rity to the contrary, I ventured to state (1), that, in the language of Grotius, "placuit gentibus" that this crime against the human race shall no longer be sheltered by International Law. "For myself," (said President Lincoln in 1864), " I have no doubt "of the power and duty of the Executive, under the "law of nations, to exclude enemies of the human race "from an asylum in the United States. If Conแ gress should think that proceedings in such cases. "lack the authority of law, or ought to be further regulated by it, I recommend that provision be "made for effectually preventing foreign slave-traders "from acquiring domicile and facilities for their "criminal occupation in our country" (m). 66 The same President had observed in his annual Address for 1863: "The supplemental Treaty be"tween the United States and Great Britain for the "suppression of African slave trade, made on the "17th day of February last, has been duly ratified "and carried into execution. It is believed that, so "far as American ports and American citizens are "concerned, that inhuman and odious traffic has been brought to an end" (n). 66 XVI. The causes of the War between England and China in 1856 underwent a full and elaborate discussion in both Houses of Parliament. The House of Lords approved, the House of Commons condemned, the war. The portions of this memorable debate which will chiefly interest the International Lawyer are those which relate to the criteria by which the (1) Chapter xvii. (m) Ann. Reg. 1864, p. 289. national character of a merchant vessel is to be ascertained, and to the distinction between Reprisals and War. XVII. The Annexation of the Kingdom of Oude to the British dominions depends for its justification upon the right application of the doctrines laid down in this volume respecting the Rights of Acquisition (0) and of Intervention (p), partly also on the Law of Treaties discussed in the second volume (q). XVIII. The Convention (proposed 14th of October, 1854, confirmed 18th of October, 1855) of Nagaski, between England and Japan, is not an unimportant extension of International relations to a part of the globe from which they have been hitherto practically excluded. By that Convention, certain ports are opened for certain purposes to British ships, and the jurisdiction of British authorities over British subjects in Japanese ports is retained and ships of war, in the necessary performance of their duties, have a general right to enter all the ports of Japan; but, unless compelled by necessity, they, like the merchant ships, are confined to certain ports named in the Convention (r). XIX. The CONDUCT, and still more the CONCLUSION, of the last war with Russia must always be memorable to the historian or the writer on International Law. (0) Pt. iii. ch. xii. (p) Pt. iv. ch. i. (9) See remarks as to International Law between Christian and Heathen civilized States, pp. 22-6. The instrument of Annexation is printed in the Appendix. (r) Correspondence respecting the late negotiations with Japan, laid before Parliament, 1856. In the former, Great Britain waived (s), in the latter she abandoned, one of the most certain and highly valued Belligerent Rights, namely, the right of confiscating enemies' goods found on board neutral vessels (t). The mode of abandoning this right was little less remarkable than the abandonment itself. The abandonment of that Right was not formally incorporated in the provisions of a Treaty, but was stated in a Declaration accompanying the Treaty, with the objects of which, however, it had no natural connection. This anomalous Declaration, whatever may be its binding effect, was signed by most of the European States, but not by the State the most interested, and, next to Great Britain, the best acquainted with the subject-the United States of North America. On the contrary, but a few months afterwards (u) this State formally declined-as it was perfectly competent to her to do-to sanction the general principle of abandoning Privateering, that is, of carrying on war by the aid of the individual exertions of the Subject as well as of the Government,-unless, indeed, the same Powers would agree to a Treaty securing the free navigation of the sea to all merchant vessels whatsoever. This is not the place in which the expediency of the abandonment of this great maritime Right of the Belligerent can be fully discussed; but it may be observed, that a defence which has been put forth, namely, that nations are defeated by fleets and armies, (s) Vol. iii. pt. ix. ch. x. (u) August 1856. and not by attacks upon their commerce, does not appear to be either very well founded in history or well supported by reason. It is obvious that the food and the means which procure the food of your enemy are as valuable to him, to say the least, as his weapons or his ships. It is no less obvious that wars are always shortened, and frequently ended, by the privations of the Subjects of the Belligerent, whether by interruption of commerce, or by the blockade, or the siege. These privations of the Subjects, the inquiries which they sharpen, and the demands which they beget, are the natural correctives of the ambition and passion of Rulers. It is, moreover, surely plain, that the Neutral who is the carrier of the commerce of the Belligerent, enables him to convert his commercial into his military marine, and greatly to increase and strengthen the latter. Nor is it a light objection that a state of things is produced, in which the Governments of States are at war while their Subjects are at peace. Lately, indeed, it has been suggested, that the commerce of Bellige rents should continue to be carried on in War as in Peace; that being the condition on which the United States of North America offer to abandon the right of Privateering. Let it, however, be remembered, that to redress a present injury, to take security against a future transgression, are the only legitimate causes of war; and that in such cases, toto certatum "est corpore regni." The continuance of commercial intercourse between the subjects of the offended and the offending nation is, as a matter of Public Law, แ utterly destructive of the first notion of allegiance on the part of subjects to their respective sovereigns: and as a matter of International Law, the proposition that the will of the subject is, so far as other States are concerned, bound up in the will of his Government, is a proposition of the most vital importance to the due administration of International Law, and to the peace of the world. After all, it remains a very serious question whether the tendency of these exemptions is not to prolong hostilities, to protract the horrors of war: are they not, in truth, devices for making war perpetual rather than real mitigations of its attendant calamities? "If we were to go to war with the United States "of North America it would not much matter, we "could carry on our trade all the same," was the language of a merchant to the author when this fundamental change in the principles of Public and International Law was proposed. Such a remark bore true testimony to the fact that, by this fundamental change, one great check imposed upon the hasty beginning of this terrible scourge is removed; and the same observation applies, with at least equal force, to its continuance. How many wars have been, in fact, ended by the sufferings which their duration inflicted upon the subjects of the Belligerents? or rather, who, looking back into history, can fix a probable period of termination to many wars kindled by the passions of Nations or of their Governors, if the commerce of the Belligerents had remained unaffected? or if the famous, but perhaps legendary, precedent of the two Dutch admirals-who, commanding antagonistic fleets, sold powder to each other, |