also good, and there is a large quantity of pine. The pine on the Palouse is found eighteen miles from its mouth.

From the Palouse to the Columbia, north of the Snake, the country is not so favorable; there is not much wood, nor much running water, and the grass is of inferior quality. There is nothing but drift wood on the Snake, enough, however, for camping purposes. There is nothing but drift wood on the Columbia till you reach the mouth of the Wee-nat-chap-pam, where the pine commences.

From the mouth of the Palouse, and from the several crossings above, there is no difficulty in moving to the Spokane country all through the winter. The grass is uniformly good, there is abundant pine in the Spokane, and there will be wood for fuel at all the intermediate camps on all the routes.

The information here given so minutely is wholly the result of personal examination, and I can vouch for the accuracy of it all.

I send you a map of the country from the Cascades to the Bitter Root mountains, showing the Indian tribes, their numbers, their warriors, the points those hostile are now believed to occupy, the several routes for the movement of troops, points for depot camps, where there is abundant grass and abundant pine within reach, the several crossings of Snake river, and the winter snow line, over which the Indians cannot cross when pursued by troops, and the line within which troops can operate all through the winter.

I will respectfully recommend that you urge forward your preparations with all possible dispatch, get all your disposable force in this valley in all of January, establish a large depot camp here, occupy Fort Walla-Walla, and be ready early in February to take the field. February is generally a mild and open month. February and March are the favorable months for operating. All the Indians are destitute of food, the rivers are easy to cross, the mountain passes are closed. In April the Indians can retreat in the Pearl d'Oreille route eastward of the mountains. In May the Coeur d'Alênes route is also open. The streams are swollen, and the salmon begin to run. June roots are abundant, and the streams most difficult to cross. If operations be vigorously prosecuted in February and March, there is little probability of any of the tribes now peaceable taking part in the war. This is the conclusion to which I was brought by the recent council held by me with the Indian tribes on the Spokane.

I do not entertain the idea that all operations can be brought to a close in these two months. The strength of the combination can, however, be broken, but the country should be held all through the ensuing year.

As to transportation, I would urge that a line of barges be established on the Columbia; that supplies be hauled in wagons from the Dalles to the mouth of the De Chutes, and thence by water to Fort Walla-Walla, then to the Yakima country, (the Mission;) to the crossing at the mouth of the Palouse, and to any point which may be selected in this valley as a depot camp, supplies can be hauled in wagons. The roads are all good.

When operations are extended to north of the Snake, and the north

bank is held, a new depot camp can be established, and the water line extended.

The Hudson Bay barge should be adopted, only be increased in size. The barge most commonly in use carries 6,000 pounds and requires seven men. But the great difficulty in the river is at the falls, at the mouth of the De Chutes river, which is avoided by hauling in wagons to above that point. A barge could be constructed which would carry 12,000 pounds, require eight men, and make two round trips a month from the De Chutes to Fort Walla-Walla. Supplies for 500 men, say four pounds per day, including clothing, ammunition, &c., and forage for 500 animals, 12 pounds a day, each animal, would require 10 of these barges, 80 men, about ten (10) three-yoke ox teams, running from the Dalles to the De Chutes. An ox team could not make more than three round trips from the Dalles to Fort Walla-Walla, in two months, and this would be more than ought reasonably to be expected. To transport the above amount of supplies and forage in wagons would require 100 ox teams and 100 men. Unless foraged on the road, oxen, after making one round trip, must have rest, and a large number of spare oxen must be at hand at both ends of the line to keep the teams constantly in motion. It will probably be very difficult to get early into the field so large a train; a pack train will be still more expensive, and it will be wanted in advance. Supplies, in my judgment, will mostly have to be transported from the depot in this valley by pack trains.

The Hudson Bay people at Fort Vancouver can put their hands on the men who understand making these barges. I estimate that five barges could be built at Portland and be in readiness for their loads at the mouth of the De Chutes in 20 days, and five more in 30 days. It is a small affair to make them.

I derive my information in regard to the barges from Mr. Sinclair, of the Hudson Bay Company, a gentleman of sound judgment and large experience, and most favorably known to all the citizens of the Columbia valley.

I believe it is practicable to run stern-wheel steamers from the mouth of the De Chutes to above Walla-Walla, and as far as the Priests' rapids; but time will be required to get a suitable one on the route, and to establish wood yards. There is nothing but drift wood on the immediate banks of the Columbia, below the mouth of the Wee-natchap-pan. I would respectfully urge, however, that your early attention be given to the matter.

The plan of campaign which occurs to me as feasible is as follows: Occupy the Walla-Walla valley in January; establish a large depot camp on the Touchet; hold Fort Walla-Walla; get up supplies by a line of barges on the Columbia; have an advance post on the Tucanon, and pickets at the crossings at the Palouse and opposite the bend of the Tucanon. This disposition of the troops will make you master of the Walla-Walla valley, give you the control of the country of the Snake, and enable you to get information of the enemy. In February cross the Snake, attack the enemy on the Palouse, establish a depot camp at the first wood, extend the line of barges up the Snake to the Palouse, and push forward a column to below Okinahane.

These operations will probably drive all the hostile Indians into the Yakima country, west of the Columbia river; when more down the Columbia, cross into the Yakima country and put the enemy to his last battle. He cannot cross the mountains till May, and all the troops left behind at Fort Walla-Walla and at depot camps, except indispensable guards, marched up seasonably from Fort Walla-Walla by the line of the Yakima river, would, with the movement of the column from north of the Snake, drive him into a corner, from which he could not easily escape.

There will be no difficulty whatever in making the crossing of the Snake. To the upper crossings canoes could be brought from the Nez Percés country. For the Palouse crossing, with a few tools, boats could be made in a few days, on the Touchet, and be transported thither on wheels. My India rubber boats for the Indian service were unfortunately cut to pieces by the Indians, at Fort Walla-Walla. During the winter months the rivers are low.

The question occurs, is the plan compatible with the force at your command?

In my judgment, 300 to 400 effective troops will signally defeat any force which the enemy could bring together from the tribes now hostile. In my plan of operations at Fort Walla-Walla, at the depot camp of the valley, and to hold the river crossings, 200 men would be required. If a smaller force were left, it might tempt the Yakimas, under Kam-a-a-hum, to move rapidly into his own country, if not already there, cross the Columbia below the mouth of the Snake, steal all the animals, and break up the communications. If very much reduced, he might successfully attempt an attack upon the troops. With 200 men, I do not think he would attempt anything on this side of the Columbia. The barges in brigade of five each, manned. by 40 men, I do not think, with a small force on the Umatilla, would be in danger of attack. They could destroy all the canoes, and take from the enemy the means of crossing the river below Walla-Walla.

In the advance movement on the Palouse there should be five hundred men. This whole force will be disposable for the first blow on the Palouse; 200 men will hold the line of the Snake, and 300 will be left for the advance movement on the Columbia, below Okinahane. When the enemy is driven into the Yakima country, from the depot camps north and south of the Snake, a strong column can be thrown across the Columbia at the mouth of the Snake, say 200 men, which, with 150 from this column moving towards Okinahane, will give 350 men. I would advise that 150 men of that column be left to cut off retreat in any attempt to recross the river.

In this plan of the campaign, the troops are interposed between the hostile tribes and the friendly ones, and they are brought to a final stand, where there is scarcely a possibility of escape. If the Yakima country were held simultaneously with this valley and with operations upon the Palouse, it might drive the enemy upon the Spokane, and thus cause them to embark in the war. The holding of the Yakima country would, however, effectually protect the line of the Columbia, and render it unnecessary to leave so large a force in this valley. But this plan would require more troops than the other.

By the Walla-Walla valley on this paper, I mean the whole country in the re-entering of the Snake.

With a small force on the Umatilla, and the troops required at the Dalles, 800 effective men will be required, and making allowances for the sick list and for casualties, 1,000 men should be in the field. There are here, or are on their way, 500 volunteers from Oregon; I hear that you have, or will soon have, 500 to 600 regulars.

The volunteers with me have been mustered into the service of the Territory for a specific duty, and will be discharged when I go down to the Dalles. On the Spokane, I was able to learn nothing of the plan of the campaign, and only knew that Kam-i-a-hum, with all his forces, was believed to be on the Spokane side of the Columbia, and that the Cayuses and Walla-Wallas were assembled, some 600 warriors, in the Walla-Walla valley. I expected at that time to be obliged to force my way through this body with my small force of less, at that time, than 50 men, and the Nez Percés to the Dalles. The Nez Percés chiefs, who accompanied me from the Blackfeet council, tendered to me the services of 150 fighting men of the nation, and it was not till I had been some hours with them in council, in their own country, making the necessary arrangements, that I learned of the defeat of these tribes, and that the road was opened. I took with me, however, some 70 Nez Percés, well armed, besides young men, to herd and guard our animals.

OLYMPIA, W. T., January 29, 1856.

The above was written to be dispatched by an express to you at Vancouver. I concluded, however, to come in person, and reached Vancouver the day of your departure from Portland to San Francisco.

I have since my return carefully examined the condition of affairs in the Sound, have visited nearly every point, and informed myself thoroughly of our necessities.

We are now feeding 4,000 Indians on the Sound alone; a band of hostiles, numbering from 200 to 400 are in the field. The whole country is opened to attack from them and the northern Indians. All our people are living in block houses. The town of Seattle was attacked on the 26th instant, and the families compelled to go on shipboard. The whole of King county has been devastated, and the inhabitants driven within the line of defences of the town of Seattle. We need at least six hundred troops to cope with the enemy, and the war will, I fear, from the nature of the country, be a protracted one.

In conclusion, it is due to frankness that I should state that I have determined to submit to the department the course taken by the military authorities in the Territory of Washington for my relief. No effort was made, although the facts were presented both to Major General Wool and Major Rains to send me assistance. The regular troops were all withdrawn into garrison, and I was left to make my way the best I could through tribes known to be hostile. It remains to be seen whether the commissioner selected by the President to make treaties with the Indians in the interior of the continent is to be ignored, and his safety left to chance.

I had no fear of my own safety, but the facts in the settlements

did not warrant such belief. I simply, with 50 odd men and 150 Nez Percés, would have been compelled to fight 600 Indians in the WallaWalla valley had it not been for the operations of the Oregon volunteers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General JOHN E. WOOL,

ISAAC I. STEVENS, Governor Territory of Washington.

Commanding Pacific Division, Vancouver, W. T.

N. B. The map is not quite ready. I will send it to the post at Vancouver.

Extract of a letter from Governor Stevens to Colonel Wright, February 6, 1856.

In view of the lateness of the season, my views, as stated in my memoir to General Wool, and a copy of which I have sent to you, are modified as follows:

1. Operate simultaneously in the Yakima country, and north of the Snake river.

2. Send at least two companies of the troops now at Vancouver to the Sound.

The volunteers on the Sound will be in the field this week, but the force will be small, and unless operations are prosecuted with great promptness and energy, we have reason to apprehend that many of the Indians now friendly will become hostile.

I will urge you to push two companies to the Sound without delay, and to push your troops against the Indians east of the Cascades.

Message of the governor of the Territory of Washington, delivered in joint session of the council and house of representatives of Washington Territory, Friday, December 7, 1854.

Fellow-citizens of the Legislative Assembly:

In the absence of the executive, I have the honor to respond to your call. To the people of this Territory, and to me especially, that absence is, at this time, particularly to be regretted, for the present juncture of affairs requires all the experience, ability, and energy so justly conceded to the distinguished gentleman who has the honor to preside over this Territory, and whose duties in such absence by law devolves upon the Secretary of the Territory. With real sincerity I will assert that many and grave doubts have arisen in my mind as to my ability to discharge the weighty and responsible duties incident to, and arising out of, our present Indian relations; but, with a firm