Opinion of the Court. exactly like the one before us, yet the principle to be deduced from them is that when on the records of the local land office there is an existing claim on the part of an individual under the homestead or preëmption law, which has been recognized by the officers of the Government and has not been cancelled or set aside, the tract in respect to which that claim is existing is excepted from the operation of a railroad land grant containing the ordinary excepting clauses, and this notwithstanding such claim may not be enforceable by the claimant, and is subject to cancellation by the Government at its own suggestion, or upon the application of other parties. It was not the intention of Congress to open a controversy between the claimant and the railroad company as to the validity of the former's claim. It was enough that the claim existed, and the question of its validity was a matter to be settled between the Government and the claimant, in respect to which the railroad company was not permitted to be heard." Other cases are to the same effect as those to which we have above referred. Sioux City &c. Land Co. v. Griffey, 143 U. S. 32, 34; Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 491, 494. The principles announced in these cases fully sustain the proposition that if the above applications, of record, to purchase these lands as mineral lands were "claims" within the meaning of the act of July 2, 1864, then the lands were excepted from the operation of that act, and could not have come under the grant to the railroad company even if, subsequently to the definite location of the road, the applications for them were finally rejected because of the fact that they were ascertained not to be mineral lands. It is necessary now to inquire whether the applications in 1880 and 1881 to purchase these lands as mineral lands were "claims" within the meaning of the act of 1864. Here we are met with the suggestion that when that act was passed no statute of the United States provided for the purchase of lands as mineral lands, and that when the railroad company filed its map of general route in 1872, and when the surveyed or unsurveyed odd-numbered sections within the exterior lines of that route were withdrawn by the land Opinion of the Court. office from "sale or location, preëmption or homestead entry," no application was on file to purchase these lands as mineral lands. It is quite true that at the time of the passage of the act of 1864 there was no act of Congress under which a right or claim could be initiated to mineral lands. But as said by Mr. Justice Field in Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 458, "for eighteen years-from 1848 to 1866 the regulations and customs of miners, as enforced and moulded by the courts and sanctioned by the legislation of the States, constituted the law governing property in mines and in water on the public mineral lands." And on July 26, 1866, before the general route of the Northern Pacific Railroad was fixed, Congress passed an act looking to a sale of the mineral lands of the United States, and declared them to be "free and open to exploration and occupation by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become citizens, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law and the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts so far as the same were not in conflict with the laws of the United States." 14 Stat. 251, c. 262. But prior to the passage of that act certain important rights of miners had been recognized. In Broder v. Water Co., 101 U. S. 274, 276, it was said to be the established doctrine of this court that the rights of miners, who had taken possession of mines and worked and developed them, were rights which the Government had by its conduct recognized and encouraged, and was bound to protect, before the passage of the act of 1866. The act of 1866 was held to be a statutory recognition of the right to explore for mineral lands. That right was in nowise impaired, in respect of the lands in question, by the subsequent acceptance from the Northern Pacific Railroad Company of its map of general route. And that act was supplemented by the act of May 10, 1872, c. 152. 17 Stat. 91. The company acquired, by fixing its general route, only an inchoate right to the oddnumbered sections granted by Congress, and no right attached to any specific section until the road was definitely located and the map thereof filed and accepted. Until such definite Opinion of the Court. location it was competent for Congress to dispose of the public lands on the general route of the road as it saw proper. Provision for the indemnification of the company in such an emergency was made by a clause in the act of 1864, providing that wherever, prior to the date of definite location, "any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, or preëmpted or otherwise disposed of, other lands shall be selected by said company in lieu thereof, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in alternate sections, and designated by odd rumbers, not more than ten miles beyond the limits of such alternate sections." 13 Stat. 368. Hence it was said in Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 154 U. S. 288, 320, in which case the act of 1864 was construed, that the privilege of exploring for mineral lands was in full force at the time of the location of the definite line of road, and was a right reserved and excepted out of the grant at that time. In this view of the soundness of which we entertain no doubt it would seem to be clear that the formal applications made in 1880 and 1881, under the statutes then and still in force, to purchase these lands as mineral lands, were "claims " within the meaning of the third section of the act of 1864. It was admitted by the demurrer that applicants made oath, before the proper officer, that they had discovered mineral thereon and had located the said quarter section as mineral land, and claimed the same as having valuable mineral deposits thereon. Upon the present record it cannot be said that those applications were not made in good faith. Whether the lands sought to be purchased as mineral lands were of that character was a matter for the determination, in the first instance, of the Land Department; and there was jurisdiction in that department to pass upon every question arising upon applications to purchase them as mineral lands. How then can it be said that such applications, filed and of record before the definite location of the road, were not "claims" within the meaning of the act of 1864? As the lands in question were not free from those claims at the time the plaintiff definitely located its line of road, it is of no consequence what Opinion of the Court. disposition was or has been made of the claims subsequent to that date. The only ground upon which a contrary view, can be rested is the provision in the sixth section of the act of 1864, that "the odd sections of land hereby granted shall not be liable to sale or entry or preëmption before or after they are surveyed, except by said company, as provided by this act." But this section is not to be construed without reference to other sections of the act. It must be taken in connection with section three, which manifestly contemplated that rights of preëmption or other claims and rights might accrue or become attached to the lands granted after the general route of the road was fixed and before the line of definite location was established. Literally interpreted, the words above quoted from section six would tie the hands of the Government so that even it could not sell any of the odd-numbered sections of the lands after the general route was fixed — an interpretation wholly inadmissible in view of the provisions in the third section. The third and sixth sections must be taken together, and so taken it must be adjudged that nothing in the sixth section prevented the Government from disposing of any of the lands prior to the fixing of the line of definite location, or, for the reasons stated, from receiving, under the existing statutes, applications to purchase such lands as mineral lands. Much was said at the bar as to the decision of this court in Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U. S. 55. On one side it is said that that case construes the sixth section of the act of 1864 as excluding the possibility of any right being acquired adversely to the railroad company to an oddnumbered section embraced by the exterior lines of the general route after that route had been established. On the other side it is contended that the only point necessary to be determined and the only one judicially determined in that case was that the defendant could not initiate a preëmption right to the land there in dispute so long as the Indian title referred to in the opinion was unextinguished. Without stopping to examine these contentions, it is sufficient to say that Syllabus. the Buttz case involved no inquiry as to the respective rights of the railroad company under the act of 1864, and of parties making applications in due form prior to the definite location. of its road to purchase lands as mineral lands that were within the exterior lines of its general route. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion in the Buttz case, and, speaking for the court in Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, above cited, stated that the grant in that act excepted the privilege of exploring for mineral lands. For the reasons stated, we adjudge that the lands in question were excluded from the grant of 1864 by reason of the pendency of record, at the time of the definite location of the plaintiff's road, of applications to purchase them as mineral lands, such applications being in the form prescribed by the acts of Congress that related to such lands, and undetermined when the company filed its map of definite location. The judgment below is Affirmed. WHITNEY v. FOX. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH. It is the ordinary rule to accept the interpretation given to a statute by the courts of the country by which it was originally adopted; but the rule is not an absolute one to be followed under all circumstances. In this case the court accepts the construction given by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah to a statute of that Territory disqualifying certain persons as witnesses, rather than the construction placed upon a like statute by the Supreme Court of California, although the Utah statute was apparently taken from the statute of California. Equity will sometimes refuse relief where a shorter time than that prescribed by the statute of limitations has elapsed without suit. It ought always to do so where, as in this case, the delay in the assertion of rights is not adequately explained, and such circumstances have intervened in the condition of the adverse party as to render it unjust to him or to his estate that a court of equity should assist the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff, seeking the aid of equity, forbore for an unreasonably long time |