and join his cause: the spirit of that country was well known both to him and to the allies. Another effect of his success would be, as he argued, the fall of the tory ministry in England; a result which he conceived might, of itself, terminate the war. If, however, the other allied powers continued to advance, ample time would remain for him to march his victorious army on the Rhine to oppose their approach. Lastly, the terrible evil of abandoning the provinces of France to the devastating invasion of a million of enemies would be avoided.

Napoleon finally resolved on the latter plan of the campaign. His calculations were, in part, disturbed by a serious insurrection in La Vendée, which obliged him to send twenty thousand men into that province in order to quell it, and reduced his disposable force to a hundred and twenty thousand men; but this did not alter his determination. The army was put in motion, and every preparation made for the approaching struggle.

When all was ready the Emperor took leave of the chambers of legislature, on which occasion he replied to the address of the deputies in the following terms:-"The struggle in which we are engaged, is serious. The seductions of prosperity are not the dangers which menace us at present. It is under the Caudine Forks that foreigners wish to make us pass. The justice of our cause, the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the army, are strong grounds of hope for success; but should we encounter reverses, it is then that I should trust to see displayed all the energy of a great people. It is in times of difficulty that great nations, like great men, unfold all the energy of their character, and become objects of admiration to posterity. The constitution is our rallying point; it should be our pole-star in these stormy times. Every public discussion, tending directly, or indirectly, to diminish the confidence which should be placed in its arrangements, would be a misfortune to the state: we should then find ourselves in the midst of rocks, without compass or pilot. The crisis in which we are involved, is arduous. Let us not imitate the example of the lower empire, which, pressed on all sides by the barbarians, rendered itself the scoff of posterity by entering into abstract discussions when the battering-ram was at the gates of the city. In all circumstances, my conduct will be direct and firm. Aid me to save the country. First representative of the people, I have contracted the obligation, which I now renew, to employ in more tranquil times all the prerogatives of the crown, and the experience, such as it may be, which I have acquired, to ameliorate our institutions."

Of this parting address, which is remarkable for a noble simplicity of thought and language, the last words should be especially remembered, and taken as a pledge, that in happier times, Napoleon would have entered on the task of revising and reforming the faulty enactments which he had hastily made in the midst of the overwhelming labours attendant on his preparation for the war.

The Emperor left Paris, for the army, on the night between the 11th and 12th of June. The words, put into his mouth by some writers, to the effect that he was going to "measure himself" with Wellington, are excessively foolish, and only invented to enhance When the Emperor was the result, after it had occurred. 66 measuring himself" with the armies of Prussia, England, Belgium, &c.; while the armies of Russia and Austria were rapidly advancing, it is ridiculous to suppose that he should single out the chief commander of any one of them, as the sole object of his efforts! The imperial guard had commenced its march on the 8th. All the different corps of the army were in movement towards Maubeuge and Philippeville.

NUMBER AND POSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES- WELLINGTON-LUCHER-NAPOLEON ARRIVES TO TAKE COMMAND OF HIS FORCES-ADDRESS TO THE SOLDIERS-BALL-ROOM AT BRUSSELS-ATTACK ON CHARLEROI AND FLEURUS-BATTLES OF LIGNY AND QUATREBRAS-BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

THE forces under the command of the Duke of Wellington were of various nations. He had about thirty-five thousand English; the remainder was composed of the German Legion-Hanoverians, Brunswickers (commanded by the Duke of Brunswick), and Nassau, Dutch, and Belgian troops (under the Prince of Orange), amounting in This force has usually been The Duke of Wellington's

all to about seventy-five thousand men. designated as the Anglo-Belgian army. head-quarters were at Brussels. His first division occupied Enghien, Brain-le-Comte, and Nivelles; and communicated with the Prussian right at Charleroi. The second division (commanded by Lord Hill) was cantoned in Halle, Oudenard, and Grammont, together with the greater part of the cavalry. The reserve (under Sir Thomas

Picton) was quartered at Brussels and Ghent. The army of Blucher amounted at this time to about a hundred and twenty thousand. They extended along the line of the Sambre and the Meuse; occupied Charleroi, Namur, Givet, and Liège; and communicated on their right with the left of the Anglo-Belgian army. The various divisions of the allied armies were thus cantoned over an extent of fifty miles. This circumstance, so dangerous in case of a sudden need for concentration, was partly attributable to the facilities thus gained for obtaining food and shelter, and partly to the secrecy with which Napoleon had conducted his movements; so that the allied armies knew not on what point to expect him. An extensive line of defence, however hazardous, was therefore deemed expedient.

Napoleon left Paris in the morning of the 12th of June, 1815. He arrived at Avesne on the 13th. On the night of the 14th, his army encamped in three directions; his left (amounting to upwards of forty thousand) at Ham-sur-Heure, and Solre-sur-Sambre; his right (amounting to about sixteen thousand) at Philippeville; his centre (amounting to sixty or seventy thousand of the imperial guard and the reserves of cavalry) at Beaumont, which was his head-quarters. The camps were pitched in the rear of small hills, a few miles from the frontier, in such a manner that the allies could not see the fires during the night, nor had they any knowledge of the encampment. The returns now laid before the Emperor shewed that his army amounted to one hundred and twenty-two thousand, four hundred men, with three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. Napoleon had just issued the following address:-"Soldiers! this is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland. Then, as after Austerlitz and Wagram, we were too generous. We gave credit to the protestations and oaths of the princes whom we suffered to remain on their thrones. Now, however, coalesced among themselves, they aim at the independence, and at the most sacred rights of France. They have commenced the most unjust of aggressions. Are we no longer the same men? Fools that they are! A moment of prosperity blinds them. The oppression and the humiliation of the French people are out of their power. If they enter France, there will they find their tomb. Soldiers! we have forced marches to make; battles to wage; perils to encounter ;but with constancy the victory will be ours. The rights-the honour of the country will be recovered. For every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment has now arrived either to conquer, or perish!"

In the night between the 14th and 15th, scouts returned to the head-quarters of the French, at Beaumont, reporting that there was no movement among the invaders at Charleroi, Namur, and Brussels. It thus appears, that Napoleon's plans for concealing the movements of

his army during the last two days were perfectly successful. This fact has of late years been contested by some writers, who would not have it thought the Duke of Wellington had been surprised,—as though a surprise was not a common occurrence in war, especially in the wars with Napoleon. But the circumstance, stated in order to shew that the duke was aware of Napoleon's position and design during these last two days, proves the contrary. It is said that the duke was not taken by any surprise, because "at half-past one o'clock, p. m. of the same day (Thursday, the 15th), a Prussian officer, of high rank, arrived at Wellington's head-quarters in Brussels, with the intelligence of Napoleon's decisive operations." This, being the only ground of argument, merely shews that the duke possessed no knowledge of the position and intentions of Napoleon anterior to the afternoon of the 15th, which is all that need be granted to prove the degree of the surprise. All this is acknowledged by the Duke of Wellington himself,-first, in his letter to Lord Bathurst on the 13th, in which he declares his disbelief in the report that Napoleon had joined the army; and secondly, in his official dispatch of the battle of Waterloo.*

The characters of the two generals-in-chief opposed to him were taken into consideration by the Emperor. Knowing the enthusiastic temperament and hussar-habits of Blucher, he felt assured that he would draw his sword the moment he found the French were advancing, even if he had but two battalions with him, and endeavour to retard the masses, with a view to give the English time to collect their forces. He believed that Wellington, on the contrary, being more methodical and circumspect, would not hazard a battle until the whole of his forces were concentrated. If the English army were attacked first, Blucher would more rapidly arrive to the support of the English, than the English were likely to arrive if the Prussians were first attacked: Napoleon therefore determined on first attacking the Prussians.

The Emperor's force, for the field, amounted to between one hundred and ten, and one hundred and thirteen thousand men. These, with the exception of a few distributed on out-posts, he formed into two masses. The principal mass (amounting to about sixty thousand men) he directed on Fleurus, at which place he knew the Prussian army was assembled. The other mass (amounting to forty-three thousand men) he placed under the command of Ney, who had just arrived, with orders to advance on the road to Brussels, and make himself master of the position of Quatre-bras, at all points, so as to prevent Wellington from supporting the Prussians. He was to march at daybreak (on the 16th), occupy this position, and intrench himself.

• See "Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington," compiled by Lieut.-Col. Gurwood.