then, of making an exception for an Aristocracy? An Aristocracy means a portion of the People, generally indeed a very small portion, who have distinction and power over the remainder. The immutable principles of human nature teach us, that when they are endued with irresponsible power, they will abuse it; and it is plain that it is irresponsible, so long as they may employ it as they please.

There is a point, however, at whico, by enlarging the number of electors, you approach very nearly to the object in view. You may get so large a portion of the whole body, that the interests of the selected portion shall be nearly, if not altogether, the same as that of the whole People. The meaning of this statement is, that the portion which each person of this large elective

body would get by oppressing the whole, in his character of elector, would be smaller than the portion he would lose in his character of citizen. Before this happens, however, the number of electors must bear a very large proportion to the whole number of the People. Experience has taught the people of England, for example, that an Aristocracy may be very large, and yet very mischievous. We have seen the landed gentry (which is a large class), while it possessed the actual control over the House of Commons, make laws for its own especial interests; and what is still more startling, we have seen the Reformed Parliament uphold those laws. The laws to which I here allude are the Corn Laws, by which it is attempted to make the whole nation submit to pay a high price for its bread, in order to put money into the pockets of the landlords of England. From this experience, and from many other facts of the same description, I come to the conclusion, that before the elective body can be said practically to have interests the same as the society at large, it must include a very large majority of the whole adult population. There are many

pressing reasons (which, for my present purpose, I need not here adduce) which make me believe that no Government will fully attain the end for which all Government is, or ought to be, established, unless it include in the body of electors, the whole of the adult popula. tion.*

The reader will see that I here maintain the so much dreaded doctrine of universal suf frage. In this opinion I know that I differ from many, for whose judgment and character I have the highest respect. Nevertheless, after having given the subject my best consideration, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion in the I may here mention that one chief reason that has brought me to this conclusion, is deduced from an argument usually brought against it. Much stress is generally laid upon the ignorance of many of the poorer members of every society, and danger to every thing beneficial is expected from that ignorance. If while the rich and the instructed felt thus, political

text.