17th. A. H. Robie is appointed quartermaster and commissary of subsistence at the Dalles. 18th. G. K. Willard to be surgeon and purveyor of medicine and medical stores at headquarters. 19th. M. P. Burns is appointed a surgeon in the 2d regiment, and ordered for duty with the central battalion. 20th. Dr. R. M. Bigelow, surgeon for the northern battalion. 21st. The officer commanding the southern battalion will appoint a surgeon for his command, and report his name to this office, that a commission may issue. 22d. Edward Furste is appointed chief clerk to the quartermaster and commissary general. 23d. James Roberts is appointed military clerk to the office of the commander-in-chief. 24th. In all service of combined volunteer and Indian military forces, the military officer will take command of the whole. 25th. All officers commanding are requested to make reports to this office as frequently as practicable. By order of the governor and commander-in-chief. JAMES TILTON, Adjutant General W. T. Volunteer Forces. HEADQUARTERS, Olympia, W. T., February 25, 1856. The Governor of Washington to the Secretary of War. EXECUTIVE OFFICE, TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON, SIR: In my two reports, of February 19 and March 9, I laid before the department the circumstances of my return from the Blackfeet country, the condition of the Territory, and the measures taken by me to call out volunteers and to apply them to the prosecution of the war. I now propose to lay before the department a full view of the whole matter, and to indicate the measures which, in my judgment, are still necessary to protect these distant settlements, and to inflict that summary chastisement upon the Indians demanded both by their unprovoked atrocities and the permanent peace of the country. I have caused two maps to be prepared; one of the country west of the Cascades, showing the points now occupied by that portion of the friendly Indians who, for five months, have been under the charge of local agents; the lines occupied by the regular troops now in the field under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Casey; the point occupied by the naval forces; the lines occupied by the volunteer forces now in the field; the block houses occupied by our citizens; the lines of supplies; the depots for their protection; the country occupied by the hostiles; the lines over which reinforcements can come to them from east of the Cascades; and one of the country east of the Cascades, showing the tribes, the lines of communication, and the points at the latest advices occupied by the hostiles. The number of souls and of warriors will be shown on this map. A glance at the first map will show that the citizens of the Territory have, for the protection of their families, and to get in and harvest their crops, and in connexion with the military service of the Territory, built some thirty-three block houses and depots. Of these some are large establishments. Fort Henniss, in Mound prairie, is a large stockade, with block houses at the alternate corners, with buildings inside affording shelter to all the families of that flourishing settlement. At Nathan Eaton's the defences consist of sixteen log buildings in a square, facing inwards, the object being not only to collect the families for protection, but to send out a scouting party of some fifteen men when marauders are in the vicinity. This point is within four miles of the Nisqually bottom, which was the headquarters for four weeks of a band of hostiles, and is central to many Indian trails. On Skocham bay there is an establishment of the same character, and nearly as large as Fort Henniss. The latter was built by one of the volunteer companies of the new levies, but the former entirely by the citizens, without any aid from the territorial authorities. The settlements are now so secured by block houses that the citizens will hold them, even should every Indian in the Sound become hostile, and be reinforced by large bands from the north. The whole country on the eastern shore of the Sound, from the Shookum creek to Snow-how-mish, is a war ground. No friendly Indian is allowed there except he has a pass from an authorized agent stating his specific business, or he be connected with the military and naval service. Two parties of Indian auxiliaries are now in the field, besides which, quite a number of Indians are employed as spies, guides, and in canoe service. I will now give you a condensed view of the present condition of the military operations on the sound. 1. The regular troops now occupy the Muckleshoot prairie as their central position. The line of communication to Steilacoom is secured by a block house and ferry at the crossing of the Puyallup. A company has been sent to Seattle to move up the Duamish and open a communication with the central position. A block house will be established at the mouth of Cedar creek, and probably one at John Thomas'. The force under Lieutenant Colonel Casey has been very active, and this gallant officer has made the most favorable impression upon our people. 2. The naval forces occupy Seattle. This place is also held by a company of volunteers, who, for some days, have been under orders to occupy the line of the Dunamish, and who, in that duty, will cooperate with the company sent there by Lieutenant Colonel Casey. 3. The northern battalion have their headquarters at Fort Tilton, near the falls of the Sno-qual-mie They number about ninety white men, and about the same number of friendly Indians, under Pat Kannim. They will establish block houses in the prairie above the falls and on Cedar creek, and will extend their scouts to the Muckleshoot and Dunamish. 4. To circumscribe the field occupied by the enemy, I have suggested to Captain Swartwout, in command of the naval forces, a joint operation upon the lake back of Seattle, a block house to be built on the lake at the nearest point to Seattle, a good road opened with Seattle, and boats from the navy, with one hundred men, to be placed on the lake. Captain Swartwout does not, however, by his instructions, feel authorized either to co-operate with the military authorities of the Territory, or to take part in any operation carrying his force away from the immediate shore of the Sound. I enclose a copy of my letter to Captain Swartwout and of his reply thereto. 5. The central battalion have their headquarters at Cornell's prairie and at Porter's. The communication with the rear is received by a block house and ferry, at the crossing of the Puyallup, and block houses at Montgomery's, at the Yellem Prairie, at Nathan Eaton's, and Jones'. This battalion numbers in the field, including the garrison of Yellem and Montgomery's and the crossing of the Puyallup, about 150 men. 6. Our supplies are drawn mainly from the country between this point and the Cowlitz landing. The route is well secured by block houses. 7. Lone Tree Point is also held by a volunteer force of ten men. It guards several important trails. 8. Bellingham Bay has its block house defended by fifteen men of Captain Peabody's company. 9. The southern battalion, on its arrival on the Sound, will be for the most part dismounted and sent to reinforce the central battalion. The two battalions will then operate up White river, towards the Nachess pass, co-operating with Lieutenant Colonel Casey. The map of the country east of the Cascades will show the large number of Indians already hostile, or who may be incited to hostility, the ease with which they may communicate with each other, the great number of excellent trails, the large extent of country embraced in the theatre of operations, and the facility with which reinforcements can be sent over the Cascades. Hence the importance of the most vigorous and decisive blows to get possession of the whole country east of the Sound, now invested with the savages, and to hold in our hands the routes over the Cascades, before they become practicable in May, and hence the necessity of the most vigorous measures east of the Cascades, in order that the Indians may be simultaneously struck in the Yakima country. It is probable that the hostile Indians rather exceed the minimum estimate of two hundred men, as stated in my memoir to General Wool, a copy of which has been sent to the department, but I do not think they will be found to exceed three hundred men. Their headquarters have been on the Muckleshoot prairie, now occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Casey, and now they have moved up either White or Green river. But there are bands also on the lake back of Seattle, and probably of Cedar creek. The map will show that the hostiles are only within a few hours distance of every reservation. There are many trails known only to Ex. Doc. 66-3 the Indians, and it will not be possible, in any contingency, entirely to prevent communication. From the hostile camps marauding parties can steal out, and turning the heads of the Puyallup and Nisqually, they can, in from six to twelve hours, strike any settlement from Steilacoom to the Cowlitz landing. More than this, there are places where they can on this line of settlements establish themselves, and for many days defy all our efforts to drive them out. Consider the face of the country, prairies and heavy timber, and many streams, almost impenetrable brushwood on the banks, and heavy drift along either shore, there is not a road or trail of twenty miles in the whole Sound country which does not afford one or more excellent ambuscades. Between this place and Cowlitz landing are two Indian reservations. The Chehales and Cowlitz. The former can easily be incited to hostility and they number a little more than one hundred warriors. We know of some three or four men who are endeavoring to stir up the tribe to war. My plan has been to get up a small auxiliary force of some fifteen of the best men of the tribe, who make scouts every few days towards the head of the Shookum-chuck. It has been found to work well. The difficulty is, that if the men of the tribe, believed to be in alliance with "Leschi," were summarily disposed of, the whole tribe would break out. We have no positive evidence, except the impression of their commander, Captain Ford, who is of opinion, that in his last trip ten of the men tried to kill him. He has great daring and presence of mind, and he believes he can prevent an outbreak. So of the reservation opposite Olympia, Lieutenant Gosnell has made one scout in the Nisqually bottom of ten days, with fourteen Indians. Yesterday morning he started out on a scout of three days, with thirty Indians. The effect of the first scout was salutary. Such will, I doubt not, be the effect of the second. Yet on the first scout Lieutenant Gosnell went with his life in his hands. Some of his Indians were more than suspected, and he went with them alone. The most melancholy feature of this war is that the Indians who have taken the lead in murdering our men, our women, and our children were those who have received the most favors from the whites, and were held by them in the most consideration. Many cases have occurred of Indians killing their friends and benefactors. Are you surprised that a general distrust of all Indians pervades the public mind? Therefore, consider the task which has been imposed upon the territorial authorities, to see to it that the Indians not taking part with the hostiles are treated as friends. In short, the whole country is a frontier, within a few hours of the camp of the hostile Indians, and with four thousand friendly Indians in our midst, of whose faith we cannot be certain. Our safety lies in two things: first, to carry the war against the hostiles with the whole force of the Territory, and to bring them to unconditional submission; and, second, to give no cause of offence to the friendly Indians, even in the cases of persons more than suspected. You have served in an Indian country, and know something of In dian modes of thinking, and can appreciate that, when, in a contest like this, troops have once entered the field, they must not be withdrawn till they have accomplished the object for which they were sent into the field. There must be no changes of plan. We must push forward and do the work we have undertaken, else the Indian will say he has driven us from the field, and thereby get large accessions from tribes who otherwise would continue friendly. General Wool has recently visited this Sound, and, with a full knowledge of the course taken by me in calling out the volunteers of the Territory, of the cordial spirit of co-operation between Lieutenant Colonel Casey and myself, and of the fact that the volunteers were actually in the field engaging the enemy, has ignored effectually the necessity of this, but has practically admitted it in directing Colonel Casey to make a requisition upon me for two companies of volunteers. This requisition I have refused to comply with, for reasons which will be found in my letter to Colonel Casey and Major General Wool, herewith enclosed. Those reasons, it seems to me, are conclusive, and they show the necessity of removing from the command of the department of the Pacific a man who has by his acts, so far as this Territory is concerned, shown an utter incapacity. I will most respectfully call your attention to my letter to General Wool, and to his letter to which mine was an answer, and I simply ask that justice may be done between us. So long as I am the governor of Washington, and till I receive instructions from my superiors, I shall pass on in the path indicated in that letter to General Wool. I beg leave respectfully to recapitulate, briefly, the points of differ ence. 1. General Wool states that the movement of the Oregon volunteers was entirely unnecessary, and precipitated the Walla-Walla and other tribes into hostility. I assert that this movement probably saved my party from destruction, and that the Indians then hostile had been so even before the Oregon volunteers moved against them. 2. General Wool states that Governor Curry had no right to move his troops into the Territory of Washington. I assert, and have shown, that the Oregon volunteers fought the Indians mainly of Oregon, and that, near the confines of the two Territories. 3. General Wool states, that if the Oregon volunteers are withdrawn, he will have no trouble in managing affairs and keeping the Nez Percés friendly. I state, officially, to General Wool and to the department, that the Nez Percés are in my hands, and that without an armed man I will undertake to keep the Nez Percés friendly, if General Wool does not interfere with me in the management of these Indians. But I also state that General Wool, in addition to his regular force, will require the best efforts of the Oregon volunteers, to strike such blows this spring and summer as will protect the settlements. He can do nothing more. |