RADICAL SUPPORT TO A WHIG MINISTRY. By J. A. ROEBUCK, M.P. 31. TAXATION OF THE RICH AND OF THE POOR. MR LAING'S JUSTICES' JUSTICE. BY J. A. R. EDITED BY J. A. ROEBUCK, M.P. [PRICE TWOPENCE.] RADICAL SUPPORT TO A WHIG MINISTRY. DURING the last session of Parliament the Radicals of the House of Commons steadily supported the Whig Administration. This steady support resulted partly from their fears, and partly from their hopes. They feared. much from the in-coming of the Tories -and they hoped something from the Whigs. There was a constant cry of, "Do not endanger the safety of Government. If you press for further and greater reforms, the Cabinet will go to pieces, and the Tories will come in. We shall get the Corporation Reform, if you wait and are willing to temporise. You will lose everything if you are obstinate and impracticable." These suggestions had their effect; and we obtained the English Corporation Reform Bill. It now becomes a ques tion, whether the same reasons exist for In the first place, it is evident that From the Steam Press of C. & W. REYNELL, 14, 15, & 16 Little Pulteney street, Haymarket. parliamentary majority. This is now so clear, that the Tories themselves must see it; and, such being the case, it is equally certain, that the people. of England would never permit them to hold power upon any such tenure. A civil war is a subject of intense horror to the people of this country they dread the very idea of it-and would forego much that they themselves desired, and thought right, rather than run the hazard of so terrible a contingency. The Tories, then, cannot hope to come into office permanently. But the Whigs, without the support of the Liberals, are no match for the Tories as a Government they would be utterly powerless without our aid. In such case, we are in a position to dictate to them. If we were to desert the Whigs, things would stand thus:The people would not allow the Tories to hold power-and the Whigs could not hold it. The Radicals, therefore, though not possessed of a parliamentary majority, are by fortuitous circumstances enabled to dictate to the Government. I have no hesitation in saying, that they ought to take advantage of this lucky state of things, and to make the most of it for the advancement of their principles and Ministers give an example of concession to their friends. We have had examples enough of concession to their enemies; and also we have had examples sufficiently numerous and important on the part of the Radicals to the Whigs. Now, then, let the Whigs practice what they preach. Let them concede to us. What, it may be asked?-Let them concede the Ballot, and the Stamp Duties on Newspapers. No doubt but that the Radicals would consider these concessions of great value, and their support of the present Administration would then be hearty and steady. The practical mode of expressing these demands is-absence. If the Ministers refuse this concession to our wishes, when the question of the Irish Church comes on, let all the Radicals be absent. The effect would be startling, and to the Whigs exceedingly disagreeable. Mr O'CONNELL and the Irish Members may exclaim against us for deserting their cause. Our answer might be, "No, we do not desert you, you desert us. You have the power, if you have the will, to compel the Ministers to make the concession we desire. Use this power, and you shall, as heretofore, have our steadfast support." For the sake of the whole empire, for the sake of Ireland as well as England, we stand out; the demands we make are not selfish, but are for the benefit of the whole community. In no country is the Ballot more wanted than in Ireland -in no country is education more needed. To enable the voter to act according to his conscience, to have that conscience directed by reason, is the object of our present endeavours. Ours then is no sectarian, party, or personal object; if we take advantage of our position, it is for the benefit of all. We seek to confer a lasting and extraordinary benefit upon the whole nation. Some persons, however, may object to the conduct here proposed, that it would be ungrateful and ungenerous. "The Whigs having given you Corporation Reform, you, because you have no more to hope from their voluntary concessions, take advantage of their position, and endeavour to compel them to grant what you desire. So long as you expected anything from them, you were quiet and obedient; now, when nothing more is hoped for, you become restive, turbulent, and craving." For my own part, I cannot help wondering how this talk about gratitude has ever been introduced into such a matter. We were told, until we became tired of the very sound, that we ought to be grateful to Lord GREY. What is the meaning of this? Did Lord GREY, did the Whigs do anything more than their duty? Did the People of England receive anything more than they had full right to demand? As Ministers, was it not the actual, the bounden duty of Lord GREY and Lord MELBOURNE to introduce, the one, the Parliamentary, the other, the Corporation Reform Bill? These two noble Lords, by introducing those measures, showed that they believed them necessary for the welfare of the country. Lord GREY also thought the Coercion Bill necessary. If, in the one case, we ought to be grateful, so ought we in the other. But the truth is, that the idea of duty towards the People is always studiously kept out of view; everything is done in order to shut out the hateful notion, that the good of the People is a matter of right, and that they who forward that good as legislators, or Ministers, perform an imperative duty. Gratitude to them is not needed, neither should we be persuaded to forego further reforms necessary to our welfare, because we have happened to have servants who once did what they ought. I am not desirous of undervaluing the merit either of Lord GREY or Lord MELBOURNE the latter, under the peculiar difficulties of his position, deserves no small, no niggard share of praise. But what I contend for is, that this, their desert, even were it ten times greater than it is, does not entitle them to ask of the People to delay one moment in working out all such reforms as are needed for their own comfort. The Whigs, as a party, have no claim whatever. They did not effect either of the reforms mentioned, which were the work, in fact, of the People; and it is something too much, something monstrous indeed, for the shreds and patches of the Whig party, who now compose the Cabinet, to assume a high tone, and talk of their merits, deserts, and of popular ingratitude. I will not pursue this theme further, having no desire to stir up strife; but it is to be hoped that our patience is not again to be tried by talk about gratitude to the persons at present holding office; who, with the exception of their chief, hardly deserve even the common praise of being industrious and zealous servants. As for the accusation of want of generosity, it is very much like that of want of gratitude, the result of a complete misconception respecting the duties of the People's Ministers. Generosity here can only be intended to signify, the permitting the Whigs to have a quiet tenure of place. Why should they have this ?-Answer, because they passed the two Reform Bills. We then are to put up quietly with burthens that oppress us, in order that the Ministers may have easy lives. For how long is this to last? What term will be sufficient to evince our generosity? If we are to be silent, and the Whigs happy for one year, why not for two; and if for two, why not for three, four, or any number? From the ordinary talk of official persons on ques re tions like the present, it would seem that the regular and natural course of Ministers is doing mischief-that doing good is so extraordinary an effort, so wonderful a proof of sublime virtue and self-denial, that the People can never sufficiently repay. Simple approbation and respect are not reward enough-something more solid and more agreeable is required to compense a virtue of this exalted character. This something more agreeable being the quiet enjoyment of a lucrative office. An analogous case may illustrate this position. Suppose the Chief Justice of the King's Bench to try to-day a case of libel against the Ministry, suppose him to sum up distinctly against the Government; and suppose, also, that he did this, in spite of the strong feeling of his party and his friends. He would thus do his duty. We should admire his conduct, and we should respect him. But, should we continue to do so, if to-morrow he were gravely, in the following words, to propound the doctrine above combated :"Yesterday I acted so as to obtain your admiration and respect. I hope, now, that you will be grateful and generous, and, hereafter, let me lead a quiet life. I shall not appear on the Bench for a year; and, for some years to come, I shall let iniquity have sway in my Court. The power to do this, I claim as a reward for my service of yesterday; and you, by permitting me to act thus, will evince your gratitude and generosity." Every one sees the absurdity, in the case of the Judge. What line can be drawn between his situation and that of a Minister? Some persons, however, who may not be willing to oppose the conduct I propose, as wrong in itself, will still object to it, as attempted at the wrong time. Their reasoning will be as follows:-" By temporising last year, we ་ got the Reform of the English Corporation,-by the same course, we may get the Reform of the Irish Municipal System this year. Support the Ministers, then, in the way you did during the last Session; get what you can peaceably; and when, at length, you find nothing more will be done, act as you now propose." This is plausible, but not conclusive. We shall obtain the Irish Corporation Reform, whether the Ministers like it or not. That measure no longer depends upon the will of any party. To refuse the Irish Reform when we have granted the English, would be so glaring an injustice towards Ireland, would so clearly draw a line between the two countries, as materially to aid the repeal of the union. Well might Mr O'CONNELL then exclaim-" There is no justice for Ireland." Moreover, the granting of the English Reform, last year, has gained that strength for the Liberal party, which alone was wanted to make their power permanent. That power, now, cannot be shaken. A dissolution would make us irresistible in the House of Commons; so that no coup d'etat of the sort played off in November, 1834, will again be tried. It is clear, then, we shall lose nothing by the plan proposed and we have every chance of gaining much. Ireland will be no worse off; and the whole nation much better. It is the custom of politicians to invest their proceedings with much mystery-to pretend to great secrecy and stratagem. There will not be wanting many to laugh at me for openly propounding my scheme; as it will be supposed, thereby, to be utterly frustrated. They, however, who act not for party, but for national purposes, and whose strength lies in the public support, ought to court no secrecy, to affect no mystery. Neither public nor private ends ought to be sought by unworthy means. If we be ashamed of the means-if we dare not openly avow them, we certainly ought, also, to be ashamed of using them. Neither can our means be diminished by publicity. It is by no skilful manoeuvring, no artful combination of individual forces, that we hope to gain our ends. The ends, themselves, are approved and sought for by the public. The means we propose are, by taking advantage of their weakness, to force the Ministers to obey that public desire. They are completely in our power; and justice to our country demands that we TAXATION OF THE RICH AND OF THE POOR. ALL representative assemblies are the servants of those by whom they are chosen. In the United States of America the several Legislative Assemblies are chosen by the unrestrained suffrages of the People. The consequence is, that the legislative measures of those Assemblies are such as the mass of the People believe to be conducive to their interests. In the British House of Commons this is still far from being the case. Before the passing of the Reform Act, the control of the titled and untitled Aristocracy over the limited constituencies was perfect. The influence of the Peers, and of the families with which the Peers were connected, in returning, or rather nominating a majority of the House of Commons, was notorious; and the subserviency of that Honourable House to the sinister interests of the ruling few was but little affected by the inconsiderable number of comparatively liberal men who were the advocates, rather than the representatives, of the People. The Reform Act broke in upon the dominion of the Aristocracy, but it did I mean the fact of their being unrepresented. But even the new electors enjoy much less influence in the aggregate than the sanguine might have anticipated. The franchise was clogged with restrictions and impediments, so that the influence of the Aristocratic class is still sufficiently powerful to destroy the effect which would otherwise have arisen from the sympathy of the new electors with the mass of the People. Thus the House of Commons is still, in |